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Abstract
Although participatory budgeting (PB) was introduced in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2005, it
has yet to be widely adopted. While PB has great potential to enhance citizen
participation in the democratic process, little academic research has focused on the utility
of PB as a mechanism for citizen empowerment in the region. The purpose of this case
study was to gain further understanding of the role of civil society in educating and
empowering the citizens of Ijede LCDA in Lagos State, Nigeria to participate effectively
in budgetary decision-making processes. The data were gathered from 15 semistructured, one-on-one interviews of purposefully selected participants that included adult
citizens of Ijede, government officials, politicians, and representatives of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) connected to the budget process, two follow-up
focus groups with participants, and analysis of government budgetary documents. Using
Avritzer’s theory of participatory institutions as the foundation, the study explored
stakeholder perceptions of how citizens can be effectively educated and empowered to
participate in the PB process. The data revealed the fragility of PB when local
government officials suspended the process because other financial demands were
considered more expedient than PB, a situation made possible in the absence of a legal
framework institutionalizing the process. Another major theme uncovered is that PB must
engage community-based organizations to be effective. Positive social change in the form
of enhanced citizen participation in the political process can come about in Nigeria if PB
is implemented under an institutionalized legal framework that guarantees sustainability.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
As a political institution in Nigeria, participatory budgeting (PB) has not attracted
sufficient interest among the socially disadvantaged who stand to benefit the most from
being involved in political discourses (Osmani, 2007). The decision-making processes in
the region, most of which are under democratically elected governments, exclude the
involvement of several classes of citizens whose lives the decisions affect (Bratton,
2012). The political class appears unconcerned about such excluded citizens. They
consider such individuals as commoners and unintelligent, lacking in the sophistication of
governance, and unworthy of the power to make public policy decisions (Bratton, 2012;
Leduka, 2009).
Participatory democracy has grown in recent times, especially because of the PB
experience of Porto Alegre, Brazil. In the 1980s, the opposition of civil society in Brazil
to years of military rule was the formation of the formation of political movements,
which metamorphosed into political parties such as the Worker’s Party, and the Brazilian
Democratic Movement. In 1985, democratic governance returned the new parliament
passed a constitution guarantying citizen access to health care, education and housing
(Avritzer, 2009; Wampler, 2012a). Under the government guaranteed access to social
services, federal, state and municipal administrations began experimenting with various
processes that permit citizen participation in public policy decision-making. The
Worker’s Party introduced PB to allocate resources to Brazil’s low-income communities
and to orientate citizens towards active democratic participation (Avritzer, 2010;
Wampler, 2012a).
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Participatory democracy redirects power away from the highest level of
governance and presents new opportunities for those at the bottom of the social ladder to
have a say in governance. It does this because it is a bottom-up approach to democratic
governance that places control in the hands of ordinary citizens (Roussopoulos, 2005).
Participatory budgeting is an annual process that allows citizens in organized groups to
participate voluntarily in decision-making concerning parts of local budgets. It has
proven to be the quintessential example of participatory democracy (Pateman, 2012).
The World Bank and the United Nations have promoted PB, which has become a
universal phenomenon present in hundreds of cities and local governments around the
world (The World Bank, n.d.; United Nations Democracy Fund, 2014). All citizens,
especially the grassroots and the poor who are remote from political leadership, should
have decision-making opportunities in matters that influence their lives.
The federal government of Nigeria, prompted by the United Nations, encouraged
local governments to begin experimenting with PB (DESA, 2005). The experimentation
represents an excellent opportunity in the subfield of participatory democracy to explore
an emerging research area concerning the factors that best facilitate public involvement
and best practices in the PB process (Avritzer, 2010; Goldfrank, 2007; Wampler, 2012a).
This study leverages this opportunity by undertaking a case study of PB in Ijede Local
Development Area (LCDA) of Lagos State, Nigeria.
The study explored the role of civil society and government in fostering the skills
and resources necessary to encourage grassroots participation via PB. Without such
skills, citizens are unable to engage the government to negotiate their interests on issues
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that affect their lives. This is of particular importance for the relevance of governance to
ordinary citizens.
Citizens determine the projects to be executed under PB because they know what
they want, being the direct beneficiaries of the decisions in which they participate. The
ultimate benefit to the citizenry is that politicians give priority to the desires of the
people, as the ruling class does not determine matters for the people. To this end, the
people inspire government projects that meet their needs. Having ordinary citizens decide
on project priorities makes governance directly relevant to meet the peoples’ needs. In
Nigeria, there is a gulf between the government and the governed, which could be
bridged through a democratic institution such as PB.
In the next section of this introductory chapter, the background of this study on
PB, and its roots in participatory democracy as exemplified through PB are examined.
Following this, I present the research problem that this study interrogates and follow the
examination with the explanation of the research methodology for the study. Next, I
present my research questions with the theoretical and conceptual frameworks, which
drive this academic analysis. In the final section, I narrate the potential contributions of
this study to the body of knowledge in participatory democracy and PB.
Background of the Study
To achieve the overarching objectives of PB, citizens need to play key roles of
providing grassroots information emerging from the community and generating native,
intuitive ideas to the government for the enactment of public policies in the best interest
of the public (Michels & de Graaf, 2010). Thus, the citizens serve as informants to the
government on important decisions that affect their daily lives.
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In their study of PB in the Netherlands, Michels and de Graaf (2010) suggested
that participatory democracy might be less successful in developed economies where
representative democracies have been established for several centuries. In contrast with
older democracies, Avritzer (2010) posited that because of PB, participatory democracy
has recorded impressive success in Brazilian cities, especially Porto Alegre. Michels and
de Graaf (2010) and Donaghy (2010) observed that voting pattern and numbers at general
elections neither tell the whole story of protestations of citizens nor express judgment
they pass on policy issues. After elections, there is the general feeling of apathy among
the electorates, causing a gradual erosion of grassroots interest and reduced voter turnouts
at elections from year to year. In response to this state of apathy, governments, with the
encouragement from the United Nations and the World Bank, have turned to
participatory democracy through PB.
Participatory budgeting encourages participation of the electorate at the local level
in decision-making on issues of direct concern to their daily economic and social lives
(Avritzer, 2010; Dobson, 2005; Michels & de Graaf, 2010). Avritzer observed that with
PB, the grassroots of Brazil gained some control of and access to public services.
Participatory budgeting provided the forum at which the government and the citizens
interacted to undertake significant socio-economic decisions. As Donaghy (2010)
observed, the grassroots developed active influence once they had shared points of
interest around which they could organize themselves to present their needs to the
government. Consequently, the people learned the democratic process by engaging in
various purposeful and deliberate actions that constitute their democratic activities and
responsibilities. By so doing, the citizens demand transparency and accountability from
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the political class, acting as the watchdog against the excesses of government officials.
The people reciprocate the ceding of some political space by paying taxes, because they
know such government revenues would be put to judicious use for which there would be
proper accountability.
In Brazil, civil society, which included NGOs, neighborhood associations,
business communities and professional organizations, formed social structures that
supported participation (Avritzer, 2010; Donaghy, 2010). Through the social structures,
the citizens learned to engage in the social discourses, which provided the springboard for
informed participation in decision-making processes. The system of political education
by doing and practicing democracy encouraged the people to recognize the importance of
their input and the protection of their stake in the government. Through the process of
learning, the citizens defied the belief that the grassroots lacked the sophistication to
comprehend the rudiments of governance and the confidence to get involved in political
processes as participants (Avritzer, 2010; Michels & de Graaf, 2010).
The training provided by NGOs contributed in no small way to the development
of novice grassroots organizations, which acquired the necessary skills to become
politically perceptive participants (Avritzer, 2010; Michels & de Graaf, 2010). As
Acharya, Lavalle, and Houtzager (2004) found, community-based associations are more
likely to participate effectively in local issues than advocacy NGOs, most of which fail to
empower the people with the skills necessary for participation. As Michels and de Graaf
(2010) observed, politicians recognized the knowledge and ideas that the grassroots
contribute to public policy discourses, most of which the politicians considered and
implemented.
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Participatory budgeting has been successful because elected officials yielded
some control over political decisions to the grassroots, by providing the necessary legal
framework that institutionalized the process (Wampler & Hartz-Karp, 2012).
Furthermore, civil society and community leaders recognized the need to organize the
citizens at the lowest levels of human assembly for the opportunity to be part of the
decision-making machinery of the government (Avritzer, 2010).
The findings of Acharya et al. (2004) set the backdrop for this postulation but
pointed out that civil society organizations (CSOs) such as the NGOs tend to be
“institutionally embedded actors” that are closer to the government than with those they
are set out to represent (p. 41). Bherer (2010) held that the state could change the status
quo and empower the economically disadvantaged by strengthening neighborhood civic
groups. Participatory budgeting created avenues for social groups, hitherto excluded from
decision-making, to get involved in public decision-making (Acharya, Lavalle, &
Houtzager, 2004).
As in any corrupt environment, the poorest people in Nigeria suffer most from the
repercussions of corruption. Corruption eliminates, or at best, weakens the social supports
for the poor and deprives them of the knowledge, skills, and abilities to confront the
ravaging effects of corruption (Essia & Yearoo, 2009). Dobson (2005) posited that
without a voice or representation from their socioeconomic groups, the grassroots are an
excluded group in most democracies. However, when the grassroots get involved with a
participatory process, corrupt practices are noticeable to the grassroots, leaving political
officials to submit to embracing governance that is more transparent. Bherer (2010)
posited that participatory mechanisms create opportunities for the government and the
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civil society to dialog and collaborate, but without excluding the rights of civil society to
protest. Civil society organizations could be critical of the state without being
confrontational, but they could form partnerships with the state for the benefit of the
community as a whole (Essia & Yearoo, 2009). It is possible for average people to learn
governance by participation as the educational benefits make for a population with a high
sense of civic responsibility (Bherer, 2010). A sign of the link between policymakers and
the poor in the society is visible when citizens can hold politicians accountable for public
spending and other issues that affect the poor and the vulnerable in the society.
There have been few studies on the educational content of the training civil
society provides or should offer grassroots populations to allow them to participate in a
meaningful way in PB in sub-Saharan countries (Conyers, 2007; Dobson, 2005; Leduka,
2009; Matovu & Mumvuma, 2008). Furthermore, there are very few published research
materials in the professional literature about PB in Nigeria. Adesopo (2011) is one
author who has addressed PB in Nigeria. Through the literature on PB, Adesopo
identified some difficulties that are likely to confront the process in Nigeria. These
inhibitors include the lack of understanding on the part of stakeholders of how democracy
works, misunderstanding about the functions and obligations of stakeholders. Other
inhibitors include poor oversight and evaluation of projects, transparency and
accountability issues, poor communication, and inadequate resources.
The article fell short of identifying ways to overcome these shortcomings in the
context of the Nigerian space. It is necessary to examine the presence of these gaps in the
particular case of Ijede LCDA and investigate ways to reinforce participatory democracy
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by strengthening PB. Therefore, this study aims to gain further understanding of the
issues to which CSOs need to pay more attention in educating grassroots for effective PB.
Problem Statement
It was not known whether and how civil society empowers citizens to participate
in the PB process. Specifically, was is not known whether and how civil society can
empower citizens of Ijede LCDA in Lagos state, Nigeria to participate in the PB process.
Participatory budgeting is still a practice at the fringes of democratic development in
most of Sub-Saharan Africa despite its introduction in the region in 2005, to encourage
the attainment of the millennium development goals of the United Nations (Bertucci,
2008).
The failure of PB, a soft introductory process to participatory democracy, has
been due primarily to poor implementation that did not embrace local dynamics such as,
the complexity of the process of rule-making, the role of women, transportation, cultural
values, and perennial violence in the slums (Avritzer, 2010; Avritzer, 2012). In
Pateman’s (2012) view, citizens soon develop the knowledge, skills, and sophistication of
governance if they have the opportunity to participate in the decision-making processes
that affect their lives (Osmani, 2007). What stands in the way of democratic participation
by the grassroots is the lack of skills and the confidence to engage politicians and
professionals that are more knowledgeable. It remains unknown how civil society might
better integrate and empower citizens of Ijede LCDA in Lagos state, Nigeria to
participate in the PB process. Participatory budgeting designs work best when they are
organic, and they are not constrained by foreign ideas that have no bearing on the realities
of local idiosyncrasies (Avritzer, 2009). This study extracted information from the
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participants to understand from their perspectives the particularities that need to be
considered in Ijede for PB to yield its desired objectives.
The Purpose Statement
The purpose of this qualitative case study was to gain further understanding of the
role of civil society in educating and empowering the citizens of Ijede LCDA to
participate effectively in budgetary decision-making processes. The data for this study
were collected from 15 semi-structured one-on-one interviews of purposefully selected
participants that included adult citizens of Ijede, government officials, politicians, and
representatives of NGOs. Participants partook in focus group discussions at the end of the
one-on-one interview sessions. For data triangulation, government documents of past
budgets were reviewed.
Research Questions
The research questions drive the qualitative methodological approach to gain
further understanding of the role of CSOs in educating and empowering the citizens of
Ijede LCDA to participate in PB. Thus, the following research questions probed the
subjective understanding of those who have been directly involved in the PB process at
the site of inquiry:
RQ1: What roles do nongovernmental organizations play in the design structure of the
PB process at Ijede LCDA?
RQ2: What resource framework and network are necessary for effective PB advocacy at
Ijede LCDA?
RQ3: What local dynamics at Ijede LCDA encourage the involvement of the business
community in the PB process?
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RQ4: What sustainability strategies should Ijede LCDA consider for citizen-selected
projects?
These research questions were designed to extract from the participants the
necessary components if citizens were to have the ability to engage with the government
over budgetary allocations and spending. To answer these questions, I used interview
questions to interrogate the roles of NGOs, if any, in empowering citizens to acquire the
necessary skills to engage the government effectively.
Research question 1 addressed the problem statement by investigating the roles of
NGOs, if any, in working with the government to design a PB process that enabled the
citizens to participate in, and benefit from, the objectives of interacting with the
government for decision-making purposes. The question also probed the means by which
NGOs engaged with the citizens in order to empower them. Research question 2
unraveled, through the intuitive perception of the participants, the activities CSOs needed
to embark on in order to empower the citizens to participate in the PB process at Ijede
LCDA in Lagos state, Nigeria.
Financial resources are hardly adequate for local or municipal administrations to
fund PB to meet the desires of the citizens. Idemudia (2009) conjectured that some
corporate organizations do reinvest in the communities by providing funds, materials, and
equipment toward the execution of community projects. Idemudia suggested NGOs, in
their advocacy roles, interact with corporations to participate in community projects.
Research question 3 explored, through the experiences of the participants, the underlying
factors that encouraged corporations to fill the resources gap experienced by
governments. Through the intervention of NGOs, corporations should be aware of
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community needs. Such intervention is essential to the success of PB. Research question
4 also explored the sustainability strategies the government could consider to ensure
citizen-selected projects are completed and maintained. This research question could
potentially lead to policy changes requiring NGOs to pressure the government to consider
some sustainability strategy for a stronger PB process.
Together, these research questions provided the means to collect relevant data
through semi-structured interview questions, follow up questions, and focus group
discussions. The data collected allowed me to gain a deeper understanding of the role of
civil society in educating and empowering the citizens of Ijede LCDA to participate
effectively in budgetary decision-making.
Theoretical Framework
The foundations of this study hang on the two frameworks of participatory
institutions, and the conceptual framework of PB. The frameworks serve to explicate the
praxis of PB and serve as the prism to stratify the interplay of elements that drive the
process.
The Theory of Participatory Institutions
The main theoretical framework of this study is the theory of participatory
institutions as posited by Avritzer (2009). The theory connects the tripartite relationship
between “civil society, the political society, and institutional design” (p. 1). Avritzer
(2009) argued that the three bottom-up approaches to democratic institutions emerging
from Brazil’s democratic governance did not always create the much touted active public
engagement and equitable distribution of public services. Avritzer (2009) posited that the
peculiarities of institutional designs influenced successful outcomes in the four Brazilian
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cities of Belo Horizonte, Porto Alegre, Salvador, and Sao Paulo. The precondition that
permitted these results was the presence and the nexus between civil society, the political
society, and institutional design.
The Workers’ Party introduced participatory budgeting to Porto Alegre, Brazil in
1989. The party had won the mayoral election on the backdrop of political legacies of
corruption and discrimination against the poor (Wampler, 2012c). The party promised the
kind of democracy in which the poor could participate and to alter the pattern of public
spending to include the development of poor neighborhoods. The Workers’ Party met an
empty municipal treasury when it took over the administration of Porto Alegre (Acharya,
Lavalle, & Houtzager, 2004). In keeping with its electoral manifesto of giving citizens
direct involvement in governance and to reverse the pattern of concentrating social
programs in middleclass neighborhoods, the concept of PB came into being (Abers,
2001).
Participatory Budgeting
Participatory budgeting is a democratic process that provides the opportunity for
the electorates to interact with the government when the constituents actively engage in
decision-making on fiscal planning priorities from the perspective of the voters.
Electorates can develop political sophistication through regular interaction and contacts
in public discourses with the government and bureaucrats (Fischer, 2012; Pateman,
2012). Participatory budgeting programs have the hallmark of transparent governance in
that citizens are directly involved in the allocation of resources among competing
alternatives (Latendresse, 2005).
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For PB to be successful, there must be the willingness on the part of the
government to respect the budget priorities of its citizens. The community organizing
activities of civil society in educating and informing the electorates on procedural and
legal matters need the support and encouragement of the government (Grajzl & Murrell,
2009). Since PB involves fiscal issues, the government must be transparent in providing
the citizens with its finance and policy guidelines. In Porto Alegre, the organizers
provided transportation and childcare facilities for those who may be inhibited from
participating because of the absence of these incentives (Wampler, 2012b).
In participatory spaces, civil society is attentive to the actions and nuances of the
political society, as the two have direct exchanges often in the full view of the citizenry
(Avritzer, 2009). With legal support for the process, these direct exchanges become
institutionalized over time and the citizens develop expectations of positive outcomes
from the relationship as civil society introduces broader and pertinent issues into the PB
arena. Thus, political society in PB spaces sees the formation of citizen agendas through
the activities of civil society actors. Civil society could contribute to the restoration of
social interactions among the poor and the middleclass, just as it did in Latin America
(Peruzzotti, 2012).
The advancement of citizen participation occurs under purposefully designed
institutional arrangements such as PB (Avritzer, 2009). Where there is the nexus between
civil society, the political society, and purposeful institutional design, PB is capable of
rebalancing power between a disconnected central government and the grassroots. The
tripartite network could evolve among the citizenry, the awareness of rights to certain
urban services, public goods, and resource contributions by the local business community
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to the PB process (Abers, 2001; Baierle, 2005; Wampler, 2012a). Civil society has been
responsible for the realignment of social networks among the poor such that the political
society could no longer ignore their contributions to public policy decisions (Avritzer,
2009).
The important design feature relevant to PB is the enhancement of the potential
benefits of doing away with the top-down approach of the political society and
establishing a level or bottom-up approach to decision making. Thus, institutional design
would focus on direct communication between the political society and the community
(Avritzer, 2009).
Operational Definitions
The following are the operational definitions that are germane to the contextual
corpus of this study:
Civil society, or civil society organizations (CSOs): consist of nonpolitical
organized social formations, which exist based on the rule of law and civility,
representing social movements and civic activism, with all activities outside the ambit of
government. Civil society organizations include charitable organizations, professional
associations, and voluntary organizations (Kaldor, 2003).
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs): are a subset of CSOs that are not
politically partisan or private, but their purpose is not to challenge institutions of
governance but to cooperate with the government as advocates of the citizens (Clarke,
1998). Their activities are humanitarian without criminal purpose. As the name suggests,
they do not make any profit, but they provide voluntary services to communities, groups,
and individuals. Nongovernmental organizations include philanthropic organizations,
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religious organization, professional, and academic institutions that are not profit making.
For the purpose of this study, NGOs include community-based organizations (CBOs) that
mobilize and organize communities towards shared goals.
Grassroots: refers to any group of people with limited access to social goods,
services, and government institutions (Willie, Ridini, & Willard, 2008). Grassroots
includes and is interchangeable with excluded people who are entrenched in impenetrable
existence in a closed network with others of similar characteristics with poverty been the
strong connection between them (Catell, 2004). Grassroots also include the poor who,
according to Gordon (2005), are those who lack opportunities and the economic ability to
live a dignified existence. Consequently, the poor lack the capacity to partake in basic
societal engagements such as public discourses. They lack adequate means to feed or
clothe their families, and they are powerless and insecure without healthcare and
educational opportunities (Catell, 2004). Environmentally, the poor live on the fringe of
existence without water or sanitation. When they have jobs, the poor are poorly paid and
unable to take adequate care of their families (Gordon, 2005). The cause of poverty is not
natural phenomenon but structural deficiency of equitable distribution of resources
(Pearce, 2006).
Nature of the Study
Design of the Study
The choice of a research method depends on its adequacy and relevance to the
research question and the purpose of the study (Yin, 2009; Locke, 1989). Yin (2009)
presented the definitional foundation for this case study as the firsthand inquiry into
understanding a case rooted in the complexity of its real world situation through the
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gathering of multifaceted data at the locus of inquiry. Yin (2009) embraced interviewing,
review of documents, direct observations, scrutiny of artifacts, and participant
observation as the data collection strategies available to qualitative researchers. The
appropriate data collection strategies for this study were in-depth, semi-structured, openended one-on-one interviews; focus group discussions; and the review of government
records (Seidman, 2006; Yin, 2012).
As a qualitative approach, interviewing is best suited to investigate a process such
as PB through the subjective understanding of those who have been directly involved in
the process. According to Ferrarotti (1981), the best way to understand a sociopolitical
process such as PB is through the first-hand experiences of the organizers of, and the
participants in the process. As participants provide answers to interview questions, they
ruminate about events to construct realities through their experiences (Yin, 2012).
The lives and professional activities of the organizers of PB and the participants
in the programs form the content of the process of PB. Interviewing isolates the
individual experiences of the participants from the collective experiences of others thus
engendering context and diversity of participant perspectives (Ferrarotti, 1983). Seidman
(2006) further asserted that interviewing is as necessary, as it is a sufficient strategy of
inquiry. I used interviews as a means to understand the effectiveness of the activities of
civil society in the process of PB in Ijede LCDA. The participant selection method was
purposive, in an effort to select individuals who could provide specific, relevant, and rich
information.
The study population consisted of citizens of Ijede LCDA, who were civil
servants, elected representatives, and members of NGOs active in the community, all of
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whom had previously participated in PB at the local level. The sample size consisted of
15 individuals representing each of the aforementioned groups. The sample size (n = 15)
was sufficient to take care of attrition, and according to Marshall and Rossman (2011),
the diversity of the population group required a large sample, which enhanced
transferability. The participants fulfilled the qualitative research paradigm of using
narratives to provide meaning and trends of the research phenomenon (Hancock &
Algozinne, 2011; Patton, 2002; Yin, 2009).
Yin (2009) recommended the use of some theoretical basis to provide a strategy
to the design including screening of the case to study, selection of participants data
collection, and data analysis and interpretation. This guidance provided the source of data
for this study. Data were collected from citizens, government officials, active NGOs, and
CBOs. Purposively selecting participants from these groups was appropriate and
consistent with the purpose of the research. The theory of participatory institutions and
the concept of PB recognize each group as a unit of investigation (Avritzer, 2009; Klein,
Dansereau, & Hall, 1994).
The interviews provided thick data that I used to describe and analyze the
implementation of PB in Ijede LCDA at the time of the study (Hancock & Algozinne,
2011; Yin, 2009). The design provided the best-fit alignment between the research
questions, the methodology, and the conceptual and theoretical frameworks. The design
also aligned with the sampling method, sample size, the role of the researcher, and ethical
issues (Endicott, 2010). I submit that interviewing provided the best-fit alignment
between the research question and the qualitative method to understand the particular
case of PB in Ijede LCDA. As a descriptive paradigm, the case study’s interviewing
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framework sought to provide description and meaning specific to a given population
without the intention of applying the results to groups or settings outside the study group
(Hancock & Algozinne, 2011).
Assumptions
There were four basic assumptions of this study. First, the study assumed the
current process of PB had not sufficiently yielded the desired results the sponsors of the
process, that is, the United Nations, anticipated; hence the need to strengthen the process.
The 2014 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) Reports indicated that despite global
improvements in all the seven goals, Nigeria still lagged behind in many of the areas
including poverty and infrastructure development (United Nations, 2014). The MDGs
included: (a) eradicating extreme poverty and hunger; (b) the achievement of universal
primary education; (c) gender equality and empowerment for women; (d) reduction of
child mortality; (e) improvement of maternal health; (f) combating HIV/AIDS, malaria,
and other diseases; (g) ensuring environmental sustainability; and (h) the development of
a global partnership for development.
Participant selection was purpursive to capture the perspectives of those who have
had prior experiences of PB. This study assumed these individuals had much to
contribute to the study because of their prior involvements. This study assumed that the
participants had good memory and accurate recall of event sequences, context and
contents, such that the information they gave was truthful. The categories of participants
were those with sufficient knowledge and understanding of issues involved in PB and
that they had good command of English to narrate technical information without the need
for translation or interpretation.
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Scope and Delimitations
The focus of this study was to identify barriers that might have limited the ability
of PB to yield desired results, to determine local solutions to strengthen PB, and improve
outcomes. Poor implementation could be symptomatic of poor understanding of the aims
and goals of PB. Nongovernmental organizations are in the best position to be neutral
educators to improve the people’s understanding, and to motive citizens to action.
The scope of this study was limited to the activities of NGOs and the roles they
played in creating a common link among the elements and factors that could strengthen
the PB process. The inclusion of the political society, civil servants, NGOs, and
community representatives in the list of participants ensured that this study collected
information from diverse perspectives. The selection strategy limited the information
available to this study to the particular space and time of the experiences of the
participants. The pool of participants did not include citizens who might have participated
in prior PB processes but were unknown to the intermediary who provided access to the
participants. Furthermore, residents of the community who could corroborate any claims
to success, or point to failures, were not included in the participant pool.
Having provided contextual details of the research paradigm of this study, and
having disclosed the assumptions and limitations that are pivotal to the research, the
results of this study are potentially transferable to environments with idiosyncratic
dynamics that are similar to the locus of this study. The setting of Ijede LCDA is quite
similar in several respects to other local governments in Lagos State and several other
states in Nigeria. Therefore, the findings of this study have the potential for
transferability to other local governments in Nigeria.
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Limitations
Following case study design, I used interviewed participants in person. Unlike in
a typical ethnographic case study, I did not immerse myself in the participants’ lived
experiences. Therefore, this study did not involve the observation of an actual PB
process. Furthermore, in the absence of any record at the local government of individuals
and organizations who participated in prior processes, I relied on an intermediary to
identify the participants for this study. It was necessary to adopt snowball sampling when
some of the selected participants were considered unable to yield sufficient information.
My bias as the researcher is rooted in the passion as a Nigerian citizen who is concerned
about the development of the electorates to become sensitive to their environments and
be sufficiently enlightened. Such bias could have an impact on data interpretation.
Significance
The significance for social change included the potential to influence how
government arrives at public policy decisions, supported by better informed and active
electorates, for successful policy implementation, especially when the policies might be
unpalatable (Avritzer, 2009; Donaghy, 2010). From a public policy standpoint, by
integrating citizens’ priorities into budget priorities, there is strong perception of
transparency by the citizens who feel the direct impact and relevance of public policy, an
elusive situation since independence in 1960.
With the collaboration of the citizenry, government should be able to create
strong institutional designs of particular relevance to local dynamics that are inclusive of
the poor and marginalized in the community. Early local developmental successes have
the potential to encourage the federal and state governments, and the business
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community, to direct more resources toward PB. Thus, public policy might become
citizen focused, having been instigated by the consensus of the people ab initio. This is
also significant for the improvement of a peaceable social environment devoid of
incidences of sporadic violence, engendering peaceful coexistence in a society that
respects individual liberty and freedom of expression (Hazen, 2009).
Beyond enthusiasm at election times, the citizens of Ijede LCDA, as most of
Nigeria’s poor, are not actively engaged in the political process in a tangible way. This
study could help identify the dynamics CSOs need to consider and to integrate into their
activities such that the poor could sit at the table in a PB process to negotiate for
resources to provide needed sustainable public goods and services. Subsequently,
developing economies across the globe could develop PB designs to attain similar goals.
This study promotes positive social change by informing the government of
Lagos State of the need to institutionalize the PB process through a legal framework that
prevents the impulsive interruption of the process by political office holders and civil
servants. Ijede is in dire need of development programs beyond available resources.
The study also informs the Ijede community, which expressed its desire for
developmental evolution, of development strategies through public-private partnerships
under the build-operate-transfer agreement, incorporating the Smart Growth Strategies of
the United States Environmental Protection Agency. Participatory budgeting makes
possible the creation of the type of urban development that the citizens desire and support
(Avritzer, 2010; Wampler, 2012a). After all, the adoption of PB should go beyond
fulfilling the demand of the World Bank and the United Nations but lead to tangible and
meaningful development beyond the millennium development goals.
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Summary
Participatory budgeting is a quintessential example of participatory democracy, in
which a political institution that has not attracted sufficient interest among the socially
disadvantaged who stand to benefit the most from being involved in political discourses.
Participatory budgeting gives citizens the opportunity to engage actively with the
government in decision making on fiscal planning priorities. It is not known whether and
how civil society empowers citizens to participate in the PB process. Specifically, it is not
known whether and how civil society can empower citizens of Ijede LCDA in Lagos
state, Nigeria to participate in the PB process. The purpose of this qualitative case study
was to understand the role of civil society in educating the citizens to participate
effectively in the budgetary decision making processes.
The foundations of this study centered on the Avritzer’s theory of participatory
institutions, and the concept of PB. The case study design with particular emphasis on
semi-structured interviewing was of particular relevance to this study. It facilitated the
extrication of relevant information from the subjective understanding of the participants.
In Chapter 2, I discuss the historical and current outlines of literature that support
the importance of PB and the role of civil society in the praxis of the process. Chapter 3
details the methodological approach, data collection, and the strategy for data analysis. In
Chapter 4, I lay out the results of the study. Chapter 5 articulates the detailed discussion
on the findings, the conclusion of the study, and recommendations.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction
To most Africans on the continent, participatory democracy is defined by the
ability to vote in general elections (Adesopo, 2011; Leduka, 2009). Beyond suffrage, the
socially disadvantage neither appreciate the need to be involved in decision making, nor
the necessity of engaging the political class directly in discourses on matters that affect
their daily lives (Bashir & Muhammed, 2012; Bowen, 2008; Donaghy, 2010; Ganuza &
Frances, 2012). Consequently, decision making remains firmly within the purview of
politicians.
The purpose of this literature review is to gain further understanding of the role of
civil society in educating and empowering citizens to participate effectively in decision
making processes through participatory budgeting (PB). This literature review analyzed
the concepts of CSOs, participatory democracy, PB, and best budgeting paradigms.
Circa 2007, Nigeria joined a host of developing economies to adopt PB, a process
that Brazil introduced to 36 of its municipalities that were under the control of the
Worker’s Party in 1989 (Adesopo, 2011). Porto Alegre, Brazil emerged as the
quintessential example of PB and the socio-political lessons learned from that example
continue to be the reference point for studies on PB. However, the actual origin of PB
could be traced back to the 1970s, when the Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement
submitted its budget plans to the citizens for open debate (Avritzer, 2010; Goldfrank,
2007; Wampler, 2007;).
Participatory budgeting was an idea out of Latin American socialist ideology to
reduce the widening gap between the rich and the poor (Goldfrank, 2007). Paradoxically,
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both the political right and left worldwide have embraced the process as a tool to combat
the menace of poverty and as a strategy to reduce the gap between the rich and the poor
in the jurisdictions that have adopted it. International organizations such as the World
Bank, the United Nations, and the European Union have been responsible for the ubiquity
of PB (Avritzer, 2010; Fung & Wright, 2001; Goldfrank, 2007; Latendresse, 2005).
These institutions have recommended PB as a democratic tool to address the menace of
poverty that continues to ravage portions of developed economies and the developing
world. However, in spite of legal mandates introducing PB to municipalities, the
underlying principle or orientation of PB has nonetheless failed to filter to the majority
poor, the intended target of the process (Dewachter & Molenaers, 2011; Donaghy, 2010).
Efficiency in the administration of scarce resources and transparency are two
principal objectives of PB. However, authors and researchers of PB could not
categorically conclude that these goals have been achievable with PB experiments
(Goldfrank, 2007; Heller, 2012; Peruzzotti, 2012). More often than not, there are
contending local factors and circumstances affecting the ultimate outcomes of PB. It is,
however, by its nature, iterative and open to continuous improvement. The effectiveness
of PB at achieving its primary goals also depends on the presence of active and wellinformed CSOs that partner with the citizens as advocates in the state (Donaghy, 2010;
Ganuza & Frances, 2012).
Some conditions have arguably furthered the success of PB in different
jurisdictions. These include willing heads of governments, the absence of strong rightwing opposition, and influential elites, all of whom have played some important roles in
recorded successes of PB (Fung, 2006; Goldfrank, 2007). The provision of technical and
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financial assistance by national and international agencies, the availability of adequate
budgetary allocations, and the active involvement of CSOs are some of the enabling
dynamics that have contributed to the success of PB (Avritzer, 2009; Baierle, 2009;
Bherer, 2010; Goldfrank, 2007).
Literature Search Strategy
This literature review benefited from a broad spectrum of research from various
databases including the Walden Library linking with Google Scholar and dissertation
databases. Google Scholar was the primary resource for the articles reviewed in this
chapter. Through Google Scholar, I was able to access materials available at Walden
University Online Library. The databases included: ProQuest Central, EBSCOhost, and
Sage Political Science Complete. Although Walden University dissertation database
yielded only a couple of dissertations that had any relevance to PB, a slightly higher
number addressed participatory democracy in the areas of housing, transportation, and
urban planning. The relative unavailability of materials on PB at Walden University
dissertation database makes this study a valuable contribution to scholarship at the
University. Beyond the dissertation, PB is prevalent among the proponents of
participatory democracy and searches on Google Scholar demonstrated the ubiquity of
the process worldwide.
Keywords that yielded search results included: participatory budgeting,
participatory democracy, civil society, nongovernmental organizations, participatory
budgeting in Brazil, participatory budgeting in Nigeria, participatory budgeting in
Africa, participatory institutions, and deliberative democracy. Others included: budgeting
best practices, budget transparency, civil society, corporate social responsibility, and
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strategic planning. Although the search date range was in the last 5 years, it was often
necessary to widen the scope to accommodate the review of older articles on theory and
classic articles by authorities in the fields covered by this study.
The articles that informed this study contributed through their relevance to
participatory democracy and PB and in many respects suggested ways to strengthen
participation in public discourses. The body of literature contributing to the knowledge
base of participatory democracy uses a variety of research styles and methods. Some
scholarly articles developed frameworks and discussions using existing literature in the
field. Others use the mixed methods research design in which the researchers sought
external validity to their studies. Predominantly, researchers used qualitative
methodology to study various aspects of participatory democracy and PB.
In the remainder of Chapter 2, I will discuss participatory institutions as the
theoretical framework and PB the conceptual framework of the study interrogation.
Following this is the analysis of CSOs and participatory democracy. The review
discussed the review of current literature on participatory democracy, PB, CSOs, and
some best practices in budgeting.
Literature Review: Background
In Lagos State, Nigeria, 100% of the capital budget of local governments is
available for PB. Previous research I conducted via email and telephone interviews into
the practice and implementation of PB in six local governments of Lagos State, Nigeria
revealed weak implementation of PB, skeptical electorates, and unmotivated officials at
the state and local levels. These preliminary findings suggested that there was the general
lack of trust standing as a barrier to citizen involvement in PB. The poor residents who
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are the targets of the process declined the call to participate for fear of being labeled tax
dodgers. The study also found that rather than encouraging individuals to participate in
PB, representatives of neighborhood associations were the invited participants. All the
participants in that research identified inadequate funding as a challenge to development.
Expectedly, governments have to operate with scarce resources; the efficient and
equitable management of resources distinguishes effective governments from inefficient
administrations.
The literature on PB indicated only 20 to 30% as the percentage of capital budgets
available for PB in most jurisdictions (Abers, 2001; Boulding & Wampler, 2010;
Fölscher, 2007; Geissel, 2009; Gollwitzer, 2011; Matovu & Mumvuma, 2008). As good
as this may sound for Lagos State, it is common for politicians to intrude into the process
by prioritizing participant selected projects for their vested interests, known locally as
constituency projects (Adesopo, 2011). Consequently, transparency suffers because the
budget documents are not in the public domain, and neither do the participants’
involvements go beyond project selection into project monitoring.
Theoretical and Conceptual Frameworks
The two frameworks that drive this study are the theory of participatory
institutions and the concept of participatory budgeting. The effectiveness of the roles of
participatory institutions determines the outcomes of PB as a framework.
The Theory of Participatory Institutions
Avritzer (2009) had set out to discover under what conditions PB could succeed
and whether the Brazilian experience of PB could be replicable elsewhere with different
sociopolitical dynamics. Avritzer thus proposed the development of some measurements
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to determine if participation yielded the presumed outcomes of empowering ordinary
citizens and sharing control over decision making.
Civil society had become involved in political movements in Brazil a relationship
that blurred the boundary between the state and civil society. The connection between
civil society and political party in implementing reforms of participation turned out to be
a variable that required some theoretical explanation. The hitherto autonomy of civil
society within participatory institutions diminished and a new relationship between civil
society and political society developed. Avritzer (2009) propounded a new theory of
participatory institutions to explain the emerging relationship between civil society and
political society in the participatory space. Avritzer (2009) developed the theory of
participatory institutions as a departure from some 20th century democratic theories
including Weber’s theory of irrationality of popular sovereignty, which posited that
participation by the general populace in decision making could not have rational
outcomes (Weber, 1947).
Nevado (2010) in agreement with Avritzer (2009) recognized the shortcomings of
other theories of participation such as those postulated by Habermas (1994) and Oxhorn
(1995), which are offshoots of social movement theories. Avritzer stated that these
theories were incapable of capturing the enduring interactions between civil society and
state actors.
Theorists of representative democracy such as Berelson (1952), Dahl (1966), and
Schumpeter (1976) are contented with representation as a form of political participation.
These theorists view collective actions of unelected citizens as irrational (Fischer, 2012;
Pateman, 1995). Avritzer (2009) contended that the theory of participatory institutions
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connects the tripartite relationship between “civil society, the political society, and
institutional design” (p. 1). According to Avritver’s (2009) observation, the three
institutional design approaches, that is, the bottom-up designs, power-sharing designs,
and ratification designs to democratic institutions emerging from Brazil’s democratic
governance created the much touted active public engagement and equitable distribution
of public services. Bottom-up designs are open to all citizens to participate such as in PB
programs. Power sharing designs allow for civil society actors and political actors to
share decision-making with the citizens. In ratification designs, citizens do not take part
in the deliberations over the contents of proposals, but they can vote to accept or reject
proposals.
Civil society actors, who were embedded in government institutions in the search
for resources, lost some autonomy in their interactions with the political society
(Acharya, Lavalle, & Houtzager, 2004). Notwithstanding, the work of civil society in
participatory democracy in Brazil shaped a political process in which the poor could
contest elective positions. Despite the success of PB, unemployment was high while
violence increased but Avritzer (2010) argued that the opportunity to participate in
governance enabled the poor to envision the possibility of easing the burden of poverty
by increasing access to public goods and services.
In Brazil, Argentina, and Bolivia, especially in the 1990s, civil society actors were
able to advocate for participation by ordinary citizens in institutionalized public places
(Wampler, 2012a). It thus became necessary for these public institutions to gravitate
towards the interest of the people in the affairs of state and to open up the participatory
spaces in health, environmental issues and urban planning (Nevado, 2010).
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Nevado (2010) identified four characteristics of participatory institutions that are
necessary for participation. These features are: the interconnectedness between
participation and representation; the transformation of volunteerism of civil society into
organizing for political actions; the interactions between participatory institutions, the
political society and state actors; and the necessity for institutional design for the success
of participatory institutions. The ability of civil society to advance from community
organizing to visible presence in the conscience of the political society contributed to the
success of PB in Brazil (Wampler, 2012c).
Institutional design goes a long way in determining the overall success or failure
of participatory institutions; hence, Nevado (2010) advocated regular reviews and
variations of participatory designs to ensure their continued relevance and sustainability.
In effect, there should be a nexus of relationships between civil society, political society,
participation, and representation. Therefore, where civil society understands the actions
of the political society, participatory institutions provide the space for the state and civil
society actors to collaborate in responding to the needs of society as a whole (Avritzer,
2009).
Since PB permits open participation by individuals and groups, civil society
actors can participate in matters in which their program objectives focus. In other cases,
they form alliances or loose cooperatives with groups of CSOs, elected representatives,
and individuals (Nevado, 2010). Comparing the outcomes of PB, the health councils and
municipality planning processes in four of Brazil’s major cities, Avritzer (2009) posited
that the favorable results were due to the individual peculiarities of each of the cities,
which influenced the institutional designs. The precondition that permitted these
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outcomes was the presence and the interconnection that existed between civil society, the
political society, and institutional design.
Participation. The opportunity for all citizens to contribute to decision-making
conversations that affect their daily lives is one of the pillars that give legitimacy to any
democratic system (Marien, Hooghe, & Quintelier, 2010). A democratic society is weak
and of little relevance if the poor cannot participate in anti-poverty initiatives (Bowen,
2008). The United States’ Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 acknowledged the
significance of participation by the beneficiaries of an anti-poverty program when it
called for “maximum feasible participation” of the beneficiaries of the program (p. 451).
The consequence of this provision was the ubiquity of grassroots community organizing.
The idea of maximum feasible participation unsettled the elites who sensed the
weakening of their hold on power (Bowen, 2008; Hardina, 2004).
At the signing ceremony of the law, President Lyndon Johnson assured the elites
that the aim of the law was to end poverty by helping rural and urban dwellers to reestablish their footing, a scenario that potentially benefited United States, rather than
entrench them in poverty, (Johnson, 1964). The political elites were not convinced, but
incrementally, the United States congress defunded the program into obscurity (Hardina,
2004). Similar to political leaders in Africa, the elites of the United States did not want to
share power with the poor (Mosca, 1939).
Group Strategy versus Individualism. Low-income citizens who operate within
social groups are the primary targets of PB because the theory focuses individual
participants who are outside group formats and lack the voting block to influence
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decisions (Wampler, 2007). Therefore, CSOs with substantial capacity to mobilize tend
to thrive well in PB.
Voting methods within PB vary from city to city and from country to country.
Some of the voting practices include secret ballots or show of hands with majority
carrying the decisions. Cities have tried to be all inclusive by distributing resources
according to the proportional representativeness of the population (Wampler & HartzKarp, 2012). Montambeault (2009) hypothesized that when mobilizing efforts for
participation is at the individual level, quid-pro-quo arrangements between politicians
and political parties, and exploitation the political environment for personal gins are
pervasive. Consequently, an autonomous civil society that mobilizes at the individual
level produces uncoordinated participation in public discourse. Individuals with selfinterests and the inability to negotiate effectively with other persons or groups have no
influence over public policy. However, when civil society uses its autonomy to mobilize
people into groups for collective purposes, the benefits of participatory democracy are
exemplary.
In general, voting practices at PB sessions mirror the pattern with which the
citizens are already familiar. Governments have experimented with voting rules to
determine alternative strategies to arrive at the optimum outcomes acceptable to all
citizens. The process of PB has empowered citizens to learn how to network and
negotiate trade-offs by creating the kind of trust environment that unites rather than
divide (Wampler & Hartz-Karp, 2012). Magee (2012) investigated the impact of
participation in urban planning in five US cities of Birmingham, Alabama; Dayton, Ohio;
Portland, Oregon; Saint Paul, Minnesota; and San Antonio, Texas. The investigation
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concluded that when the public participates in decision-making processes on issues that
directly concern them, the citizens could build strong communities with a healthy sense
of civic responsibility. The participants in the study agreed that their input supported the
government in focusing on issues relevant to their communities, assisting government to
identify priorities, and in propagating government actions on project implementation
among citizens.
Inequality and Social Justice. Political participation is as much a strategy as it is
a moral responsibility to ascertain that no interest supplants another and that all citizens
have equal access to decision-making (Dalton, 2008; Marien et al., 2010). In other words,
citizens may not receive or enjoy public goods equally, but their interests should be given
equal consideration along with other contending interests of groups with higher economic
or social status. Participation provides the platform for citizens to air their voices (Dalton,
2008). Thus, a structural defect exists in a political arena where poor citizens do not have
the resources to undertake their civic obligations (Marien et al., 2010).
However, there are factors creating and encouraging inequality in participation.
Marien et al. (2010) identified education, age, and gender as three of the factors that
create inequality in participation. The better-educated citizens participate and engage
intensely in political activism than do the poorly educated. While gender inequality in
participation may have declined in Western politics, it is still prevalent in developing
democracies with large rural populations. Marien et al. posited that the lack of political
engagement is quite prevalent among youths, but when age is considered along with the
use of social media, the situation changes. Social media has encouraged political
awareness, and it has stimulated some activism among the youths.
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Participatory democracy theorists believe that for democracy to thrive, citizens
must participate beyond exercising suffrage rights (Fischer, 2012; Pateman, 1995).
Indeed, by delegating decision-making powers to representatives, citizens are
disenfranchised from the political sphere (Michels & de Graaf, 2010). The researchers
did not observe any controversy in the legitimacy of public decision where the citizens
formulated the decisions. The process of engagement empowers citizens to develop
strong civic responsibility and interdependency such that there is a sense of personal
ownership towards the decisions. In the course of engaging with peers, there are superior
and compelling arguments, cajoling and juxtaposing of interests, all of which culminate
in policy decisions acceptable to all (Dobson, 2005; Fung, 2006; Richard, 2013).
Contrary to this position, Mutz (2006) posited that such deliberations unduly task citizens
with the unrealistic assumption of mutual respect. Michels and de Graaf (2010) on the
other hand observed the personal satisfaction of citizens in collective free expression as
equals, devoid of superior interests, but conducted with mutual respect.
Engaging the Poor. Some researchers and authors have found that poor citizens
are more likely to experience disconnection from, and lack interest in political discourses
(Brodie, 2011; Dewachter & Molenaers, 2011; Haynes, 2013; Marien et al., 2010;
Pateman, 1995; Richard, 2013). Thus, the lack of active participation by the poor
majority limits their access to public goods. In developing nations, such lack of access
encourages corruption, waste, fraud, and abuse by elected officials and civil servants
(Avritzer, 2012; Verba, 2003; Wampler & Hartz-Karp, 2012). Therefore, to participate
effectively, poor citizens require education in the form of social and civic training, the
mantle of which falls on civil society through NGOs and CBOs. This kind of activism by
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civil society creates independent and politically aware citizenry, whose increased
awareness encourages transparency, accountability and efficiency (Postigo, 2011).
The Concept of Civil Society
Although there is the lack of consensus on a definition of civil society, some
authors agree that civil society is the public space of voluntary actions between the state,
the market, and the family (Akpan, 2009; Fowler, 2012; Idemudia, 2011; Obadare, 2011;
Powell, 2008). Diamond (1994) defined civil society as the “realm of organized social
life that is voluntary, self-generating, largely self-supporting, autonomous from the state,
and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules” (p. 5). This definition clarified the
distinction between civil society and the society as a whole. Citizens have to act
collectively and publicly to make their mutual demands, express their interests, and hold
the state accountable for its actions. Walzer (1991) associated civil society with an arena
of freedom for “family, faith, interest, and ideology” to exist openly (p. 1).
Other authors described civil society as a dense network of civil associations
formed to stabilize the democratic process and to be the public conscience in support or
against policies emanating from the government (Foley & Edwards, 1996; Newton,
2001). Diamond (1994) and Newton (2001) rejected the inclusion of family for the
simple reason that it is not up to anyone to determine to what biological family they
belong. Diamond (1994) went further to reject the inclusion of the individual,
recreational, and religious groups for profit entities and political associations in the
definition because potentially, these entities exclude those who hold contrary beliefs and
ideologies. Therefore, civil society consists of voluntary associations, without restrictive
conditions of membership, from the national level through local community
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organizations (Diamond, 1994; Newton, 2001; Powell, 2008). One assumption is that
citizens and institutional actors outside the government can work together for citizen
participation in democratic arrangements (Nevado, 2010).
Another assumption is that CSOs are civic, proclaiming and ensuring equality,
equity, and the entrenchment of strong democratic principles (Fowler, 2012). Fowler
(2012) and Powell (2008) held that civil society is a community, rather than an
aggregation of agitating organizations, which have some common norms as a minimum
with the normative purpose for the community. The exclusion of religious and
associational life groups from civil society would hold in Africa where society relies on
and trusts those formations more than other groups (Orji, 2009). Religion and life
associations that connect to collective affinities are the main forces of attraction that give
rise to community-level association.
For civil society to have broader application and entrench social roots without
unnecessarily excluding major groups, Orji (2009) posited that the dominant powers of
such groups are necessary for CSOs to have a meaningful impact in influencing policy
processes. Civil society organizations consolidate efforts to highlight societal concerns
for the attention of the state and the larger public. In so doing, they also act to provide
contrary positions in their areas of expertise and over a broad range of issues (Grajzl &
Murrell, 2009).
The premise for the activities of CSOs is the rule of law, freedom of association,
and the establishment of civility between governments and citizens (Diamond, 1994;
Fowler, 2012; Newton, 2001; Orji, 2009; Powell, 2008). The activities often involve
charity, volunteerism, and civisms, all of which are fundamental to participatory
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democracy (Heller, 2012; Hilmer, 2010; Powell, 2008). Thus, the rights to associate
freely, socially, politically and economically form the bond on which the concept of civil
society hangs (Dobson, 2005; Donaghy, 2010). With freedom of association emerged the
cooperation between citizens and groups to provide self-help where governments have
failed (Fowler, 2012). Through such self-help, civil society has created a platform of
equality where the poor can demand the attention of the state to address issues that affect
the poor in the society (Powell, 2008).
Civil society organizations have opened up the public sphere such that those who
hitherto were too poor to be part of governance and public decision-making could have a
say through participatory democracy (Orji, 2009). The struggle for equality and
fundamental rights that the intelligentsia spearheaded in defiance against oppressive
states has shifted gradually to communities and individuals for collective social actions
(Powell, 2008). Civil society has thus shown its ability to educate the poor to recognize
public ethics, morality, transparency, and accountability (Fowler, 2012). At the turn of
the century, Brazil led the way in converting the effectiveness of civil society to the
social movement of the poor (Powell, 2008). Civil society organizations in Nigeria have
the additional task of establishing trust between the government and citizens in the effort
to attain the social transformation that restores the people’s confidence in their
government (Dobson, 2005).
There is unanimity among some authors that the attainment of heightened
participation by the citizenry requires a vibrant civil society to actively mobilizing the
people (Avritzer, 2007; Avritzer, 2010; Fischer, 2012; Pateman, 2012; Postigo, 2011;
Wampler, 2012a). These authors agreed that institutional designs played a significant role
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in the positive outcomes of participatory democracy by identifying best practices that
stimulate participation among the poor. Postigo (2011) informed that civil society was
able to operate efficiently and thus developed as mobilizing agents because the state
opened up the space by sponsoring and encouraging PB. Thus, these authors contended
that the enabling environments for successful PB were the presence of a vibrant civil
society, and the willingness of the state to cede grounds for citizen participation. Since
the poor often lack the confidence, skills, organization, and the education to participate,
the state and civil society need to establish some institutional design to stimulate
participation (Hilmer, 2010; Wampler, 2012b). In other words, there must be civic
mobilization, stable financial and organizational arrangements.
Grassroots democratic participation requires issue-based community organizing
that enhances specialized influence rather than addressing all issues, which obviates
potential mediocrity on complex issues (Devarajan, Khemani, & Walton, 2011). When
communities organize around issues, the electorates gain a better understanding of those
interests, thus developing better control over matters of direct interest to the community
(Powell, 2008). Poorer communities can attract the attention of the government through
the support of civil society when they gain some expertise on contending issues in their
communities (Lewis, 2002). In the absence of community, organizing, ordinary citizens
lose the opportunity to convince policymakers to provide access to public services and to
empower communities economically (Brodie, 2011).
Transparency, Good Governance, and Civil Society
Generally, there is agreement among authors about the need to strengthen
democratic accountability and administrative transparency (Bowen, 2008; Donaghy,
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2010; Fischer, 2012; Fowler, 2012; Grajzl & Murrell, 2009; Houtzager & Lavalle, 2010;
Lindgreen & Swaen, 2010; Pateman, 2012; Peruzzotti, 2012; Postigo, 2011). However,
authors have conceptualized the issues from varying perspectives. For instance,
Peruzzotti (2012) abstracted accountability and transparency from the standpoint of the
three factors that determine these matters. The legal frameworks that institutionalize the
reforms that support participation include the specialized CSOs. The CSOs along with the
press intervene in the democratic space as watchdogs and to project the visibility and
dissemination of sociopolitical agenda.
The globalization of social movements against neoliberalism in Porto Alegre,
Brazil showed the world that poor citizens are capable of learning the complexities of
democratic paradigms if given the education and the opportunity (Cabannes, 2004). The
poor and the uneducated can learn to shift the balance of economic equality by
contributing to their social destiny (Powell, 2008). In spite of the progress made by civil
society in mobilizing the people, several NGOs would only participate if they have some
official relationship with the government or some sponsoring organizations external to
the jurisdictions (Donaghy, 2010). Community-based organizations have to engage the
state, as they know best, which results in inadequate self-representation and inadvertent
legitimization of the acts of the state that might be inimical to the wellbeing of the poor
(Grajzl & Murrell, 2009).
Effectiveness of Civil Society Organizations
An advantage of CSOs is that they enjoy unfettered autonomy to engage in
organizing citizens for action. With the exit of the Workers' Party in Porto Alegre in
2005, several of the CSOs withdrew from communities because of the new government's
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policy to de-emphasize PB (Rodgers, 2010). Consequently, participation in PB became
less organized. Unfortunately, functioning neighborhood associations lacked the required
experience and resources to mobilize, and group membership waned (Montambeault,
2009). Citizens could learn governance by participating in PB, and the experience makes
for a population with a high sense of civic responsibility (Bherer, 2010). As one of the
objectives of budget distribution is to minimize poverty, the decline in the poverty rate
can be noticeable wherever PB succeeds (McGee & Gaventa, 2013).
In Nigeria, as in most of Africa, citizens are rightly skeptical of civil society and
its activists who have defected from championing the peoples’ course to join the political
class (Obadare, 2011). According to Obadare, the people see these activists as political
opportunists, whose real ethical and moral legitimacy occurs when they malign elected
officials, and at the right moment, ride on the sentiments of the people for personal
political gains. For several citizens, the disillusionment with civil society has generated
distrust to the point that activists are perceived as economic opportunists that pretend to
do good for the poor, when indeed, all they have is self-interest (Essia & Yearoo, 2009).
After all, the activists are the products of the same harsh economic climate that has driven
the people to poverty. Activism in the civil society realm provides a window of
opportunity to address poverty and inequality, but on its own, it does not provide ways
out of poverty (Bowen, 2008; Postigo, 2011).
Works and Expectations of Civil Society Organizations
The most important function of CSOs is in strengthening democracy and
supporting the interaction between citizens and their governments (Mill, 1909; Weber,
1947). With associational freedom, CSOs bring people with diverse backgrounds and
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interests together to engender mutual appreciation and respect. Civil society
organizations strive to relieve unpleasant circumstances and induce societal tolerance
(Newton, 2001). Socially, CSOs use common bonds and ties to resolve conflict without
external interventions. The civic advocacy of CSOs creates a responsible citizenry that
learns to appreciate the necessity of reciprocal empathy. Where CSOs cooperate among
themselves, they achieve greater reach and stronger collaborative efforts (Putnam, 1995).
Such, according to Putnam, presupposes neutrality in political ideology and other divisive
issues that may fragment or factionalize the associations.
The dilemma with Putnam’s position is that most of the issues confronting CSOs
have the propensity for factionalizing the public space (Foley & Edwards, 1996). Overall,
civil society can influence policies emerging from reform processes without direct benefit
from the improvements. They serve to reduce the domination of the public space by
wealthy self-interest groups and their political collaborators (Grajzl & Murrell, 2009).
Corporations, Civil Engagement, and the Effect on the Poor
In the West, corporate organizations are directly active with civil society through
their corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs when they address issues such as the
environment, education, health and poverty (Idemudia, 2011). Corporate organizations
engage in CSR programs to enhance their public image of accountability and social
responsibility (Lindgreen & Swaen, 2010). These organizations expend considerable
resources to impress on the public that profit is not their sole motivation. In the absence
of legal or regulatory compulsion, they maintain high ethical standards alongside their
commitments to the socio-economic development of the communities in which they
operate (Fowler, 2012; Lindgreen & Swaen, 2010). The motivations for CSR range from
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corporate strategy to the defense against some anticipated actions, and altruism
(Idemudia, 2011; Lindgreen & Swaen, 2010).
To advance the discussion to the African context, Idemudia (2011) highlighted
issues such as tax avoidance, tax evasion, unsustainable investment, and poverty
reduction agenda of the corporate organizations operating within the continent. These
organizations benefit from the inadequacy, gaps, and lapses in administrative exactitudes
including corrupt practices. Thankfully, posited Idemudia (2009), through CSR, some of
these organizations do reinvest in the communities by providing funds, materials, and
equipment towards the execution of community projects.
Perhaps African NGOs need to look to corporations to participate in community
projects rather than providing funds to the state, which are often misdirected and
misappropriated. Such misdirection of resources, suggested Idemudia (2011), is evident
in Nigeria where multinational oil companies fail to focus on the real issues such as
corruption, environmental degradation, and declining economic climate in all sectors, all
of which confront their host communities. In exploring the ramifications of government
inadequacy for CSR, Idemudia (2011) further postulated that the voluntary nature of CSR
weakens the effect of the practice on the intended beneficiaries. Idemudia suggested that
CSOs should serve as the conduits for CSR efforts. Without a full understanding of
cultural nuances and socio-political complexities of communities in Africa, CSR
programs do not only fail to address poverty reduction but they also exacerbate the fragile
inter-communal tensions that might have pre-existed (Akpan, 2009; Lindgreen & Swaen,
2010).
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Idemudia (2009) discovered that when CSR efforts link directly with CBOs, the
outcome has more positive impact on the community than when corporate organizations,
device strategies and impose policies. Indeed, CBOs can advance CSR initiatives of
corporate organizations by helping to identify what message to communicate and other
factors unique to the effectiveness of communication in the community (Lindgreen &
Swaen, 2010). The involvement of civil society in CSR helps to avoid rash and impulsive
actions that may yield disruptive and wasteful consequences (Grajzl & Murrell, 2009).
Furthermore, as far as the Brazilian PB experience goes, skilled delegates who operated
within CSOs realize they have the power to influence decisions; thus. PB highlights the
importance of active CSOs, which leads to the formation of competing NGOs in the
participatory space (Wampler, 2007).
Civil society organizations are important institutional building partners. They
provide the public space for discourses on public policy, debates over matters of
importance to communities, and the atmosphere for the expression of individual rights
(Grajzl & Murrell, 2009). Citizens need to be wary of individuals and groups with vested
interests that sponsor CSOs since such partisan interests are counterproductive for
legitimacy in public discourses (Essia & Yearoo, 2009).
Some Observed Weaknesses of Civil Society Organizations
Some significant roles of CSOs are those of advocacy, to be the voice for the
voiceless, to ensure social justice and equitable distribution of public goods (Diamond,
1994). Civil society organizations in many countries, including Nigeria, rely on the
government to provide substantial resources (Essia & Yearoo, 2009). This dependency
weakens the effectiveness of CSOs in challenging the state when the rights of citizens are
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under threat. The reliance on state fund has emboldened state officials to diminish the
efforts of CSOs at protecting the interest of ordinary citizens. Civil society organizations
with multiple ties to political associations lack focus, but they pursue interests other than
those of the communities they set out to represent.
The Brazilian experience indicated that although CSO leaders in PB did not have
to negotiate with the state secretly for equitable distribution of public goods, political
patronage still existed at individual levels (Montambeault, 2009). Institutionally, political
patronage and corruption declined as negotiations for new democratic spaces emerged
(Baierle, 2008). Thus, CSOs that engage in participatory institutions occupied the
traditional domain of control of political parties to eliminate rent seeking (Montambeault,
2009).
One of the challenges confronting CSOs concerning budgets is the timely access
to comprehensive government budget documents (Benito & Bastida, 2009). The materials
help to facilitate the analysis of budgets for CSOs to target their advocacy efforts at
specific areas of concern (Carlitz, de Renzio, Krafchik, & Ramkumar, 2009). Several
authors have demonstrated empirically that freedom of information, especially on
budgeting and budget performances have a close correlation with good governance. Free
flow of information reduces corruption, affects human development positively, and
improves socio-economic pointers (Bastida & Benito, 2007; Benito & Bastida, 2009;
Peruzzotti, 2012; Sintomer, Allegretti, Herzberg, & Rocke, 2008; de Renzio, Gomez, &
Sheppard, 2009).
As far as PB goes, transparency is a precondition for enthusiastic participation by
citizens (Goldfrank & Schneider, 2006). However, de Renzio, Gomez, and Sheppard
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(2009) argued that resource-dependent nations, like Nigeria, which relies on income from
oil and gas, experience transparency gap, but the presence of active CSOs may help to
close the gap. Carlitz et al. (2009) posited that transparency should go hand in hand with
other factors and expectations. These include deliberate efforts by the government to
promote pro-poor policies and agenda, encouraging information freedom and wellinformed media, providing prompt budget information, and facilitating a civil society that
can interpret and analyze budgets.
With more transparency, civil society gets more opportunities to intervene on
behalf of the citizens and by so doing, widen the space for participation in governance.
When the public has timely and reliable budget information, citizens can engage
meaningfully in budgetary policies and hold the government to its public
pronouncements. Carlitz et al. (2009) suggested that civil society could be more efficient
by demanding more information under the freedom of information laws that most
countries, including Nigeria, have enacted. In which case, civil society could analyze
budgets and disseminate the information in more comprehensible language to the public
with whom they should engage in advocacy on issues arising.
Participatory Budgeting
Electorates can develop political sophistication through regular interactions and
contacts with elected officials and bureaucrats in public discourses (Fischer, 2012;
Pateman, 2012). When citizens participate in budgetary policy formulation, they actively
engaged in decision making on fiscal planning priorities. Participatory budgeting
encourages the transparent environment for resource distribution and selection of choices
between priorities (Latendresse, 2005). For PB to be successful, there must be the
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willingness on the part of the state to respect the budget priorities of the citizens
(Acharya, Lavalle, & Houtzager, 2004; Avritzer, 2012; Fung & Wright, 2001).
The community-organizing activities of civil society in educating and informing
the electorates on procedural and legal matters need the support and encouragement of
the state (Fung, 2006; Goldfrank, 2007). Since PB involves fiscal issues, the government
needs to be transparent in providing the electorates its finance and policy guidelines
(Agbude & Egbide, 2012; Bastida & Benito, 2007; Benito & Bastida, 2009). To relieve
the poorer electorates of the cost of participation, it is also necessary to address those
obstacles that increase the burden of participation such as distance and language
(Latendresse, 2005).
Participatory budgeting is a public decision-making arrangement that provides a
platform for citizens to negotiate with the government and to negotiate between
competing communal interests on the distribution of budgetary allocations. In one yearly
cycle, citizens decide what projects to undertake, by whom, and where to locate the
projects (Goldfrank, 2007; Wampler, 2012b).
The model of PB practice in Brazil usually begins with plenary sessions of all
participants in each district to review budget implementations for the previous year
(Postigo, 2011). The assembly then identifies areas of priority while it elects delegates
who deliberate over all the proposals presented by different communities (Peruzzotti,
2012). At the second round of plenary meetings, another set of elected delegates
consolidates all the requests of the various communities, reviews each proposal, and
allocates resources to the projects (Peruzzotti, 2012; Postigo, 2011). At a final stage, the
delegates present the approved proposals to the mayor. The mayor lays out the delegates’
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proposals for deliberation at a municipal council meeting, which approves the plan for
implementation (Peruzzotti, 2012; Postigo, 2011). The primary functions of municipal
employees are to provide guidance and technical assistance to the delegates who may not
understand the rudiments of governance and the complexity of the process (Wampler,
2007).
Participatory budgeting requires state officials not to have project preferences,
and they do not determine or influence the location or the contractor to execute projects
(Wampler, 2012b). Rather, the citizens deliberate in open fora among themselves while
government officials act as impartial arbiters in cases of deadlock (Wampler, 2012a).
Participatory budgeting is open to individuals without affiliations although as Wampler
found, group membership increases the chances that their project preferences prevail. As
citizens learn to dictate public agenda and negotiate budgetary spending in PB, they can
transfer the skills to other participatory spaces to meet civic demands (Wampler, 2012a).
Variations in Participatory Budgeting Processes and Outcomes
Wampler’s (2007) described PB as a process that encourages citizens to engage in
decision making by voicing their opinions and voting at meetings sponsored by the state.
Participants at these meetings vote for important programs they believe the government
should implement. They elect representative delegates from among the participants to
negotiate on the issues and priorities that are of concern to the citizens. Elected delegates
representing different communities negotiate among themselves, with government
officials, CSOs and other activists for competing priorities. Figure 1 is a visual
representation of a typical PB process, drawn for the purpose of this study from
Wampler’s (2007) description.
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The variation in outcomes between municipalities could be due to differences in
cultural, institutional, political, and historical connections of the territories. The successes
of PB have occurred not because of any prescriptive best practice paradigm (Avritzer,
2009). Indeed, the outcomes of participatory institutions vary by local political model, the
willingness of local officials to advance the process, and the effectiveness of CSOs
(Avritzer, 2010; Wampler, 2012a).
As a political institution, PB engendered the environment for citizen involvement
in creating the type or urban development that the citizens desired and supported.
Consequently, it has enhanced local democracy and strengthened the effectiveness,
efficiency, and transparency of local governance. In addressing issues through
participation, Sheller (2010) suggested that communities should apply hierarchical order
to prioritize the needs of the communities. In other words, concerns such as crime,
sanitation, and environmental issues that lend themselves to social solutions should
prevail over sidewalks and other esthetics. On the other hand, Geissel (2009) argued that
municipalities adopted PB, not necessarily to improve representative democracy, but to
address exploding public spending to attain balanced budgets. The assertion could be true
of Europe where Geissel (2009) viewed PB as a glorified exercise in consultation.
Postigo (2011) surmised that it would be unrealistic to expect PB to alleviate
poverty. Bowen (2008) agreed with this position in Jamaica: citizen participation in
decision making on community projects had limited effect on the economic conditions of
the citizens. Poverty alleviation is a problem for central governments to address, but PB
is a program for local governance (Avritzer, 2010). Participatory budgeting has achieved
fairer distribution of resources, the defining public services as civic and social rights, and
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the creation of a citizenry that demands responsible and accountable government (Bowen,
2008; Peruzzotti, 2012). Citizens who participate in PB processes understand how to
demand transparency and equity in the distribution of public goods for the benefit of all
citizens (Avritzer, 2010; Wampler, 2012a).
As citizens learn to engage in participatory democracy, they also recognized the
necessity to engage in other participatory processes involving health, education and urban
planning (Peruzzotti, 2012; Postigo, 2011). Bowen (2008) submitted that where
participation is inadequate, citizen involvement in decision making amounts to tokenism.
Citizens need appropriate training and support from CSOs, just as they need opportunities
to participate in developing the capacity to address communal issues effectively for
meaningful participation in decision making (Bowen, 2008).
Stimulus of the Growth of Participatory Budgeting
The popularity of PB has been incrementally progressive (Wampler & HartzKarp, 2012). As participation spread among citizens, interest in governance grew and the
rate of citizen empowerment expanded to an unexpected level among the poor (Wampler,
2012c). At the early stages of PB in Brazil between 1989 and 2004, districts with little
civil society activity lagged behind developmentally (Donaghy, 2010; Goldfrank &
Schneider, 2006; Latendresse, 2005; Wampler, 2007). In the absence of civil society
activities, municipal employees went to the communities to encourage participation by
forming self-help CBOs (Donaghy, 2010; Su, 2012; Wampler, 2007). As the CBOs
motivated the excluded poor, participation rapidly spread across all neighborhoods.
The lower economic class realized they had a voice in the decision-making
process that prioritized needed projects. Perhaps to their surprise, the poor realized they
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were able to monitor the government and its actions; there was the rare sense of
transparency and accountability (Donaghy, 2010). The early inter-communal
disagreements over what projects to execute soon gave way to discussions about projects
for the benefit of all, thus underplaying the hitherto self interests of the neighborhoods
(Boulding & Wampler, 2010).
Two problems plagued Brazilian polity: clientelism, the quid pro quo arrangement
that corrupted the political theatre; and rent seeking, the corrupting influence of
individuals and corporations to gain undue advantage without corresponding benefit to
the society (Avritzer, 2010; Baierle, 2009; Ganuza & Baiocchi, 2012; Peruzzotti, 2012;
Schugurensky, 2009). Participatory budgeting opened up the system to be more
transparent, and thus, it reduced corruption substantially while governance became more
democratic (Peruzzotti, 2012). Consequently, transparency reduced political patronage as
it improved the efficient allocation and consumption of resources, the legitimacy of the
government and accountability to the people.
Postigo (2010) found that the consultative nature of PB, coupled with its
associated limited decision-making powers, discouraged some civil society organization
from participating in the process. According to Postigo, the willingness of the local
officials encouraged the promotion of PB by pushing for pro-poor policies and
redistribution agenda. Thus, local officials settled disputes between competing groups
thereby demonstrating the good faith of social justice in the distribution of public
services. Postigo gave much credit to the state for opening up the space for PB to
succeed, and for CSOs to transform their modus operandi.
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Figure 1. A diagrammatic representation of a typical participatory budgeting process as
described in “Can participatory institutions promote pluralism? Mobilizing low-income
citizens in Brazil,” by B. Wampler, (2007), Studies in Comparative International
Development, 41(4), 57-98.
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The intervention of government officials encouraged cooperation between
neighborhood associations (Postigo, 2012). When participatory opportunities declined,
civil society involvement also declined. However, PB contributed to increased political
awareness of the citizens by providing the skills required for engaging in other
participatory spaces (Hilmer, 2010; Lavalle, Acharya, & Houtzager, 2005; Leubolt et al.,
2008; Michels & De Graaf, 2010).
The political class having yielded some control over political decisions to the
citizens, civil society and community leaders recognized the need to organize the citizens
for the opportunity to be part of the decision-making machinery of the government
(Avritzer, 2010; Wampler & Hartz-Karp, 2012). Acharya et al. (2004) observed that
CSOs such as the NGOs tend to be “institutionally embedded actors” that are closer to
the government than with those they set out to represent (p. 41). Bherer (2010) asserted
that the state could change the status quo, and it could empower the economically
disadvantaged citizens if it strengthens neighborhood civic groups.
Principles of Good Budget Practices
One important instrument CSOs have used to advocate policy directions has been
the budget. The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank encourage
governments to adopt budget processes that incorporate the participation of citizens, to
ensure accountability, and to enhance transparency (Fukuda-Parr, Guyer, & LawsonRemer, 2011). The United Nations expected that through improved budget instruments,
which strive to meet the requirements of the millennium development goals, especially
the eradication of poverty and diseases by 2020, its set target would be attainable by most
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governments (Simson, 2014). It is thus safe to anticipate encouraging socio-economic
development results from countries that give priority to budget accountability.
For PB to yield the desired socio-economic changes, all stakeholders are expected
to ensure the process follows best practices in budgeting. The participatory purpose of PB
may become meaningless and counterproductive if basic budgeting principles are traded
off for participation (Schick, 2003). Best practice in the budgeting process should adhere
to five core principles consisting of comprehensiveness, accuracy, annual span, legality,
and transparency (Sintomer, Allegretti, Herzberg, & Rocke, 2008). There is a vicious
circle of budget transparency leading to efficiency in governance, which gives rise to
fiscal discipline, which in turn strengthens the budgeting procedure. This sequence of
events produces better accountability and transparency in governance over budget and
other fiscal policies (Bastida & Benito, 2007; Benito & Bastida, 2009). As Sintomer et al.
(2008) surmised, there is a higher incidence of fiscal responsibility from politicians if the
budget process is transparent.
Transparency in a budget process guarantees the disclosure of substantial volume
of information to the public and inhibits political office holders from undue opportunism
(Sintomer et al., 2008). Benito and Bastida (2009) discovered in their quantitative study
of the relationship between budget transparency, fiscal responsibility, and voter turnout
that there exists a significantly positive correlation between transparency in budgeting
and participation in elections. Therefore, what the budget process sets out to achieve is to
enable governments to make informed decisions on what services to provide, what assets
to expend in providing services, and how to encourage stakeholders to reach those
decisions (Sintomer et al., 2008).
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A good budgeting process has specific rules and procedures (Schick, 2003).
Setting fiscal rules for the budget process limits government spending, and it avoids an
accumulation of debts (Gollwitzer, 2011). Budgets should be medium term, transparent,
and comprehensive: the rules should be consistent in their content and application
(Gollwitzer, 2011; Schick, 2003; Sintomer et al., 2008). Budget rules serve the purpose of
enforcing the implementation of approved budget and for avoiding arbitrary applications
of policies. However, according to Schick (2003), fiscal rules have no meaning when the
budget spans a single fiscal year because budget monitoring would be weak, and the
budget would not have considered sustainability. Additionally, the procedures should
include performance evaluation of budgets against specific benchmarks to determine the
overall effects of budgeting on the fiscal strategy (Bryson, 2011; Schick, 2003; Sintomer
et al., 2008).
Credible budgets are sustainable budgets within the context of macroeconomic
dynamics and government strategy (Schick, 2003). The forecasting and planning that
produce the budget should consider conceivably known risks that might negatively affect
the overall aims of the government. The medium-term strategy set within an efficient
strategic planning paradigm ensures sustainability of the budgets derived from the
process (Bryson, 2011). Therefore, budgeting should be an integral part of the overall
government strategy with measurable outcomes that guide future planning (Bryson, 2011;
Gollwitzer, 2011; Schick, 2003). The process must encourage sustained and consistent
communication with all stakeholders, especially when budgeting is a product of strategic
planning that would have involved these stakeholders earlier in the process (Gollwitzer,
2011).
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Legislative oversight over budgets and the budgeting process provide political
legitimacy (Gollwitzer, 2011). The supervision ensures compliance with approved
budgets since budget expenditures are subject to periodic reviews of the legislature, thus
giving credibility to the purpose of the budget process. Fölscher (2007) submitted that
the input of citizen stakeholders into the budget process involves setting priorities rather
than allocation of resources. Adesopo (2011) observed that linking fiscal and strategic
planning to PB process has contributed to the successful outcomes of the process.
Fölscher (2007) informed that when there is a gap between the planning process and the
PB process, participation by citizens has little visibility, which increases the propensity
for corruption to thrive and to impair transparency.
The Benefits of Participatory Budgeting
As with other participatory democratic institutions, citizens who participate in PB
learn civic activities and responsibilities through practice and thus improve the quality of
the electorates (Hamlett & Cobb, 2006). Citizens learn to think regarding collective goals
and benefits rather than personal gains and selfish agitations. Some of the aims of the PB
process include the elimination of political patronage, combating corruption through a
transparent budget process, and the reversal of socio-political exclusion of low economic
status citizens (Baierle, 2009). Thus, PB has become an institution of learning where
citizens acquire knowledge about their civic responsibilities and better negotiating tactics
with politicians on public policies. Fung (2006) conjectured that if the government is to
improve the type and quality of services that meet the needs of the citizens, the
contributions of ordinary citizens should be the source of information for government
officials. Having contributed to decisions that become policies, citizens are less likely to
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resist or oppose such policies. Instead, they tend to support such policies enthusiastically
(Hamlett & Cobb, 2006). Effective citizen participation requires a significant time
commitment, the benefits of which include the acquisition of both technical and
operational knowledge of public policy (Fung, 2006).
Participatory budgeting has also contributed significantly to improved social
justice in the equitable distribution of resources among citizens. Poor citizens have the
right to determine spending priorities of government and to redirect resources towards the
needs of the poor. Participatory budgeting closes the gap between elected representatives
and the citizens since PB increases access to elected officials who attend spending
prioritization meetings with their constituents (Wampler, 2012a). Therefore, there are
opportunities for citizens to engage their representatives at all times and not only during
electioneering campaigns.
One of the arguments for participatory democracy is the belief that representative
democracy, especially in developing economies, has not provided impactful governance
from which ordinary citizens benefit (Wampler, 2012c). Representative democracy has
failed to provide the public space for citizens to vote with their voices; it has not created
empowering tools such as education and economic independence (Boulding & Wampler,
2010; Dalton, 2008). Unfortunately, it has succeeded in the squandering of scarce public
resources while the majority of citizens live in penury (Wampler, 2012c). However, with
PB and similar participatory institutions, citizens and CSOs have managed to embrace
participatory democracy to reduce tokenism (Gaventa & Barrett, 2012; Leduka, 2009).
Thus, participatory institutions contributed to empowering citizens to negotiate resources,
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and to promote policies that are of interest to the wellbeing of the citizens (Wampler,
2012c).
Civil society organizations have leveraged their professional usefulness to
negotiate pro-poor policies with governments. Therefore, the raison d’être for the
adoption of participatory institutions is not to supplant representative democracy, but
rather to make it the contributory effort that surmounts obstacles (Wampler, 2012c).
Furthermore, participatory institutions have promoted social justice, addressed income
inequality, and they have debunked the myth that only the wealthy and the middleclass
could participate in the democratic process beyond suffrage rights (Fischer, 2012;
Pateman, 1995).
Resources available to participatory institutions are still relatively limited
compared to the overall expenditure of governments. In Porto Alegre, the government
allocated only about 15% of the available budget to PB (Wampler, 2012c). The limited
nature of resources has increased the necessity for participants to compromise, negotiate,
lobby, develop the interest in elective political positions, mobilizing for action, and form
CBOs (Wampler, 2012c).
The benefits of participatory institutions have also extended to government
officials as they have become better at identifying critical issues confronting their
jurisdictions (Peruzzotti, 2012; Wampler, 2012a). They could learn of citizens’ demands
first hand, and they could address potential conflicts before they expand to unmanageable
crises. Those seeking elective positions have venues at which they can gain access to
active citizens and community leaders (Abers, 2001). The public space of PB provides
the materials from which potential political aspirants can formulate electoral manifestos
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and programs. Between political office holders and civil servants, governments could
connect experts with communities and address their demands for better service delivery
and efficient management of resources (Wampler & Hartz-Karp, 2012).
Another benefit of participatory institutions is the establishment of social justice
by providing pro-poor rules of engagement to encourage participation (Avritzer, 2010;
Bertucci, 2008). In effect, participatory environments have pro-poor affirmative actions
(Su, 2012). The establishment of some measure of social justice has been the nature of
participatory spaces in developing economies with widening gaps between the rich and
the poor (Bratton, 2012; Catell, 2004; Donaghy, 2010). There have been substantial
infrastructure investments in affluent communities to the neglect of poorer neighborhoods
that contribute little to the state revenue from taxation. However, participatory
institutions have helped to address the skewed wealth distribution, and it has engendered
development in poor communities (Gaventa & Barrett, 2012; Speer, 2012). A hallmark of
good citizenship is the diligent payment of income tax. Citizens who participate in PB
experience know, first hand, what their contributions to the revenue pool could provide
(Adesopo, 2011; Wampler, 2012b).
The Drivers of Participatory Budgeting
The political system under which PB thrives is policy driven populism, and not
personality, political patronage or aggrandizement (Wampler, 2012c). Participatory
budgeting thrives under political systems that are fully democratic, with universal
suffrage and guaranteed free and fair elections (Wampler, 2012b). Under such political
systems, local government administrations have policy independence and fiscal
autonomy. In effect, the political arena should be decentralized functionally for local
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administrators to operate without undue interference from the central or state
governments (Wampler, 2012a).
Researchers in the area of participatory democracy and PB have made some
recommendations. Baierle (2008) suggested local administrations should access and
control the resources they generate such that they would develop the capacity for longterm planning and investment strategies. Without access to funds and adequate resources
for inclusion in the budget, the process of PB becomes meaningless to the participants
who might not witness the implementation of their desired projects and agenda (Avritzer,
2012; Wampler & Hartz-Karp, 2012). Adesopo (2011) identified the need for local
administrations to develop the institution, human resources, and networking capacity to
interface with CSOs to prepare citizens for interactive decision making. For democracy in
Nigeria and other developing countries to experience the institutional reawakening, the
citizens need civic engagement, which would involve the active participation of CSOs
and activists (Adesopo, 2011; Avritzer, 2012).
The decentralization of the local administration in Brazil facilitated the success of
PB. Decision making was taken away from the hands of a few influential politicians and
state officials (Wampler, 2012b). Information necessary for decision making and policy
formulation was available to the citizens who participated in the budget process (Abers,
2001). The relationship between the state and the stakeholders became transparent, and
the atmosphere of trust prevailed.
Success Factors in the Brazilian Experience
In Porto Alegre, the social movement was vocal, particularly where restive
residents were at the government’s throat for wanton neglect of their plight in the
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indigent and forgotten neighborhoods (Leubolt et al., 2008). Perhaps the most important
element that paved the way for PB was, as earlier stated, the political will of the state to
cede some decision-making powers to the restive poor. Where PB succeeded, as in the
case of Brazil, the government demonstrated its political will by establishing a legal
framework to institutionalize and support PB (Rodgers, 2010). Thus, the decisions that
emanated from the process were binding on all parties, including the government, and
those decisions became public policies (Wampler, 2012b). The political will of the
elected officials encouraged CSOs to engage state officials who worked along with CSOs
to mobilize the citizens (Rodgers, 2010).
An essential prerequisite for PB is that the organizers, usually the government,
must guarantee equality of all participants in the process (Rodgers, 2010). It is common
to find that elected delegates have had previous involvement with NGOs, especially
community, and religious organizations. As Montambeault (2009) observed, religious
organizations were able to form alliances with other groups and political parties. The
general perception, therefore, was that CSOs were equal partners with the state in
mobilizing the citizens to participate in decision-making processes, to learn negotiating
skills, and by so doing, strengthened participatory institutions (Acharya, Lavalle, &
Houtzager, 2004). The process should not give any privilege to the wealthy or influential
participants, and neither should any class dominate activities within the process (Rodgers,
2010). Except through the voting system, there should be no attempt to subvert decisions
on what to include or exclude in the course of deliberations. The people of Porto Alegre
and its environs demanded equality, justice, and wealth redistribution, and to some
extent, they succeeded (Leubolt et al., 2008).

61

In spite of legal mandates introducing PB to municipalities, PB failed to spread to
the poor at whom the process was targeted (Fung & Wright, 2001). Efficiency in the
administration of scarce resources and transparency are two principal objectives of PB.
However, authors and researchers in PB could not categorically conclude that these goals
have been achievable with PB experiments (Fung, 2006). More often than not, there are
contending local factors and circumstances affecting the outcome of PB, in spite of its
iterative and continuous improvement nature (Goldfrank & Schneider, 2006; Goldfrank,
2007). The effectiveness of PB at achieving its goals also depends on the presence of
active and well-informed CSOs serving the citizens as advocates before the state (Leubolt
et al., 2008).
Some conditions have arguably furthered the success of PB in various
jurisdictions. Factors that have contributed to recorded successes include willing heads of
governments, the absence of strong Right-wing opposition, and weak, or nonexistence of
influential elites (Leubolt et al., 2008). The provision of technical and financial assistance
by national and international agencies, the availability of adequate budgetary allocations,
and the active involvement of CSOs are some of the enabling dynamics that contribute to
the success of PB (Osmani, 2007; Richard, 2013; Schneider & Baquero, 2006;
Schugurensky, 2009).
Systemic Weaknesses in Participatory Budgeting
Magee (2012) identified some weaknesses with participatory democracy.
Participants in public decision making have the propensity of bloated expectations of
lofty achievements within specific budget constraints. These grand expectations lead to
disappointment in the process. Magee also observed that where the public has shown
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considerable interest in participation, the process could become unwieldy and time
consuming. In spite of the ubiquity of success stories of PB, some localities were only
able to sustain the process for a short period. In their study of PB in Portugal, Alves and
Allegretti (2012) used the concepts of fragility and volatility to identify reasons for the
failure to sustain the process. The researchers found that in spite of formal rules
guaranteeing participation by all citizens, and notwithstanding the special political offices
established to implement PB, the process was not sustainable. The focus was the
establishment of a perfect PB process rather than a system that was amenable to changes
and modifications.
Another obstacle to the sustainability of PB was the change of government and
political alliances. Election years tend to create disruption to PB sustainability as Alves
and Allegretti (2012) discovered, through either fund reduction or outright suspension of
the process. Some localities reduced and modified the process to accommodate
consultations with stakeholders, but the outcome of such consultations was not
necessarily binding on the government. The authors advanced the warning that in such
situations where decision-making power failed to transfer to the citizens, the government
could abandon the process ultimately. On the other hand, where the scope of PB
expanded to include other spaces such as social justice, health, administrative reforms,
social accountability, and redistribution of resources, PB has experienced sustainability.
Sheller (2010) recognized the disparity between the needs of the middleclass and affluent
communities on one hand, and the needs of the poorer neighborhoods on the other, a
situation that calls for a balanced approach and empathy on the part of the well off.
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Participatory Budgeting De-emphasized in Porto Alegre, Brazil
Changes in government in Brazil, particularly at the local level, have introduced
various changes to PB. Opposing parties to the Workers’ Party (PT) became hostile to PB
(Leubolt et al., 2008). The opposition blocked tax increases that would have made
additional funds available, and in 2005, the PT lost control of the government (Leubolt et
al., 2008). The new government, however, did not scrap PB. As Leubolt et al. informed,
the government set up a parallel process tagged Local Solidarity Governance (LSG)
while government officials boycotted PB sessions.
Three of the grouses against PB were that parochial interests of participants
overrode citywide strategy, that its one-year-span did not support sustainable
development, and that the demand for state funds did not marry such demands with
private-public partnership (PPP) investments (Leubolt et al., 2008; Sintomer et al., 2008).
Those who promoted LSG called for the mobilization of private sector investors to
supplement the scarce resources of government. The drawback with PPP, as observed by
Leubolt et al., was that it focused on larger projects such as mass transportation systems
and business district development rather than small projects to improve the immediate
locale of the poor.
In Brazil, the focus of PB has shifted since its introduction in 1989. Participatory
budgeting now has its attention on good governance, transparency, and access to
information on performance rather than robust negotiations between and among
contending interests (Alves & Allegretti, 2012; Avritzer, 2012; Leubolt et al., 2008;
Sintomer et al. 2008). Sadly, a major drawback of PPP is its lack of transparency
(Hadjimichalis & Hudson, 2006). Transparency is a hallmark of PB, but municipal
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governments’ LSG has used PPP arrangements as conduits to transfer funds earmarked
for PB to contracts awarded to private sector sponsors. Thus, municipal governments
have relinquished their obligations to PB to pursue strategies that are antithetical to PB
(Hadjimichalis & Hudson, 2006).
The motivation to participate in a participatory democratic process such as PB
differs between economic groups. The motivation for poor citizens to participate is in
direct access to public goods that would provide material benefits, whereas, the attraction
of affluent citizens to PB is the potential for good governing characteristics such as
transparency and anticorruption (Schneider & Baquero, 2006). In Porto Alegre,
Schneider and Baquero (2006) observed that the government demanded taxation from the
middleclass while it required support for the political process for material gratification
from the poor citizens. In both cases, the government expected good citizenship with a
strong sense of civic responsibility. The business sector prefers long-term fiscal planning
as opposed to the rather anti sustainability single year span of PB (Schneider & Baquero,
2006).
The North American Mega City Experiences
Lagos, Nigeria, is a mega city like New York City, Chicago, and Toronto. It is
thus, informative to examine the PB experiences of these cities. Lerner and Secondo
(2012) reported on PB in three North American megacities where the available funds
went to the three main areas that were of concern to the low-income citizens of the cities.
Participatory budgeting funds targeted schools, housing and jobs as opposed to public
parks or street improvements such as sidewalks.
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Targeted funding was possible because the majority of the participants were lowincome earners, and as Lerner and Secondo (2012) observed in New York City, the
citizens decided the rules of PB while the poor assumed leadership roles in the process.
Volunteers from various associations and committees had responsibility for the local
administration of PB in conjunction with local officials who provided guidance. Thus, the
space opened up for the usually excluded group to experience leadership (Lerner &
Secondo, 2012). In each of the three cities, postmortem meetings served to review what
worked and what did not work during previous rounds of the process. From the feedback,
the CSOs involved in the process started work immediately to address whatever lessons
emerged from the just concluded process.
To boost the interest of low-income citizens in participation, Lerner and Secondo
(2012) discovered that holding meetings in diverse locations reduced obstacles caused by
distance. Evening and weekend schedules enabled workers and youths to attend meetings
at which they participated in the discussions and voted on projects. Venues such as local
schools were popular places for holding meetings. Skilled facilitators directed the
meetings and encouraged those who might feel timid or intimidated by vociferous and
better-educated participants to speak up rather than remain passive. Recruiting
professional facilitators may require funding where a district does not have volunteers for
the job. Lerner and Secondo also discovered that the low-income citizens of Chicago,
New York, and Toronto required repeated invitations before they eventually attended PB
meetings. Teams of volunteer recruiters went around the districts canvassing for
attendance and highlighting the benefits of participation.
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Su (2012) observed PB in New York City and commented that New Yorkers,
mostly the poor who were not engaged in community activities because they distrusted
the government, became the proposers of ideas. The poor discovered the satisfaction in
volunteering as delegates for the budget process and voted without any inhibition. The
organizers of New York’s PB undertook outreach efforts targeted at the poor, and
predictably, those whom the outreach failed to capture remained excluded from the
process. Sixteen-year-old youths were also actively engaged in New York City PB
process.
In spite of the fact that youths under the age of 18 could not vote during national
elections, the 16-year-old participants were able to participate in the budget process and
voted. Participating youths learned to form interest groups to support their project ideas,
and they soon understood the need to form alliances with adult groups. The adults
expressed surprise at the contributions of the youths and soon embraced the youths as
important stakeholders in community affairs. In confirming that there is no best practice
in PB, Su posited that there is no fixed modus operandi, but the process should evolve to
take account of local dynamics for the maximum benefits of all stakeholders. Su went
further to suggest the need for the long-term engagement of participants to ensure
effective implementation and monitoring of projects.
Summarizing Participatory Budgeting
Participatory budget is by no means a panacea for resolving socio-economic
issues. Expectations should be within the bounds of its definition. Participatory budgeting
is an annual process that allows citizens as individuals or in organized groups to
participate voluntarily in decision making on the part of local budgets earmarked for the
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process. Unless deliberate good budgeting strategies co-exist and blend with PB, the
result could be similar to what obtained in Porto Alegre between 1995 and 1999 when the
rate of unemployment increased to nearly 80%, and consequently, the number of poor
people grew by 20% (Baierle, 2009). Lamentably, in the same period, income disparity
broadened by as much as 16%.
With good intentions at the local level, the best PB practices cannot create jobs, or
reduce poverty where the macroeconomic policies of the central government do not
promote economic growth (Goldfrank, 2007). In spite of its failure to alleviate poverty in
Brazil, PB has been successful in health and education (Menegat, 2002; Su, 2010;
Wampler, 2007). As Goldfrank (2007) posited, macroeconomic policies should strive for
the inclusion of citizens in fiscal debates, be transparent, and promote pro-poor policies
to reduce the income gap between the rich and the poor to achieve poverty reduction.
The World Bank, the United Nation, and some left-leaning governments have
encouraged the ubiquity of PB worldwide, particularly in developing economies (Fung &
Wright, 2001; Goldfrank, 2007). The belief by these organizations and governments is
that participatory institutions, specifically, PB, create an atmosphere of good governance.
The evidence points to success stories of PB in several cities (Avritzer, 2012; Avritzer,
2010; Fung & Wright, 2001; Wampler, 2012a). There has been no empirical evidence to
demonstrate that cities yet to adopted PB have produced different outcomes than cities
that have adopted it (Boulding & Wampler, 2010). The failure of PB has been most
noticeable in its inability to reduce poverty, or improve social wellbeing of citizens. The
suggestion of Boulding & Wampler (2010) is for municipalities to formulate revenue

68

saving policies, as well as revenue generating initiatives that encourage transparency,
which discourages corruption and reduces bureaucratic bottlenecks.
These facts notwithstanding, the civic benefits of PB are essential in assessing its
overall impact on poverty and social wellbeing (Catell, 2004; Boulding & Wampler,
2010). Benefits such as citizen empowerment, providing public platforms for the poor to
have a voice, and the creation of politically aware citizenry are laudable attributes that
provide enough stimuli for the spread of PB (Boulding & Wampler, 2010). Participatory
budgeting and similar participatory institutions serve to improve relations between the
state and the citizens, promote transparency, and improve government performance.
Integrating Participatory Budgeting with Strategic Planning
In 1990, the Workers’ Party administration in Porto Alegre streamlined the
process of setting budgetary priorities. A team of experts in strategic planning attached to
the mayor’s office designed the structure of PB in response to the administration’s
request (Menegat, 2002). Thus, PB was born out of strategic planning and hence the
similarities in the structures and processes of PB and strategic planning (Abers, 2001;
Menegat, 2002). Bryson (2011) defined strategic planning “as a deliberate, disciplined
approach” to essential decision making and taking particular actions that direct the
purpose and the existential stratagem of an organization (pp. 7-8). Strategic planning
provides the roadmap to organization leaders to determine courses of action and to
provide the basis for those actions (Bryson, 2011).
By design, strategic planning gains its effectiveness from broad deliberative
interactions among all stakeholders of an organization. Deliberations within strategic
planning take place at fora where participating stakeholders exchange opinions and
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engage in persuasive negotiations for competing alternatives based on reasoned and
convincing arguments (Steiner, 1997). The challenge for managers is to facilitate
collective thinking, learning and actions among the stakeholders without domination by
any group of stakeholders or a dominant individual (Innes & Booher, 2010).
Organizations engage in strategic planning to determine what rational actions to
undertake to project the organization’s goals and to fulfill its mandates. Strategic
planning aids in developing organizational capacity to deliver services effectively,
economically, and efficiently (Bryson, 2011). This linkage connects the stakeholders with
established structures, processes, available resources, and the political environment to
produce the kind or organizational efficiency that fulfills the mission, goals, and
mandates of the organization. Therefore, the deliberative nature of strategic planning
makes it an attractive approach for governments and nonprofits organizations to address
social problems.
Figure 2 is a model of an approach to strategic planning suggested by Bryson
(2011). In this model for local governments, the council manager initiates the process of
strategic planning, the ownership of which belongs to elected officials. Council managers
recognize the importance of cooperation between elected officials and various groups in
the community. By its nature, and similar to PB, strategic planning is capable of
generating enthusiastic participation by entire communities in the interest of building a
sustainable future. By discussing community values, vision, and mission early in the
process, participants learn about the strategy of the community to improve the standard of
living and the general environment of the community (Bryson, 2011). The mission
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statement projects the raison d'être of the community and it provide a source of
community pride around which the citizens rally for collective motivation.
Assessing the internal and external environments of the community provides the
guide for the community to prepare for events that could cause disruptions and those
events that present opportunities for the society. Internal environmental factors include
the quality of elected officials, the employees, and the ability of these individuals to think
critically and absorb new ideas (Gordon, 2005). External factors include
macroeconomics, the political environment, the legal and regulatory environments, and
the physical context of the locality (Bryson, 2011).
Strategic planning takes a medium to a long-term approach to setting goals and
objectives. The goals and objectives feed into the vision of the locality (Gordon, 2005).
The plan outlines the purpose of each objective and the transparent means by which the
district measures its performance. An important feature of strategic planning is the review
and evaluation of the plan, the programs, and the projects it sets out to accomplish
(Steiner, 1997). The locality sets criteria for performance measurement that determine
cost efficiency, program effectiveness, and the impact of the plan of the municipality as a
whole (Innes & Booher, 2010). Since performance measurement is a continuous process,
strategic plans go through reviews and amendments to reflect emerging realities. For this
reason, the locality needs to collect data that will guide the management of the locality to
take prompt actions to maintain effective and efficient performance.
Participatory budgeting emerged as a process in response to urgent demands of
the needy majority in Brazilian communities (Cabannes, 2004). Because of the need to
meet this kind of emergency, PB is a short-term measure, which, according to Cabannes
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(2004), fails to fit in with most municipalities’ longer-term strategies and sustainable
development plans. The challenge for government officials is to integrate the needs for
community or neighborhood development with local government-wide physical and
fiscal planning strategies. When the Workers’ Party introduced PB to Santo Andre, São
Paulo, Brazil and Rosario, Argentina, it was with strong linkage to the localities’ strategic
plans because the budgets of the strategic planning process spanned five to ten years,
creating sustainable planning approach to governance and public policy (Menegat, 2002).
Therefore, I propose an integration of PB into strategic planning process as shown in
Figure 2, for more effective, longer term, strategic and sustainable development
engendered by strategic planning.
Participatory budgeting stands to gain some added benefits if it is integrated
within strategic planning structure. Government officials and politicians can better
understand the context of budgeting when they consider various strategies, and how best
to attain those strategies (Steiner, 1997). They are thus able to guide the process of PB to
align with the local government’s objectives, overall budget performance, and future
strategic implications of agreed actions (Gordon, 2005; Innes & Booher, 2010).
Consequently, officials can coordinate various demands of the citizens for improved
service delivery while government becomes responsive by fulfilling its mandates,
obligation, and creating meaningful public value (Bryson, 2011).
Local Governance in Nigeria
The main purpose of local government administration in Nigeria, as with other nations
that use this tier of governance, is to ensure that every citizen, regardless of his or her
socio-economic status, can participate in community development (Bashir &

72

Muhammed, 2012). Local officials under the local government arrangement are
responsible and accountable to the communities under their purview. Under Nigeria’s
1999 constitution, local governments are institutions of decentralized governance, the aim
of which is to create national integration, efficient governance, and transparent
administration (Adesopo, 2011; Bashir & Muhammed, 2012).
The Nigerian constitutional aspiration is that of active democratic participation that
ultimately resonates at the national space. Therefore, the demands of the grassroots get
the attention of the states and the central government for macroeconomic strategic
planning. Bashir and Muhammed (2012) observed that the system has so far failed to
deliver the expected political development and socioeconomic outcomes. This failure,
posited Bashir and Muhammed (2012), has dogged freedom, liberty, and individual
empowerment, but instead, it has entrenched perennial poverty and ignorance.
For too long, the political system in Nigeria failed to improve the general living
standards of citizens, especially the poorer population (Adesopo, 2011). The absence of
participation by those who government policies affect is evident in the nonexistence or
inadequacy of basic amenities such as roads, portable water supply, schools, and health
care facilities (Dobson, 2005). These failures are not because of scarce local government
resources but because of opaque administration over local funds, lack of accountability,
corruption, and wanton disregard for the rule of law (Bashir & Muhammed, 2012;
Dobson, 2005).
Because of previous military regimes in Nigeria, there has been legitimacy crisis
in the polity. By ensuring equality of all citizens demonstrated through grassroots
opportunity to participate and deliberate on public policy issues, political systems may
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Figure 2. A suggested model integrating participatory budgeting into strategic planning process:
A visual representation partly designed from the narrative in “Strategic Planning: For Public and
Nonprofit Organizations” by J. M. Bryson (2011), Jossey-Bass. San Francisco, CA.
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yet overcome the legitimacy crisis (Avritzer, 2012). As Heller (2012) posited, when the
lower economic class overcomes the myriads of obstacles to collective action, secures the
anticipated gains of democracy. The role of civil society in this task is very pivotal to
achieving the aspiration because through organizing for collective action, lasting changes
could take place to create Rousseau’s community of equals (Pateman, 1995).
The absence of several of the real virtues of budgeting has characterized
government budgeting in Nigeria (Agbude & Egbide, 2012). In the absence of
transparency and accountability, guided by institutionalized budget discipline, the
country continues to suffer under the burden of waste, abuse, and fraud, the consequence
of which is lingering underdevelopment. According to Agbude and Egbide, the level of
underdevelopment in Nigeria, notwithstanding its wealth of crude oil reserve being the
sixth largest producer, is a paradoxical embarrassment to the African continent.
Reversing this trend requires good governance and by embracing the virtues of good
budget practices (Agbude & Egbide, 2012). Because of the inherent weaknesses in
governance, the urbanization of Nigeria and its attendant demand for infrastructure has
left the government bewildered about how to tackle the problems. As more Nigerians
move to urban centers, the growth of slums has been alarming due to lack of planning,
especially in the areas of sanitation and waste management (Omar, 2013).
The largest city in Nigeria is Lagos, which has fast become a city-state with
massive conurbation that has elevated its status to that of a megacity with a population of
over 14 million inhabitants. In the opinion of Agbude and Egbide, the government needs
to focus on providing shelter to combat overcrowding, mass transportation, infrastructure,
and environmental sanitation.
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Methodology in Literature
Since 1985 when PB took off in Porto Alegre, Brazil, there has been a burgeoning
body of literature on both participatory democracy and PB. Authors and researchers have
extensively examined the former through the prism of the latter thereby achieving
empiricism through a variety of research methods depending on the questions the
researchers set out to answer. Some inquiries into participatory democracy and
institutions took the form of case studies, gathering data from purposively selected
informants who participated in participatory processes especially PB (Bashir &
Muhammed, 2012; Bowen, 2008; Dobson, 2005; Donaghy, 2010). Alternatively, other
researchers conducted surveys of individual citizens who had engaged in participatory
institutions in one capacity or the other (Houtzager & Lavalle, 2010; Marien, Hooghe, &
Quintelier, 2010; Schier, 2000; Wampler, 2007; Wampler, 2012a).
The two alternate methods served different research objectives. According to
Houtzager and Lavalle (2010), those who used surveys to collect data identified the
features of the democratic institutions or those of civil society through the characteristics
of the individuals that participated in the studies. On the other hand, researchers who
adopted the case study and interviewing designs did so to generalize their findings on
participatory governance, which often involved civil society. They achieved their aims by
using characteristic modes of practice, dictated by the political terrain, to generalize
conceptual or theoretical assertions, albeit space and time limited the studies.
Peruzzotti (2012) employed the review of the literature in the position paper, to
probe noticeable advancements in the participatory space especially democratic
accountability in some Latin American nations including Brazil. The literature review
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honed in on the innovations involving CSOs as protagonists of accountability. Peruzzotti
concluded that, with the progress made in participatory democracy, citizens have the
opportunities to demand and to promote accountability. Monitoring accountability shifted
to civil society and other social actors whose objectives were to encourage responsible,
responsive, open, and accountable governance. Participatory institutions hold public
officials accountable, not at election cycles but at all moments during the life of a
government.
Discussion and position papers are quite common on discourses pertaining to PB
and other participatory institutions. Baierle (2009) presented a thesis highlighting a
number of issues on PB in the discussion paper on the anticipated challenges and
roadblocks in the path of PB. In a similar vein, Avritzer (2010) presented a discussion
paper on the development of PB and its transformative effects on the living standards of
the poor in Brazil and its spread across the globe.
Goldfrank (2007) engaged the use of the wealth of literature on participatory
democracy and budgeting to analyze why some PB experiments failed, and others
succeeded. Goldfrank (2007) established the connections between decentralized
administrative styles, funding, and active civil society as the drivers of meaningful
program designs.
Participatory democracy researchers have also used quantitative and mixed
methodology methods of research inquiry especially when they sought external validity
and generalizability of their findings. Wampler (2012a) used secondary data from a
survey of 833 elected officials involved with PB in Brazil to evaluate the effectiveness of
the practices of PB in other participatory spaces and economic arenas. As is synonymous
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with the quantitative method of research, the study used a random sampling method to
select the survey participants from among the delegates who had taken part in PB. The
study identified four categories of civil society organization actors, namely (a) leaders,
(b) members, (c) ex-members, and (d) those citizens who had civic engagements without
affiliations with any particular organizations.
Wampler (2012a) used logistic regression where agenda setting, political
strategies, and arena shopping served as the dependent variables to examine how
particular public activities carried out by these individuals translated into cooperation
with government mandated participatory institutions. With only one instance in the
agenda setting variable – who sets internal debate – CSO leaders were significantly more
likely to be involved with agenda setting (p < 0.05), political strategies (p < 0.001), and
arena shopping (p < 0.001) than any other group of citizens (p. 352). At the same
confidence level, the leaders were 17% more likely to determine they collaborate with
other CSOs rather than the government than PB winners whose projects were adopted.
The same leaders were 5% more likely than their members and 8% more likely than PB
project winners to collaborate with other groups to influence decision making, and to
distribute public goods in various participatory spaces (p. 354).
In the exploratory study of Michels and De Graaf (2010), the authors used the
mixed methods to assess the role of citizens who participate in public decision-making
processes and to define the degree to which these citizens influence policies. The data for
the qualitative case study design came from in-depth interviewing of eight informants
including government officials, businesspersons, and professional association
representatives. For the quantitative design, the authors conducted a thirty six-question
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survey of 272 citizens who had participated in various participatory institutions including
PB.
The phenomenological study by Owusu-Achiaw (2013) examined the effect of
participation on housing for the poor from the perspectives of the beneficiaries of social
housing. The interviews of purposively sampled 120 residents of the housing scheme
provided the data for the study. The study found that, without community involvement in
decisions about their environment, policy makers failed to provide what people needed.
Owusu-Achiaw identified the need for communities to disseminate information among its
citizens such that decision making on the part of the residents relies on the awareness of
such information.
Using secondary data from the literature on participatory democracy, Fung (2006)
developed a framework that provided a better understanding of various participatory
institutions from three perspectives: who participates, how the participants communicate
to make decisions, and the linkage between public policy and the deliberations by the
participants. The research addressed the typology of participation and by how much
participation was necessary for effective participatory governance. Fung (2006) posited
in this article that participation ultimately should achieve the three fundamental
democratic principles of “legitimacy, justice, and effectiveness of public action” (p. 73).
Fung further posited that participatory designs are effective for the particular
environment the designers have in mind. Therefore, there is no best practice; rather the
process continually evolves within the context of the particular locus or arena,
considering all the sociopolitical and economic nexus of the time.
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The case study design was the choice of Bowen (2008) in a study of eight
Jamaican communities. The study focused on what participants understood and
associated with pro-poor initiatives. It was a follow-up study to a grounded theory study.
Nonparticipant observations and review of public documents provided the triangulating
data for the study.
Drawing on the theory of representation, Houtzager and Lavalle (2010) in their
qualitative study utilized the case study design to explore civil society’s claims to
representation and the contextual meaning of representation to participatory governance.
Data gathering was through secondary data from surveys of NGOs that work with poor
communities in the megacities São Paulo, Delhi, and Mexico City. The secondary data
also included interviews with 229 NGOs engaged with residents of poor urban
communities. The participant selection was by the snowballing method where
participants referred the researchers to others whom they believe could provide
meaningful data for the research.
Houtzager and Lavalle honed in on the São Paulo survey because of the extensive
Brazilian leading experience with participatory institutions. The researchers examined the
claims of the NGOs to representing the people in political spaces, and the evidence to
support the claims. The research found that CSOs in São Paulo were politically active,
influencing the various stages that led to the formation of public policies. While the
survey indicated that participants did not believe civil society was an alternative to
democratic institutions, the research concluded that civil society had become the
intermediary between the state and the poor communities.
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Khuluq (2008) used the case study design to understand the implementation
process of the various poverty alleviation agenda of three districts of Indonesia. The data
provided the qualitative tool to analyze the effects those programs had on the living
standards of the poor. It was a comparative case study of two villages, which collected
data from the semi-structured interview of purposively selected participants consisting of
petty traders, artisans, teachers, government officials, and representatives of civil society.
Other triangulating data sources were from state documents and participant observations.
The study found that when policies succeeded in improving the lives of the poor, the poor
participated with enthusiasm in government programs and did away with the passivism.
Out of necessity, the poor united in the fight against poverty to improve their economic
status, rather than the old selfish approach to individual or parochial survival.
This study benefited from the qualitative approach, using the interviewing design
that best answers the research questions in Chapter 1. It provides the model for better
understanding of the practice of PB in the particular case of Ijede LCDA from the
subjective experience of individuals who had experienced the process. Through
interviewing of purposively selected participants, and the review of PB process
documents from prior years, the study will contribute to strengthening the process of PB
at Ijede LCDA.
Summary
Participatory budgeting is a relatively recent process in Nigeria. The outcome of
PB in Brazil encouraged the United Nations and the World Bank. Porto Alegre is the
quintessential example of successful PB, which these institutions highlighted worldwide.
The perception among several Nigerians and Africans in general is that participatory
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democracy begins and ends with the ability to vote in general elections. Beyond voting,
there is the lack of interest in engaging the political class directly in dialogues on matters
that affect daily lives (Adesopo, 2011; Bashir & Muhammed, 2012; Bowen, 2008;
Donaghy, 2010; Ganuza & Frances, 2012; Leduka, 2009). Circa 2007, Nigeria adopted
PB along with several other Sub-Saharan African nations (Adesopo, 2011). The provision
of technical and financial assistance by national and international agencies, the
availability of adequate budgetary allocations, and the active involvement of CSOs are
some of the enabling dynamics that have contributed to the success of PB (Avritzer,
2009; Baierle, 2009; Bherer, 2010; Goldfrank, 2007).
The two frameworks that drive this study include Avritzer’s (2009) theory of
participatory institutions establishing a tripartite relationship between civil society, the
political society, and institutional design. The effectiveness of the relationship between
the three institutions, in turn, determines the outcomes of PB as the other framework for
this study. The willingness of the political class to cede some power under PB, the
promotion of pro-poor policies, and redistribution agenda have been the stimulants
encouraging participation by ordinary citizens (Postigo, 2010).
As with other participatory democratic institutions, citizens who participate in PB
learn civic activities and responsibilities through practice and thus improve the quality of
the electorates (Hamlett & Cobb, 2006). Citizens learn to think of collective goals and
benefits rather than personal gains and selfish agitations. Some of the aims of the PB
process include the elimination of clientelism, combating corruption through a
transparent budget process, and the reversal of socio-political exclusion of low economic
status citizens (Baierle, 2009). Fung (2006) conjectured that if the government is to
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improve the type and quality of services that meet the needs of the citizens, the
contributions of ordinary citizens should be the source of information for government
officials.
Alves and Allegretti (2012) used the concepts of fragility and volatility to identify
sustainability problems such as the absence of legal framework to protect the process
from abandonment by Right-wing politicians. The researchers identified the quest for the
establishment of a perfect PB process, regime changes, and political alliances as other
issues that could threaten PB. There is unanimity among authors that there is no best
practice in PB, and each locality would need to consider its sociocultural, political, and
economic dynamics to determine what mix produces the best outcomes.
The review of literature explored the concept of integrating PB with strategic
planning given the high likelihood of project abandonment due to lack of funds, time to
complete projects, and regime changes particularly in the case of Ijede LCDA and
Nigeria. Participatory budgeting is an adaptation of strategic planning by a team of
experts attached to the office of the mayor of Porto Alegre, Brazil (Menegat, 2002). The
challenge for PB organizers is the measurement of the performance of the process, which
strategic planning and its medium to long-term approach are designed to achieve
(Gordon, 2005).
Some essential components of successful participatory outcomes include the role
of CSOs in the training and empowering of citizens, the willingness of the state to
mandate the process and provide adequate financial resources, and the private sector
corporate social responsibility initiatives. This study examined the influence of this mix
of ingredients in strengthening PB at Ijede LCDA.
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In Chapter 3, I describe the research methodology, the locus of the study, and the
purposive nature of informant selection to provide the data for this study. The chapter
provides details of the process as practiced at the particular setting. Chapter 4 details the
data analysis strategy, process, and interpretation. In Chapter 5, I present the discussion
on the findings, the study conclusion, and recommendations.
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Chapter 3: Research Method
Introduction
It is not known whether and how civil society empowers citizens to participate in
the participatory budgeting (PB) process. Specially, it is not known whether and how
civil society can empower citizens of Ijede LCDA in Lagos state, Nigeria to participate in
the PB process. The purpose of this qualitative case study was to gain a better
understanding of the role of civil society in educating and empowering the citizens of
Ijede LCDA in order for them to participate in the budgetary decision-making processes.
The research questions of this study interrogated various elements that identify the
dynamics CSOs need to consider in coordinating their activities to empower the citizenry.
Data collection for the study was conducted through interviews with purposively
selected participants consisting of residents of the community, government officials,
politicians, and representatives of CSOs that are active in the local government. The
study reviewed budget documents for the fiscal years 2012 through 2014. The local
government did not maintain official records of past PB processes.
In this chapter, I present the research paradigm that directed the data gathering
process for this study. The research questions determined the qualitative methodological
approach. In the first section of this chapter, I lay out the details of the research
methodology, the description of the locus of the study, the participants, and the method of
participant selection. In the third section, I discuss the data collection, method of data
analysis, and finally, I present the discourse on ethics in research and the protection of the
participants in this study.
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Research Design
As stated in Chapter 1, the research questions for this study drive the investigation
and choice of a case study approach. The choice of the constructivist paradigm to which
the case study design belongs was driven by the research questions, which were designed
to collect rich data from the narratives of the research participants. The participants
provided the information that revealed the particulars the research questions set out to
investigate; namely, the activities of NGOs and their roles in mobilizing the community
to participate in PB.
RQ1: What roles do nongovernmental organizations play in the design structure of the
PB process at Ijede LCDA?
RQ2: What resource framework and network are necessary for effective PB advocacy at
Ijede LCDA?
RQ3: What local dynamics at Ijede LCDA encourage the involvement of the business
community in the PB process?
RQ4: What sustainability strategies should Ijede LCDA consider for citizen-selected
projects?
These research questions were designed to extract from the participants the
essential factors needed for citizens to possess the ability to interact with the government
over budgetary allocations and spending in a PB process. The interview questions
examined the roles of NGOs, if any, in empowering citizens to acquire the necessary
skills to engage the government effectively.
Research question 1 addressed the problem statement by investigating the roles of
NGOs, if any, in the design of the PB process that enables the citizens to participate in,
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and benefit from, the objectives of interacting with the government. The question also
examined the methods NGOs adopt to interface with the citizens toward their
empowerment. Research question 2 unraveled, through the intuitive perception of the
participants, the activities CSOs needed to embark on to empower the citizens towards
participating in the PB process at Ijede LCDA in Lagos state, Nigeria.
Idemudia (2009) conjectured that some corporate organizations do reinvest in
communities by providing funds, materials and equipment towards the execution of
community projects because financial resources are hardly adequate for local and
municipal administrations to fund PB. Thus, in their advocacy role, NGOs are expected
to interface with corporations to participate in community projects.
Research question 3 explored, through the experiences of the participants, the
underlying factors that encouraged corporations to fill the resources gap experienced by
governments. Essential to the success of PB is the intervention by NGOs establishing
connections with corporations to create awareness about community needs. Research
question 4 was also exploratory, surveying the sustainability strategies the government
could consider to ensure citizen-selected projects are completed and maintained. This
research question has the potential to lead to policy changes requiring the government to
consider some sustainability strategies such as medium-term to long-term budgeting, and
increased funding for PB.
Together, these research questions provided the background for the collection of
relevant data during the semi-structured one-on-one interviewing, the follow-up
questions, and the focus group discussions. The data collected led to further
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understanding of the role of civil society in educating and empowering the citizens of
Ijede LCDA to participate effectively in the budgetary decision making.
Qualitative Method
The qualitative approach is a social constructivist and naturalistic paradigm
researchers use to understand their existence and their world (Marshall & Rossman,
2011; Miller & Salkind, 2002). Researchers who engage in this approach gather most of
their evidence through open-ended interviews with individuals who live phenomena
under inquiry in the study (Kvale, 1996; Seidman, 2006). Creswell (2009) discussed the
social constructivist paradigm along with the advocacy and participatory model. Sharing
knowledge through social construction, researchers are able to organize relational
patterns of thoughts and behaviors to give meaning to the experiences of research
subjects (Yin, 1994). Advocacy and participatory models present the opportunity for a
researcher to investigate the socioeconomic issues of poverty, oppression, inequality, and
empowerment (Marshall & Rossman, 2011; Patton, 2002). Researchers in this area,
through advocacy, appeal to the conscience of society about the plight of marginalized
citizens.
Yin (2012) described as a compelling feature of the case study design the need to
acquire in-depth understanding of phenomena in a real world context. Consequently, data
collection for the case the study design occurs in the natural setting of the unit of
analysis. Such an embedded mode of research produces new insights and learning. Case
study research outcomes have been applied to the evaluation of process initiatives and to
document the analyses of the results of social experiments in public policy decision
making (Yin, 2012).
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There are various research traditions under the qualitative paradigm. Common
among these are: ethnography, grounded theory, phenomenology, and case studies
(Marshall & Rossman, 2011; Patton, 2002).
Yin (2009) identified interviewing as a very important method for collecting
information for case studies. Interviewing is a significant part of the case study design
and is widely used in process evaluation research into sociopolitical programs and
initiatives and social projects by governments and NGOs (Kvale, 1996; Yin, 2012).
Interviewing permits the inclusion of a broad range of context and other conditions
without restricting the researcher to remote variables (Seidman, 2006; Yin, 2012).
Interviewing assumes that the researcher has some strategic interest in the activities of the
participants at a particular point in their lives. Blumer (1969) submitted that through
interviewing, the participants grant context access to the researcher to understand their
actions, behaviors, and meanings. In effect, the meaning people ascribe to their
experiences determines the manner in which they pass through those experiences
(Mishler, 1991; Seidman, 2006).
Although there are various forms of interviews, such as in surveys where closeended questions are appropriate, the open-ended interview questions used in case studies
enable the researcher to convert interview respondents into informants (Yin 2009). The
researcher, according to Yin (1994) can ask for the respondents’ opinions about aspects
of the phenomenon under study or about specific events or to suggest personal insights
(Yin 1994). Such personal insights often provide the researcher the opportunity for
deeper probing questions.
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The Setting
In conformity with Yin’s (2012) clarification of what constitutes the case in case
the study design, this study’s unit of analysis is the PB process at Ijede LCDA of Lagos
State, Nigeria, one of the local governments that should have completed five rounds of
PB. As a bounded entity, “the boundary between the case and its contextual conditions –
in both spatial and temporal dimensions – may be blurred” (Yin, 2012, p. 6). For this
study, the PB program in Ijede LCDA is the case but without definitive boundary
between the PB process at the LCDA, and its space and time. A single case study site
avoids diluting the details of the study and provides robust analysis of the context of the
development of a novel phenomenon (Wolcott, 2008). The selection of Ijede LCDA was
purposeful because of the ease of access to the site through a trusted gatekeeper, the
Council Manager, whose position offered access to the participants.
In 1999, the Lagos State government, in a controversial political maneuver,
created 37 new local governments out of the existing 23. The move was controversial
because the federal government opposed it due to the belief that the creation of additional
local governments would increase the amount of federal allocations to the state. Ijede
LCDA, along with the other local governments and LCDAs in the state, did not receive
the statutory allocation of funds from the government at the center for nearly nine years.
In spite of the nonpayment of its statutory allocations, Lagos State government was able
to fund local administrations, albeit with far fewer resources than should have been
available (Ugoh & Ukpere, 2009). Consequently, development was on hold for 9 years.
Ijede is an old, semi-rural town with a history dating back further than 650 years
(IDF, 2014). Geographically, it is to the north of Lagos Island, separated by the Lagos
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Lagoon. Fishing was the mainstay of the people of Ijede. However, as the economy of
Lagos State grew, the proximity of Ijede has attracted low income and middle-class
dwellers who commute to work in the city of Lagos daily.
The presence of federal and state institutions has been sustaining the economic
activities in Ijede. The LCDA has a number of government institutions including:
schools, hospitals, community health centers, ferry terminals, a federal governmentowned gas company, an oil palm plantation, and some housing estates. The majority of
the inhabitants of Ijede are poor, and citizens look to the LCDA to enact policies that
would address poverty and improve their economic status. Ijede LCDA, like most local
governments in Nigeria, is in need of a network of roads, housing, electricity, and other
essential social services and amenities. However, according to Khalil and Adelabu
(2012), the most urgent need is for the people to engage local officials to identify
priorities, obtain the commitment of the government to address those priorities, and hold
the government accountable for its actions. Participatory budgeting has presented such
opportunity.
Population and Sample
The method of selecting participants for this study was purposive sampling that
ensured the collection of relevant and useful data from those with sufficient PB
experience in the LCDA. This kind of criterion sampling is useful where informants have
had direct exposure to the phenomenon under study (Yin, 1994). The sample population
provided the required information to understand the roles of actors in PB. This study
embraced Yin’s (2012) approach to the population, sample selection, and sample size.
The purposively selected participants included adult citizens of Ijede LCDA: the civil
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servants, the elected representatives, and the members of NGOs active in the community,
all of whom had previously participated in PB.
The study sample of 30 participants was drawn from this population. There were
15 one-on-one interviews and two focus group discussions including five participants
each. The focus group discussants were selected based on the usefulness of the
information they provided at the individual interview stage. Each category of participants
was represented in the focus groups. The focus group discussions encouraged the
participants to generate spontaneous and emotional conversations. A large focus group
could become unwieldy and beyond the interviewer’s control (Kvale, 1996; Seidman,
2006).
The study population consisted of adult citizens of Ijede LCDA: the civil servants,
the elected representatives, and the members of NGOs who were active in the
community. Participants were purposively selected for their previous PB experiences.
The other criteria for participant selection included literacy, ability to communicate in
English, and availability for the in-person interview and discussion sessions. See
Appendix A for study population criteria. The sample size (n = 15) was sufficient to
minimize the risk of participant attrition, and according to Marshall and Rossman,
(2011), the diversity of the population group required such large sample, in order to
enhance transferability.
Participant Selection Process
The gatekeeper provided assistance to locate individuals who met the participant
criteria for this study (Patton, 2002). The gatekeeper made initial contact with the
participants, relating to them this research and its purpose. The gatekeeper provided
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telephone numbers and email addresses of each willing individual. I contacted the
participants to provide detailed information about the study, confirmed their
qualifications under the participant criteria, and obtained the agreement of each
individual to participate voluntarily in the study.
Informed consent procedure
Research participants should be informed of the risks and benefits of taking part
in research studies and be informed of the voluntary nature of their participation
(Rudestam & Newton, 2007). The process of obtaining participants’ consent to be part of
this study was by telephone, explaining the purpose of the study and the criteria under
which participants qualified. I requested via short message services (SMS) that the
participants send their email addresses so that they could receive the informed consent .
The informed consent provided details of the research topic and purpose, specifying the
criteria for including the participants in this study.
The initial correspondence included some sample questions, the estimated 45 to
90 minutes time allotment for each of the two interviews, in which the participants were
involved, and the risks and the mitigation of the risks to which the participants might be
exposed. It also stated the voluntary nature of participation, the equivalent of $10 reward
for each interview, and the freedom to withdraw from the study at any time. Participants
were encouraged to communicate questions, concerns or any other issues that needed
clarification to the researcher or to an appropriate representative of the institutional
review board of Walden University, who was identified in the consent document. The
participants were given up to a week to consider the conditions stated in informed
consent email before communicating their responses by replying to the email. At the
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venue of the interviews, each participant was handed two copies of the informed consent;
one to be signed, dated and returned to me and the other to be retained for the
participant’s record.
Confidentiality
To ensure the confidentiality of the participants in this study, I expunged from the
data, all references to identifying information. I retained sufficient information in field
notes to identify the participants for member checking. A professor of intercultural
communication at Iowa Wesleyan College undertook the data transcription, a fee based
service rendered in a consulting capacity. He is an experienced communications expert
with expertise in data transcription. The service is necessary to ensure accurate and
detailed transcription. In addition, under consideration was the short turnaround time that
made member checking possible during fieldwork and not several weeks thereafter when
participants might not have full and accurate recall of their accounts.
The transcriber signed a confidentiality agreement for the data transcription
service. During data collection, I uploaded the audio files of the recorded interview to the
transcriber via an encrypted link to an iCloud account I set up for the fieldwork. The
transcriber returned the transcripts to me via an encrypted link from the transcriber’s
iCloud account. The transcriber deleted the interview audio files and transcripts of the
interviews as soon as I completed member checking satisfactorily. I encrypted all audio
files I generated during the fieldwork and I backed them up to iCloud. I deleted all the
recorded interviews on my phone and on my computer after backing them up to iCloud. I
will retain the data I collected for this study in my secure iCloud account for the
mandatory five years after which I will delete them permanently.

94

Sharing Study Results with Stakeholders
The study participants and the community, through the Ijede Community Online
News, and the website of Ijede Development Foundation (IDF), will have the opportunity
to read the summary of the results of this study as Stake (1995) recommended. The
community holds monthly fora at which attendees deliberate on issues of concern to the
community. The Ijede community, at one of these fora, will have the opportunity to
discuss the results of this study. Policymakers and other stakeholder are inspired and
likely to take action because of media interests and public opinions. Therefore, there
should be a platform for stakeholder feedback to attract the attention of policymakers in
the community and the broader Nigerian space. The successful adoption of results and
recommendations of this study by the Ijede LCDA could pave the way for its presentation
and adoption at larger fora at state and national levels.
The Interview Protocol
The interview protocol for this study was standardized open-ended questioning
with structured wordings designed to capture, in general, the same information from
participants in the same group as recommended by Gall, Gall, and Borg (2003) and Kvale
(1996);. The dialogues thus focused on the main points of the interviews and flexible
enough for probing questions to explicate additional information from the participants.
The interviews took place at a conference room in a hotel located within Ijede
Community. The hotel and its facilities were adequate for hosting the interviews. The
one-on-one interviews lasted between 17 and 47 minutes. As with the one-on-one
interviews, I facilitated and moderated the two focus group discussions, which lasted
about 50 and 53 minutes respectively. I recorded the interviews with iTalk TM, a
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telephone application, which was located close to the participants. Additionally, the
Microsoft Word TM version of Apple TM MacBook laptop, which has the capacity for
audio recording and annotation at various timelines, acted as backup recording device.
To ensure confidentiality of the focus group participants, I instructed the
participants on the importance of discretion during the discussions, which proceed
without referring to anyone by name but by pre-assigned alphanumeric identifiers. I
devised a list of identifiers, each unique to each participant to maintain anonymity
(Rudestam & Newton, 2007). I applied the identifiers in place of participants’ names on
all the notes taken during the group discussions. The recordings on iTalk contained
prompts to indicate speakers’ identifier, which I annotated on the recording timeline on
the Microsoft Word media recorder.
Rudestam and Newton recognized difficulties such as domination of discussions
by some individuals or muted participation by some women, which were addressed by
requesting contributions from less active participants, respectfully thanking the dominant
contributors and allowing other participants to provide alternative perspectives. I made
deliberate eye contact with others who might want to contribute to the discussions
whenever the opportunity arose. This study had a participant pool of 16 from which only
15 were required. The proposed target for the participant pool was 30. The interview
protocols for the one-on-one interviews, the focus group interviews, and the document
review protocols are in Appendices B through F.
At the conclusion of each focus group discussion, the participants had sufficient
opportunity to ask questions. Kvale (1996) suggested participants confirm the clarity and
transparency of the research process, and to encourage them to share their feelings and
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reactions to any aspects of the research. The participants were interactive and spoke
freely throughout the discussions. Finally, with gratitude, I reminded the participants of
the content of the informed consent form and the contact information contained therein,
should there be the need to clarify any issues or desire to be informed of the study result.
Validation of Interview Questions
The interview questions were specifically constructed for this study, and they
were subjected to validation of application as de Vaus (2001) recommended. To ensure
content validity of range of meanings, and the reliability that the interview questions
would give the same result when used recurrently in varying circumstances, two crosscultural communications experts reviewed the interview protocol through a consensual
validation process. A professor of political science and culture at a leading Midwest
university who is a prolific writer and researcher, and whose works have focused on
Nigeria and Africa’s political spaces, and an associate professor at a Southern university,
who used the interviewing method to interview participants in ethnographic research in
parts of Africa, validated the interview questions. I chose these professors for their
contributions to African socio-political commentaries and their expertise in the nuances
of African sociocultural constructs.
In reviewing the interview questions, the experts considered the language of the
interview questions appropriate for the average Nigerian English speaker. While the
questions were adjudged acceptable, further explanations were suggested for participants
who, from responses to the first two icebreaker questions, might require additional
prompting to obtain detailed accounts that contributed to the thick data obtained. In
particular, I was cautioned to listen for local jargons or slangs and to paraphrase
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responses provided by the participants ensuring concurrence of meanings between the
researcher and the participants. During data collection, I modulated the language of the
interview questions to accommodate the level of understanding and verbal articulation of
the participants. The interview protocols were validated without material alterations, and
they were used on the field as they were designed.
Researcher Role
I had conducted a study of the practice and implementation of PB in six local
governments in Lagos State, Nigeria, which revealed weak implementation of PB,
skeptical electorates, and unmotivated state officials. The study further revealed a general
lack of trust on the part of the citizens in the motive of the state. The poor residents who
are the targets of PB declined the calls to participate for fear of tax dodger labeling. The
study also found that rather than encouraging individuals to participate in PB,
representatives of neighborhood associations were the invited participants. All the
participants in the research identified inadequate funding as a challenge to development.
These findings prompted the need for further study into the process of PB in Lagos State.
None of the participants in the preceding narrative was involved in the present study.
Therefore, this study and its participants were independent of the prior research. The
qualitative researcher is a data collection instrument during a research process (Corbin &
Strauss, 2008). The qualitative researcher designs his or her instruments and does not rely
on some third party survey questions developed for other purposes. I had the moral
imperative to collect data as objectively and realistically as possible (Marshall &
Rossman, 2011). Thus, the task of this researcher, as Kvale (1996) submitted, was to ask
good open-ended questions and reduce bias to the minimum by being neutral. Following

98

Kvale’s suggestion, I explored the responses of the participants and extricated their
meanings from those narratives. My responsibility was to ensure the interviews remained
focused as structured..
This study involved human subjects who provided the data. Consequently, before
entering the field, the Institutional Review Board (IRB) of Walden University ensured
that the benefits of this research outweighed the risks. As I proceeded to fieldwork, I
conducted interviews with participants with whom he established some empathetic or
emotional relationship in the course of collecting data. My duty as the researcher was to
put the participants at ease such that without undue pressure or influence, the stories they
were willing to tell unfolded. Because of the large data qualitative research potentially
produces, the number of participants is usually not very large. Therefore, 15 participants
were sufficient to reveal information that ranged from personal through controversial to
subversive all of whom contributed towards answering the research questions and
influencing the conclusion of this study (Stake, 1995). This researcher in his role ensured
accuracy and objectivity through member checking and data triangulation strategies.
Data Collection and Analytical Strategies
Data were collected from interviewing, focus group discussions, and public
documents available at the local government (Janesick, 2011; Yin 2009). Transcripts of
interviews, with all good intentions, might not accurately reflect what transpired during
the interviews and discussions. This kind of limitation imposes additional burden on
researchers who wish to ensure the trustworthiness of the data and the subsequent
interpretations adduced to the data (Lave & Steinar, 1995).
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The purpose of collecting data was to possess adequate information to answer the
research questions. According to Yin (2009), data collection strategies available to
qualitative researchers include individual interviews, documents, direct observations,
artifacts, and participant observation, which should be derived from two or more sources.
The preferred data collection strategy for this study was to elicit information through indepth, semi-structured, open-ended one-on-one interviews, focus group discussions and
the review of government records. A fundamental assumption of interviewing is that the
interviewer is interested in people, but that assumption requires the interviewer to
suppress personal ego and allow the importance of the participants to prevail (Seidman,
2006).
Case studies are directed by the theoretical concepts (Yin, 2012). Therefore,
Avritver’s (2009) theory of participatory institutions provided the theoretical proposition
from which this study emerged. The theory contributed to the development of the
essential methodological steps of this study. Yin (2012) posited that theories assist
researchers in developing the research questions, defining the research data, directing the
data analysis, refining the case study design. Theories also play a major role in the
interpretation of the data. The application of Avritver’s theoretical orientation simplified
the implementation of this study by providing a number of theory-generated pre codes as
the foundational guide to data analysis.
I recorded the interviews without objections from any of the participants. The
recordings were transcribed verbatim, and copies of the transcripts were shared with the
participants for member checking. Following the approval of the participants that the
transcribed information was an accurate reflection of the details they wished to provide
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for the study, coding of the data began. Atlas.tiTM, a qualitative analysis software, was used
for the coding process. The analytical process categorized the data under various topics or
pre codes from the literature, the theoretical and conceptual frameworks for easy retrieval
at any time. Thus, according to Stake (1995), the standardized unit of analysis was either
a word, a phrase or a complete sentence.
The initial open codes uncovered meanings and ideas, and they revealed the
thoughts contained within the texts. Yin (2009) described qualitative data analysis as a
process seeking matching textual patterns and conflicting or missing information. The
patterns form categories of themes around concepts found both the theoretical and
conceptual frameworks, and in the literature. Using the tools available in Atlas.ti, some
concept maps or models emerged to display the interrelationships between codes and
around concepts and themes graphically (see Appendix H for coding protocol).
The triangulation of information from multiple sources is an intrinsic element of
qualitative research (Patton, 2002). In addition to the one-on-one interviews and the focus
group interviews, government budget documents completed the data triangulation for this
study. During PB process, the usual practice is to maintain some records of the
government’s preparation and how citizens are invited and delegates elected. In effect,
there should be a log of participants, attendees at meetings, and delegates representing the
citizens. The records should also contain minutes of meetings and the decisions reached.
The local government did not maintain any records of past PB processes.
The government provided budget documents and records of budgetary allocations
and disbursements for the fiscal years 2012 through 2014. There were no logs of project
launches, project assessments at various stages of completion, or completion details.
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Also, of importance were social factors that played important roles in the decisions of the
community in its preference for project selection. The type of projects selected by the
community helped to unravel the strategies and tactics of the people.
Discrepant Data Analysis
During data analysis, I sought for evidence of information that might be contrary
to emerging categories, or data that produced disparate perspectives from the rest of the
categories. Such disparate cases produced alternative prognosis, which explored during
the data analytical process. As Scheurich (2001) suggested, discrepant cases provide the
opportunity for the researcher revise the categories to provide better interpretation of the
data. Seeking conflicting or missing information is one of the activities in the process of
data analysis (Yin, 2009). Therefore, the absence of any account or references to the legal
framework to entrench or institutionalize PB was of particular concern. Without
supporting legal backing, the process is fragile and vulnerable to the whimsical dictates
of politicians and civil servants when financial constraints call for competing interests
over resources.
Trustworthiness
Guba (1981) constructed credibility, transferability, dependability, and
confirmability, as the criteria qualitative researchers need to establish the trustworthiness
of their studies. The criteria as they affect this study are described below.
Credibility. Credibility or construct validity is the effort by the qualitative
researcher to gauge the truth of research findings from the narratives of the participants.
Yin (2009) points to construct validity as the method used to accurately measure the
phenomenon of the study. Therefore, to ensure that the outcomes of this study are
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meaningful and true, and to locate the reader vicariously in the study locus, the claims of
this study derives a substantial proportion of contextually thick data such that sufficient
information is available to the reader. Triangulating data from public records of past PB
processes and field notes contributed to the validity of the study. The strategy of
identifying discrepant cases or data and revising the emerging pattern for alternative
interpretative analysis increased the credibility of the study (Patton, 2002).
The source of the researcher bias is the passion as a Nigerian citizen concerned
about developing an electorate that is sensitive and sufficiently enlightened not to be
gullible to the manipulations of the political actors. Such bias could have had an impact
on the data interpretation. As Miles and Huberman (1994) suggested, the researcher
solicited the participants’ input in member checking, interpretation of the data for
accuracy, and conformity with the participants’ meanings of their narratives.
Transferability. Merriam (1998) and Yin (2009) described transferability as the
extent to which common characteristics between the study population and a broader
population could make the findings apply to subsets of the population. In naturalistic
studies, each case is unique and findings are not transferable (Guba, 1981; Yin, 2009). In
spite of this restriction, Stake (1995) suggested that each case is in some way a reflection
of the broader population and the researcher should not reject transferability. Instead, the
onus is on interested follow-up researchers to make the case for transferability having
determined that adequate information is available about the fieldwork. Sufficient
information about the research paradigm, participant selection, the interview questions,
and the data analysis strategy indicate that this study is sufficient in detail for
applicability in other settings.
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The categories of participants represent all stakeholder groups including
politicians, civil servants, officials of nongovernment organizations, and the residents of
the local government. The broad variation in participant collections is an additional
triangulation strategy, which together with the wide variation in participant selection
increased the prospect for transferability (Guba, 1981; Patton, 2002).
Dependability. Kvale (1996) described reliability (dependability) as the extent to
which the results of an inquiry are consistent, accounting for changing dynamics of the
phenomenon under study. The various steps of the design such as the data collection
protocol, should be replicable to produce the same result (Yin, 2009) As Lincoln and
Guba (1985) suggested, for other researchers to develop a methodical understanding, and
to establish dependability, this study included sections dedicated to the research design,
planning, and implementation, working details of data collection, and reflexivity.
Following Patton’s (2002) suggestion, I engaged some level of self awareness and some
sense of socio-political consciousness in the examination, analysis, and interpretation of
the textual corpus. The interviewing process is particularly susceptible to reliability issues
specifically when the interviewer, albeit inadvertently, asks leading questions, which
might influence participants’ responses (Kvale, 1996).
Confirmability. It is inevitable that personal biases and preferences influenced
some aspects of this study. However, as Hancock and Algozzine (2011) recommended, I
provided direction in the form of an audit trail to the reader of this study through detailed
descriptive representation of the various stages of critical decisions and procedures. The
findings of this study relate directly to the experiences of the participants as opposed to
the subjective preferences of the researcher. Therefore, I concretized the audit trail by
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maintaining the electronic recording of interviews, full interview transcripts, and
government records in the public domain. Atlas.ti aided in establishing themes,
definitions, and relationships between categories. Qualitative data analysis software such
as Atlas.ti also serve as the repository of all the records generated from research studies
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985).
Ethical Procedures
Ethical considerations are present in all phases of research right from the
beginning through to the final report (Kvale, 1996). This study investigated issues
connected with PB introducing some improvements that affected human lives. Therefore,
this study abode by good ethical conduct in research, avoiding harm in the process of
providing benefits for the sake of many. Since social research participants are prone to
privacy risk, the qualitative researcher strikes a balance between participant anonymity
and the ability to generalize research findings (Yin, 2009). It was imperative that I
protected and preserved the privacy of the participants since participants not anonymous
to the researcher. In any case, the content of the informed consent form was discussed
with participants and their consent obtained before collecting data from them.
The informed consent form provided the research purpose, a brief description of
the design, and likely risks and benefits to participants. To overcome the potential for
undue influence or coercion, the document contained information about participants' right
to withdraw from the study at any time since participation was voluntary. Each
participant expressly granted his or her consent by attesting on a consent form, a copy of
which the participants retained while I retained another copy as part of the records of this
research.
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In addition, the accuracy of the data gathered was member-checked for informant
authentication and approval (Hancock & Algozzine, 2011). The participants had the
opportunity to confirm the accuracy of the interpretation of their information. Rudestam
& Newton, 2007) suggested at the conclusion of member checking, all identifying
information of the participants on the transcripts be replaced with pseudonyms to
maintain anonymity.
Summary
Participatory budgeting is a relatively recent process in Nigeria. The outcome of
PB in Brazil encouraged the United Nations and the World Bank. Porto Alegre is the
quintessential example of successful PB, which these institutions highlighted worldwide.
The perception among most Nigerians and Africans in general is that participatory
democracy begins and ends with the ability to vote in general elections, beyond which
there is lack of interest in engaging the political class directly in dialogues on matters that
affect daily lives (Adesopo, 2011; Bashir & Muhammed, 2012; Bowen, 2008; Donaghy,
2010; Ganuza & Frances, 2012; Leduka, 2009).
The two frameworks that drive this study include Avritzer’s (2009) theory of
participatory institutions establishing a tripartite relationship between civil society, the
political society, and institutional design. The effectiveness of the relationship between
the three institutions in turn determines the outcomes of PB, the conceptual framework
for this study. The willingness of the political class to cede some power under PB, the
promotion of pro-poor policies, and redistribution agenda have been the stimulants
encouraging participation by ordinary citizens (Postigo, 2010).
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As with other participatory democratic institutions, citizens who participate in PB
learn civic activities and responsibilities through practice and thus improve the quality of
the electorates (Hamlett & Cobb, 2006). Citizens learn to think in terms of collective
goals and benefits rather than personal gains and selfish agitations. Some of the aims of
the PB process include the elimination of clientelism, combating corruption through
transparent budget process, and the reversal of socio-political exclusion of low economic
status citizens (Baierle, 2009). Fung (2006) conjectured that if the government is to
improve the type and quality of services that meet the needs of the citizens, the
contributions of ordinary citizens should be the source of information for government
officials.
Alves and Allegretti (2012) used the concepts of fragility and volatility to identify
sustainability problems including the absence of legal framework to protect the process
from abandonment by Right wing politicians, and the quest for the establishment of a
perfect PB process rather than organic systems amenable to changes, modifications,
regime changes, and political alliances. There is unanimity among authors that there is no
best practice in PB, and each locality would need to consider its sociocultural, political,
and economic dynamics to determine what mix produces the best outcomes.
The review of literature explored the concept of integrating PB with strategic
planning in view of the high likelihood of project abandonment due to lack of funds, time
to complete projects, and regime changes particularly in the case of Ijede LCDA and
Nigeria. Participatory budgeting is an adaptation of strategic planning by a team of
experts attached to the office of the mayor of Porto Alegre, Brazil (Menegat, 2002). The
challenge for PB organizers is the measurement of the performance of the process, which
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strategic planning and its medium to long-term approach is designed to achieve (Gordon,
2005).
Some essential components of successful participatory outcomes include the role
of CSOs in the training and empowering of citizens, the willingness of the state to
mandate the process and provide adequate financial resources, and the private sector
corporate social responsibility initiatives. This study examined the influence of this mix
of ingredients in strengthening PB at Ijede LCDA.
Chapter 3 describes the research methodology, the locus of the study, and the
purposive nature of informant selection to provide the data for this study. The chapter
provides details of the process as practiced in the particular locus of study. Chapter 4
details the data analysis strategy, process, and interpretation. In Chapter 5, I provide the
detailed discussion on the findings, the conclusion, and recommendations.

108

Chapter 4: Results
Introduction
In this chapter, I present the data collection and data analysis processes, and
strategy. Finally, I lay out the results of the study. The research questions of this study
determined the qualitative methodological approach to gain further understanding of the
role of CSOs in educating and empowering the citizens of Ijede Local Council
Development Area (LCDA) to participate in participatory budgeting (PB). The case study
design fits the paradigm, requiring interviews of the participants (n = 15) that provided
the dense data for the study. The following research questions drive the case study design
of this study.
RQ1: What roles do nongovernmental organizations play in the design structure of the
PB process at Ijede LCDA?
RQ2: What resource framework and network are necessary for effective PB advocacy at
Ijede LCDA?
RQ3: What local dynamics at Ijede LCDA encourage the involvement of the business
community in the PB process?
RQ4: What sustainability strategies should Ijede LCDA consider for citizen-selected
projects?
The purpose of this qualitative case study was to explore the role of civil society
in educating and empowering the citizens of Ijede LCDA to participate effectively in the
budgetary decision-making processes. The disadvantaged people that stand to benefit the
most from PB have yet to give their full attention to the PB process in their community.
Nongovernmental organizations, by the design of PB, are the advocates of the citizens. It
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is necessary for them to use education to empower participation in the process. However,
is not known whether and how civil society empowers citizens to participate in the PB
process. Specifically, it is not known whether and how civil society can empower citizens
of Ijede in Lagos state, Nigeria to participate in the PB process. The research questions
were designed to collect dense information from the research participants based on their
subjective perspective of the PB process.
Through the data collected, I analyzed the local paradigms that strengthened
participatory democracy by strengthening PB.
Contextual Premise of the Study
The nature of the research questions of this study dictated the choice of the case
study design. The data sources synonymous with the design are interviewing, focus group
discussions and government budget documents. Data were collected at the locus of study.
I proceeded to Ijede to collect data from 15 one-on-one interviews, two focus group
discussions, and the analysis of the budget documents of the government of Ijede LCDA.
Demographic distribution of the participants is shown in Table 1. The venue of the
interviews was in the conference room of a hotel in Ijede.
Participant Anonymity and Interview Protocol
Conforming to the approval of Walden University’s Institutional Review Board
on approval number 09-23-15-0329984, I preserved anonymity by devising acronyms for
each participant depending on the group to which he or she belonged. Citizens were
represented by C1 to C9; politicians and civil servants were G1 to G5, and the individual
who identified as a representative of an NGO was N1 (see Table 2 and Table 3).
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The interview protocol consisted of standardized, open-ended questions with
structured wordings designed to extricate similar information from participants in the
same group (Gall, Gall, & Borg, 2003; Kvale, 1996). The interviews focused on the
theme of the study with some flexibility to elucidate additional information from the
participants.
The individual interviews lasted between 16 and 47 minutes while the two focus
group interviews lasted 50 and 53 minutes respectively. By the conclusion of the eleventh
one-on-one interview, the point of redundancy had been attained. Patton (2002) described
redundancy as saturation, the point where participants are no longer offering new
information. Nevertheless, I proceeded to complete the other four interviews as specified
in the proposal of this study.
To validate the data I collected, I presented the transcript of the interviews to the
respective participants to confirm the accuracy of the transcripts. This member-checking
process presented the opportunity for four of the participants to clarify some information
they provided during the interview sessions.
Data Analysis
The analysis of the data collected started with 29 precodes: 13 from the
theoretical and conceptual frameworks of this study and 16 from the literature review in
Chapter 2 of this study (see Table 4). More codes that emerged during data analysis were
grouped into themes. Employing pattern matching as the overall data analytical strategy,
and following Yin’s (2009) recommendation, I subjected the nodes to further reiterative
analysis until all possible perception had been achieved. Some patterns emerged to
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provide logical thematic aggregation of the salient issues, which explained the model
necessary to strengthen the internal validity of the study.

Table 1
Participants’ Demographic Distribution
___________________________________________________________________
Groups

n

%*

___________________________________________________________________
Gender
Female
Male

3

20

12

80

___________________________________________________________________
Social Groups
Citizens

9**

60

Politicians and civil servants

5

33

Representatives of NGOs

1

1

___________________________________________________________________
* Percentages are rounded to the nearest whole numbers.
** Of the nine citizens, five were representatives of the Community Development Associations, the
Community Development Committee, and Ijede Development Fund, which I later understood to be
nongovernmental organizations.
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Table 2
Participant Interview Data
____________________________________________________________
Participant
Anonymous Code

Interview

Number of

Duration in Minutes

Pages Transcribed*

____________________________________________________________
Citizens
C1

17:25

2.3

C2

22:39

4.2

C3

23:51

4.4

C4

20:22

2.4

C5

18:06

3.3

C6

16:52

2.5

C7

18:43

3.1

C8

16:58

3.0

C9

20:15

2.5

____________________________________________________________
Government
G1

21:27

3.7

G2

24:33

4.1

G3

20:01

2.2

G4

20:48

2.5

G5

16:17

2.0

____________________________________________________________
Nongovernmental Organization
N1

47.31

5.5

____________________________________________________________
* Number of single spaced, transcribed pages.
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Table 3
Focus Group Discussion Data
________________________________________________________________________

Group

Discussion a

Number of

Duration in Minutes

Pages Transcribed b

________________________________________________________________________
Group 1

53:16

7.0

Group 2

50:34

6.7

________________________________________________________________________
a
b

The discussion were conducted on November 5, 2015.
Number of single spaced, transcribed pages.

Table 4
Precodes Generated from Theoretical Framework and Literature
________________________________________________________________________
Codes from theory

Codes from literature

________________________________________________________________________
Opportunities for deliberation

Vocal social movement

Claims for rights

Political will to cede power

Redistribution of power

Legal framework

Redistribution of public goods

Binding PB decisions

Empowerment

Citizen mobilization

Citizen control

Equality of participants

Capacity to understand and decide on issues

NGOs as equal partners with state

Institutional design to promote participation

Negotiating skills

Direct interaction between state and NGOs

Efficiency in resource management

NGO autonomy from the state

Transparency

State connects grassroots with NGOs

Informed and involved NGOs

Approachability of politicians

Absence of influential elites

Connection between state and community

Willing head of government
Sustainability
Change of government

Private-Public Partnership
________________________________________________________________________
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Table 5
Nodes and the Research Questions (RQ) they Address
____________________________________________________________________________
RQ
Nodes
____________________________________________________________________________
RQ1
Confusion about PB
PB design
Attracting NGOs
Cooperation between state and community
Project oversight and evaluation
Encouraging citizen participation
Mobilizing the community
____________________________________________________________________________
RQ2
Activities of local NGOs
Education/training (understanding how democracy works)
Inhibitors
Limited resources
Transparency and Accountability
Willing government
Actions for the future
____________________________________________________________________________
RQ3
Community development
Corporate social responsibility
Limited resources
____________________________________________________________________________
RQ4
Strategic planning
Sustainability
____________________________________________________________________________
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Table 6
Nodes Dominance from One-on-One Interviews
_____________________________________________________________________
Number of
Nodes

Codes

Research
Questions

_____________________________________________________________________
Attracting NGOs

45

1

Development/Community needs

35

3

PB design

36

1

Education and training

30

2

Mobilizing the community

25

1

Activities of NGOs

24

2

Corporate Social responsibility

23

3

Limited resources

20

2&3

Encouraging citizen participation

15

1

Socio-cultural problems

15

2

Strategic planning

10

4

Inhibitors

9

2

Sustainability

9

4

Future actions

6

2

Oversight and evaluation

6

1

Transparency and accountability

6

2

Cooperation between government and community

4

1

Confusion about PB

3

1

Willing government

3

2

____________________________________________________________________
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Table 7
Node Dominance from Focus Group Discussions
____________________________________________________________________
Number of
Nodes

Codes

Research
Questions

____________________________________________________________________
Attracting NGOs

45

1

PB design

21

1

Development

17

3

Mobilizing the community

15

1

Activities of local NGOs

15

2

Corporate social responsibility

12

3

Education and training

10

2

Future actions

6

2

Confusion about PB

6

1

Limited financial resources

3

2&3

Encouraging citizen participation

3

1

Transparency and accountability

2

2

___________________________________________________________________
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The initial analysis of the data generated 299 codes, including the precodes. The
codes were subjected to further analysis, which produced a thematic taxonomy of 23
nodes. The nodes were further grouped according to the research questions they
addressed (see Table 5). Before coding, I read the interview transcripts three times for
familiarity and error correction as Lincoln and Guba (1985) suggested.
Table 6 and Table 7 show the spread of the codes among the nodes. The most
dominant nodes were attracting NGOs, Development and community needs, PB design,
education, and training.
The codes from which the nodes emerged primarily came from the 15 interview
transcripts and two transcripts from the focus group discussions. The nodes that emerged
from the data are relevant to the research questions as presented in the following section
on findings.
Findings
Research Question 1
What roles do nongovernmental organizations play in the design structure of the
PB process at Ijede LCDA? Seven dominant themes represented the roles of NGOs in the
design of PB. The question sought to extricate the input of nongovernmental
organizations as to how, at Ijede Local Council Development Area (LCDA), PB was
designed. The data revealed the noninvolvement of NGOs in the design and organization
of PB in Ijede LCDA.
Confusion about PB. There was some misunderstanding about whether the PB
process was a series of stakeholders’ meetings with the government over budget (Figure
3). In responding to interview questions, respondents had different notions of PB as a
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concept. There were conflicting recollections about when it was introduced to the
community. To some participants, PB was an annual stakeholder meeting with the
government. At the focus group discussions, G1 clarified:
The executives of Community Development Associations (CDAs) form the
Community Development Council (CDC), which coordinates the activities of all
CDAs and represents Ijede LCDA at the state conference of CDCs. The state
government registers the CDAs and the CDCs as nonprofit organizations. In
addition, present in Ijede is the Ijede Development Foundation (IDF) formed by
some educated indigenes of the community to promote the heritage of the
community and to offer scholarships to indigene students.
G3 clarified further during one of the focus group interviews:
I don’t know if we are getting the definition of NGO right. We may be looking at
an NGO as a foreign organization or an organization from outside here. Ijede
Development Foundation is an NGO. Landlords Associations, CDAs and CDC
are NGOs. May be we should redefine our perspective of NGOs so that we can
take our minds away from dollar based NGOs.
Given that NGOs exist in Ijede, but their presence not recognized as those of
NGOs, it is evident that PB in Ijede was without NGO involvement. Seven themes
appeared prominently from the analysis of the data.
The concept of PB is still relatively new in Ijede LCDA. The time line of the
introduction varied between 2009 and 2013, depending on which participant was
supplying the information. The participants also had various meanings attached to the
process. According to C7, at the one-on-one interview stage, it was simply a process for
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Figure 3. Codes Linked with Confusion about PB
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the government to “let us know what they are doing with the people’s money.” From
C3’s perspective:
…it was about two months ago that we discussed in a group and it was
mentioned. But from the description, I realize that is what we have been doing but
nobody call it that name. However we have it in mind that when this year’s
budget process begins, we will like to call it PB and fully participate the way we
should be participating.
At the one-on-one interview, N1 explained in similar vein,
Until you mentioned it, I did not know. I know they have stakeholders meetings
over budgets. They don’t call it participatory budgeting. The stakeholders'
meeting is through the CDC arrangement. In those meetings the representatives of
the local government, the head of department for Agriculture is in attendance.
Indeed, a few other participants echoed N1’s opinion believing the processes in
which they participated were stakeholders’ meetings with the government over budgetary
matters. There was no consensus among the participants about the meaning and purpose
of PB and about the timeline. At one of the focus group discussions, G2 disputed PB was
a new process:
I want to make a correction. I want to correct the impression that participatory
budgeting is new. May be the name we call it is different. If they could recall, in
2005, we had NEEDS, SEEDS and LALEEDS. LALEEDS was the process for
Local governments to call the community to be involved in the development of
the budgets for local governments. We called the community to know their needs.

121

The local government did not just give the community what the government
imagined the community wanted but what the people identified as their needs.
Contextually, PB as practiced in Ijede met some criteria of the process. The government,
according to G5 at the one-on-one interview, followed a process in which:
We called all the stakeholders and we provided the guidance on how to go about
presenting their opinions or how to go about bringing their opinions to the floor at
the stakeholders meeting. My usual advice to them was, before coming to the
stakeholders meeting, they should have had their minor in-house meeting on their
major needs so that when they come to the stakeholders meeting, they present the
views of the larger majority of those within their groups. Basically, to some of
them, it was more or less a political process that this is their council and they
needed to be there to shout and make noise. But to others, they believed, yes if
they talked to the government they could get one or two things done, but if they
did not discuss they might get nothing. So some felt it was a serious matter. Some
were there as observers, to see how things went and may be the following year,
they could have something to say.
PB design. The node identified a number of actions, decisions, and processes
constituting the designing of PB process. There was some misunderstanding about
whether the PB process was a series of stakeholders’ meetings with the government over
budget (Figure 3).
For PB to achieve its intended objective of inclusive governance, connecting the
state with the business community and providing effective local governance, PB requires
strong institutional design (Avritzer, 2009). One factor that permits the success of PB is
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the absence of influential elites who provide the usual Right Wing opposition to a
socialist initiative such as PB. G4 at the one-on-one interview informed about the absence
of influential elites, “This place [Ijede] is a community of artisans, fishermen and
farmers.” In the absence of any Right-wing opposition, the community formed some
associations known as Community Development Associations (CDAs). The executives of
the CDAs constituted the Community Development Committee (CDC) with which the
government regularly interacted. In spite of the regular meetings between the CDC and
the government, C4 at the one-on-one interview believed the government had not
communicated the objectives of PB properly with the CDC:
Unofficially, we the CDC members have discussed with the council manager that
we will like to be carried along in the proper way, but I don’t think we were
properly involved in the past. As a community, we really don’t know the process
as you (the researcher) have described it.
One of the important steps in a PB process is the invitation to all stakeholders as
groups and as individuals to attend the meetings. Without a doubt, stakeholders who form
themselves into groups tend to have much stronger influence over decisions (Boulding &
Wampler, 2010). Notwithstanding, individuals are capable of significant contributions.
However, G5 at the one-on-one interview expressed concern over who were invited to PB
meetings:
During our 2013 budget retreat, the budget officer at the time was asked a
question by one of the staff of the budget department that we should have invited
some of the public [individuals] to the retreat. Unfortunately, it was only the
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community development associations (CDA) and community leaders that
attended the meeting. That was what brought out the discussion on PB.
Individual local officials appear to understand how PB should run. The
participants representing the government, excluding the politicians, enunciated at the oneon-one interviews general descriptions of a typical PB process. As a government official,
G2 conjectured:
To the best of my knowledge, when we talk of participatory budget, it is supposed
to include the majority of the stakeholders. By the time the local government
involves all the stakeholders in its budgetary process …we will know their
problems and we will know how much to budget.
Participatory budgeting is a yearly process, but at the one-on-one interview, G4 exposed
a design gap that allowed the postponement of the process due to insufficient funds:
There was the problem with the finance of the local government in 2010, I think.
We did not complete all the projects that were selected in that year, so we had to
wait to complete those projects before we did another round of the process.
Thus, an apparent institutional design weakness stemmed from poor and unstructured PB
process. The absence of experienced professional NGOs that should have performed the
necessary advocacy role on behalf of the citizens might have been responsible for the
poor PB design. Experienced NGOs would have alerted government organizers of the
process to any potential flaws in the design.
Attracting NGOs. The perception of the absence of NGOs in the community was
especially pervasive among government officials responsible for organizing the process.
Specific invitations were not extended to any NGOs since they were perceived to be
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Figure 4. Codes Linked with PB Design
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nonexistent. This node identified what the participants suggested be done to attract NGOs
external to the community. Professional NGOs with some expertise required for PB
advocacy were not present in the community. The participants suggested several
strategies to attract NGOs to the community (see Figure 5).
In the absence of NGO involvement in the design process, the fact emerged that
the community needed to embark on efforts to attract professional NGOs with experience
in various social issues that the community desires to address. Ijede has all the conditions
that attract professional NGOs. According to C6 at the focus group discussion, Ijede is “a
rural community of peasant farmers, fishermen, artisans and petty traders”. N1 at the oneon-one interview identified potential environmental problems such as pollution “from the
nearby hydroelectric plant at Egbin. NI further informed:
NGOs can come here because we are by the lagoon. NGOs might be interested in
the fishing culture, protecting the eco system, pollution, and water purification.
There are NGOs who are interested in those areas including agriculture and
greenhouse effect and all that because of the power plant we have here. So you
have NGOs to relate to Ijede, they have every reason to be here. They can come
and look at problem of erosion, water and the socio-cultural aspects of the
indigenes here.
In spite of these reasons, G1 at the focus group discussions acknowledged that “NGOs
refuse to come.” C4 from the discussion group postulated some explanations as to why
NGOs would not establish their presence in Ijede:
Let’s look at the structures of the NGOs themselves because there is the tendency
that you find NGOs mostly in urban areas. I don’t know if the ideology behind
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them is different from what we understand NGO to be because NGOs are
supposed to provide one service or another and not supposed to make a profit. But
the way I see NGOs and why I believe they are not in this axis is that there is little
to be gained. Typically, NGO is supposed to look for gaps in the services a
community desires and they fill in that gap left by the government… There are so
many things we lack here.
Virtually all the participants agreed that the community would have to rely on
IDF and CDC to reach out to external NGOs and create the necessary interactive fora to
promote Ijede. In advising the community, C9 suggested at the focus group discussions:
We try to assess NGOs that we feel can address our felt needs. So, we will
interface with them to partner with us on some projects. Annually, we will have
programs of activities that will bring them to the community. Most of those NGOs
are situated in urban areas but we will still reach out to them because the
community development associations have three levels; primary, the secondary
and the tertiary. So, the apex level is at the state level, we can interface at that
level because we have representation there. We can interface with different NGOs
through the Ministry of Local Governments and other parastatals. We will
continue to look for opportunities to interface with those NGOs that can meet our
needs.
In G1’s view at the group discussions, “charity begins at home.” The community
should direct its efforts towards utilizing the meager resources wisely and effectively. G1
thus echoed similar suggestions of four other participants:
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…Everyone should go back to their locality and have an introspective view of
what they believe their requirements or their needs are. Secondly, they should
document everything on paper, may be in form of minutes of meetings from the
smaller units of associations to the CDC, to identify where they believe their
challenges are, collate them together and may be the local NGOs could become
stronger and more effective or use those documents to put out request to an
external NGO. When they have major decisions, they should share those with the
local government but their decisions to a large extent can be implemented without
government input as long as those decisions do not go against the law.
Ijede is a peninsula, on the Lagos Lagoon. Compared to other communities across
the Lagoon, the community is largely underdeveloped. Less than 10-minute boat ride
across the Lagoon are some of the most affluent communities in Nigeria. Ijede on the
other hand is still rural and underdeveloped. Its picturesque hilly view of the lagoon and
its affluent neighbors on the other shores of the Lagoon keep first-time visitors in awe of
its beauty.
Ijede has developed mainly from the numerous self-help projects embarked upon
by the residents. With the exception of the main access road to the community, the
community health center, and the two primary schools, Ijede has relied on self-help
efforts from the residents, especially those with more means than the average residents
have. The success of the self-help projects prompted G5 to suggest at the one-on-one
interview:
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Figure 5. Codes linked with Attracting NGOs

129

If we the politicians within this community can embark on a project within
ourselves, may be the project can attract the governments and the NGOs. That is
what we can do. You know we politicians we campaign a lot and promise we
want to do this, we want to do that. We don’t have to get into office before we can
mobilize the community to do some of those things we promise. We can really
help ourselves. If we come together and establish one or two projects that can
attract the attention of the state government, the projects may in turn attract the
NGOs at the same time.
At the focus group discussions, C8 suggested another way to attract external NGOs:
Ijede is supposed to be a good tourist attraction because there is the Ororo Spring
that flows into the lagoon. It is very important to Lagos State because when there
is to be the installation of new Oba of Lagos, the kingmakers have to collect water
for the new Oba from the spring. But the spring is there and abandoned when it
can be developed as a tourist attraction with history behind it.
Ijede is at the Northeastern extreme of Lagos State. There is only one access road
leading to the peninsula. All the participants agreed that another access road is required
for the community to be accessible to other communities, and more importantly to Lagos
metropolis. C2 at the focus group discussions, and similar to three other participants,
made the case for such a project:
The road leading to Ijede is bad. There is only one entrance to the community.
There is no exit. The other road that would have served as the exit road, which is
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Igbe-Igbogbo Road, is impassable. If the government can do something about it, it
will open up the community.
For government intervention such as the construction of major infrastructure, there need
to exist some cooperation between the state and the community. For PB to succeed, the
state must be willing to cooperate with the community and its NGO advocates.
Cooperation between state and community. This node is an essential element
of PB design structure. The political society should be willing to encourage participation
by ceding control of part of the budget to the citizens (Rodgers, 2010). In Ijede, sufficient
cooperation existed between the local government and the community to create strong PB
design (see Figure 6).
An important element of PB that is capable of derailing the process is the lack of
cooperation between the state and the community. The state should be willing to cede
control of part of its budget to the citizens (Dewachter & Molenaers, 2011; Postigo,
2011). On the surface, this has been the case in Ijede. In a PB process, the citizens select
a project or some projects, which they expect the government to undertake although,
according to G1 during the one-on-one interview:
Like any public policy, I would not say the citizens selected most of the projects.
They come, prioritize what they felt. At the end of the day, in most cases, it is
really what government officials, the politicians want to do that they really set
about doing. So in the long run, the impact on the citizen is, may be one, two or
three projects, out of the multitude of projects, which are approved in the budget,
are actually executed. As per the performance, it is usually on the low side.
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Budget performance on capital projects is just over 2% of the total budget. Most
of the funds accruing to the local government are used for overheads costs. We
have 98% recurrent expenditure and 2% capital budget. So funding is a major
problem when it comes to project implementation.

Figure 6. Codes Linked with Cooperation Between Government and Community.

G2 corroborated the inadequate financial resources of the local government at the one-onone interview:
The only challenge we have is implementation, which has to do with finance. This
place is very rural, and they could not generate much internally generated revenue
(IGR) here. They have to rely on the money coming from the federation account.
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By the time they deduct staff salaries, teachers’ salary, overhead costs from the
federation account, there is nothing to write home about. So it is the small amount
remaining they have been using to embark on all the projects that were identified
during the conference and town hall meeting for the purpose of the PB process.
The only relevant documents the local government could provide were the
approved budgets for fiscal years 2012, 2013 and 2014. Records were not maintained for
the conduct and outcomes of past PB processes at the local government. According to the
approved budgets of the local government, the percentage of actual capital expenditure of
total revenue declined from 2.30% in 2012 to 0.3% in 2013 (see Table 8). The 2% capital
budget, which declined year on year, corroborated G1’s account. However, it is not
known how much of the capital budget was allocated to PB. This explained G5’s account
that the people believed the process was “a scam, and they had to be pacified to
participate in the succeeding year”. The approved budgets also confirmed G5’s
recollection: “I could recall in 2012 and 2013 or so, we were forced to fail them because
of paucity of funds, there was so much outcry”
Project oversight and evaluation. As part of PB structure, there should be a
system of project evaluation and oversight championed by civil society organization to
ensure timely project execution to specification and within budgeted cost (Adesopo,
2011; Bryson, 2011; Schick, 2003; Sintomer et al., 2008). There were no project
oversight and evaluation by the citizens, a required element of a PB design. Figure 7
shows the codes linked with project oversight and evaluation.
Project monitoring is an important aspect of PB that encourages the citizens to
protect projects in their community. Often, local contractors are involved in project
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Table 8
Revenue and Expenditure Profiles of Ijede LCDA
_______________________________________________________________________
2013a

2012

2014b

_______________________________________________________________________
% Total
Naira Revenue

% Total
Naira Revenue

% Total
Naira Revenue

________________________________________________________________________
Revenues
Federal Statutory
Allocation

580

96.5

670

97.2

831

97.0

21

3.5

19

2.8

25

3.0

Internally Generated
Revenue

________________________________________________________________________
Total

601

100.0

689

100.0

856

100.0

________________________________________________________________________
Expenditures
Personnel Cost

185

31.0

175

25.3

217

25.4

Teachers’ Salaries

255

42.3

77

11.2

79

9.2

Other Overheads

135

22.4

103

15.0

209

24.4

Capital Expenditure

14

2.3

2

0.3

351

41.0

________________________________________________________________________
Total

589

98.0

357

51.8

856

100.0

________________________________________________________________________
Cash Balance

12

2.0

332

48.2

-

-

Note. Amounts are in millions of Naira.
a
No explanation was provided on the budget for the large cash balance and the low actual capital
expenditure.
b
This were the approved budget estimates. The actual revenue and expenditure profiles were not available
during data collection at the site.
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Figure 7. Codes Linked with Project Oversight and Evaluation.

implementation. Where the projects are too complex for a local contractor to handle,
some aspects of the projects are subcontracted to local contractors (Baierle, 2005).
Participatory budgeting anticipates the civil society would represent the citizen in
ensuring accountability and transparency over funds available to the state (Goldfrank &
Schneider, 2006; Leduka, 2009). Civil society would ensure citizen selected projects are
executed on time and within budget. G3 revealed an important shortcoming of the
citizens during the one-on-one interview:
The process of formulating the document was not that difficult. But the
implementation became a problem because when funds start to flow in, we more
or less focused on overheads than the projects. We can do that because, at the end
of the day, the people that initiated this projects hardly come back to ask about the
progress. They hardly take part in the supervision of the projects or get involved
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in any way. After the stakeholders meeting, I think the next time we get to meet
them again is another stakeholders meeting. May be once a year. In extreme
cases, if there is any event initiated by the local government, we invite them and
then they have a chance to vent their displeasure on how projects are being
implemented.
There was the indication that when projects were completed, the citizens noticed.
For example, flooding was a major problem in the community. It was one of the early
projects the community elected under the PB process. During the one-on-one interview,
C5 confirmed, “By solving the flooding problem alone, the people felt secured again,
they were very happy.”
Encouraging citizen participation. An important design structure represented by
this node goes to the core of PB. An essential feature of PB is encouraging the electorate
to participate at the local level in decision making on issues of direct concern to their
daily economic and social lives (Avritzer, 2010; Dobson, 2005; Michels & de Graaf,
2010). Participatory budgeting process works well when there are actors in the
community, including the government through its actions that encourage citizen
participation. The codes that converge into this node are in Figure 8.
Participatory budgeting thrives when the citizens are sufficiently motivated to
participate in decision making on issues that affect their daily lives (Bashir &
Muhammed, 2012; Bowen, 2008; Donaghy, 2010; Ganuza & Frances, 2012). At the oneon-one interview, G4 suggested the government should strive towards gaining the trust of
the people to encourage participation in the process:
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…call everybody to town hall meetings, let them say what they want, put it down
in writing and, bring it back to the council. The council should confirm what it
wants to do, and then execute it to the letter. That is how the people can trust us.

Figure 8. Codes Linked with Encouraging Citizen Participation.

A few other participants reiterated the need for the government to gain the trust of the
citizens as a motivating factor for citizen participation. In a suggestion to encourage
citizen participation, G5 at the one-on-one interview recommended,
The only thing I think we want for greater participation, which will serve as an
incentive…is that what we budgeted for last year we actually deliver. If we do
that, all the Olorituns [heads of CDAs] will be happy. I could in 2012 and 2013 or
so, we were forced to fail them because of paucity of funds, there was so much
outcry. I had to practically beg them to participate in the next process because
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they saw it as a scam and a waste of time. In fact the only incentive you can give
them is to do what you have promised, you must earn their trust, be transparent,
let them know in good time if for any reason such as funds or whatever, why you
will not deliver on your promise. If you do that, you have got them.
It is important also that project selection is left to the citizens. G4 at the one-onone interview acknowledged that government imposed its agenda on project selection
over citizen-selected projects:
At the end of the day, there was a technical session among the counselors, the
chairman and the management of the local government. That was more or less
like a budget retreat in which a synopsis of the stakeholders meeting was
presented and based on the synopsis; everything was prioritized based on the
needs of different stakeholder groups. The council then agreed on the projects to
undertake.
The government intervened in the selection of projects because of limited resources. Such
intervention, as G5 enunciated above, led the citizens to believe the process was “a
scam,” eroding the citizens’ confidence in the process.
Mobilizing the community. The effort to mobilize the community to action and
participation is a role for CSOs within the basic structure of PB. Civil society
organizations are deemed equal partners with the state in mobilizing the citizens to
participate in decision-making processes, to learn negotiating skills, and by so doing
participatory institutions are strengthened (Acharya, Lavalle, & Houtzager, 2004). An
important role of NGOs in a PB process is to organize and mobilize the citizens. Figure 9
is the network of codes that make up this node.
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Figure 9. Codes Linked with Mobilizing the Community.

One of the functions of civil society in a democratic process such as PB is to
mobilize the citizens (Wampler & Hartz-Karp, 2012). In Ijede, the CDAs, the CDC, the
IDF performed the roles of NGOs in the absence of professional NGOs in the
community. Indeed, the community thrived on self-help projects initiated, financed, and
executed exclusively by the citizens of the community without assistance from the
government or any external source. At the focus group discussions, C2 explained the
activities of the CDAs:
What are CDAs established for? They are set up for self-help projects based on
communal efforts expected to be supported by the local government. In most ideal
cases, we have our CDC that is the local government level of community
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development associations; we have been coordinating self-help projects at the
individual community levels.
Limited financial resources of the local government necessitate intense
competition among contending projects and groups. The more diverse the community’s
demand on government, the less impact the government will have on the community
(Donaghy, 2010). Thus, G4 suggested, “At the end of the day, the community is the
beneficiary of the projects so they need to speak with one voice.” However, through selfhelp, the CDAs and the CDC have learned to motivate the community into action.
According to C8,
In my own community, I expended more than N6 million to be sure that
electricity gets to my community without the assistance of the corporate
organizations located in the community or the government. That was done purely
through self help.
The CDC assumed the role of organizing the coordination of self-help efforts in
the community. The motivation for the CDC’s actions was because of the state
government’s policy of reimbursing self-help efforts of communities. At the one-on-one
interview, N1 observed the counter productivity of the self-help efforts:
The problem is that the system [of self help] has worked too well, and the
government does not want to take any responsibility at all. So you have
communities doing things by themselves and the government merely observing
and then the government comes to collect taxes on the usage of some of those
projects. They may also collect allocation [federal receipts] for the projects and
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not do much to help the communities since the communities have already
completed these projects themselves.
The youths who form a very large demographic of Ijede, are often left out of
community activities. During the focus group discussions, C7 opined that the youths of
the community should be involved in PB process:
The youths form a significant segment of the community. We should get them
involved in PB activities. The government and the community should decide on
what age limits they want to have among the youths to be part of the community
when they discuss PB. I think the way our children mature, we could even make it
15 years. The government and the community could give them special
assignments during the organizing stage so that they can see how the whole
process works. The youths can be involved in sports as part of bringing fame to
the community, but we need to get them to participate in debates so that they can
learn how to conduct themselves and how to convince other people about their
opinions without resorting to fights. They too can learn how to negotiate what
they want with the elders.
Traditional institutions in Ijede are quite influential on the people of the
community. At the one-on-one interview, G3 expressed the opinion that the traditional
rulers be part of the process, “be sincere, and open up to tell us what exactly is their
problem.” In contributing, G2 agreed:
The chiefs should have held a meeting with Kabiyesi [the traditional head of the
community] and determine how the traditional institutions can help the
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community. We need to enlighten them before they attend the meeting. So, we too
need to be involved in mobilizing for participation.
Research Question 2
What resource framework and network are necessary for effective PB advocacy at
Ijede LCDA? The question interrogated the resource framework and network that are
necessary for effective PB advocacy in the particular case of Ijede. Seven nodes
addressing this question emerged from the data analysis. Participatory budgeting requires
civil society organizations (CSO) to play a role for meaningful and effective process
outcomes. Through their advocacy, NGOs work with communities to empower them
through some interventional programs. Civil society organizations are autonomous of
government (Diamond, 1994; Fowler, 2012; Grajzl & Murrell, 2009). Consequently, they
use that autonomy to mobilize at the communal level to produce coordinated participation
in public discourse (Montambeault, 2009). The community associations consisting of the
CDAs, the CDC, and the IDF have played the roles of NGOs. With the successes they
have collectively achieved, there is little doubt that with adequate resources and
networking, they could prove to be sufficient and effective in their advocacy roles for
Ijede Community.
Activities of local NGOs. This node identified the activities of local NGOs at
connecting with resources, and networking with other institutions for effective
community advocacy. Nongovernmental organizations are at the forefront of advocacy
for PB. Their visibility in the community is shown by the codes that make up the network
in Figure 10.
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For civil society to thrive, there must be a willing government to allow the space
for CSO activities (Dewachter & Molenaers, 2011). The CDC in Ijede fit the outlook
posited by Acharya et al. (2004) of “institutionally embedded actors” that are too close to
the government (p. 41). Its affinity with the government is a tacit demand by the state that
summons monthly meetings hosted by the State Commissioner for Local Governments.
Bherer (2010) posited that participatory mechanisms create opportunities for the
government and the civil society to dialog and collaborate, but without excluding the
rights of civil society to protest (Essia & Yearoo, 2009).

Figure 10. Codes Linked with Activities of Local Nongovernmental Organizations.
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It is possible for ordinary citizens to learn governance by participation. The
educational benefits create a population with a high sense of civic responsibility (Bherer,
2010). A sign of the link between policymakers and the poor in the society is visible
when citizens can hold politicians accountable for public spending on issues that affect
the poor and the vulnerable in the society. In the one-on-one interview, G3 confirmed the
affinity with the government and posited on the structure of the CDC:
They are the people of the environment but recognized and registered by the
government. When there is something coming to the community, they will be the
first point of contact. They hold their regular meetings with the local government
and the state government. They are a well-recognized body.
At the one-on-one interview, C9 appreciated that the CDAs and the CDC “have been
assisting, but they do not have the expertise that professional NGOs have. They have
been assisting in transmitting the information they received from the residents to the local
government authority.” At the focus group discussions, C1 confirmed that in the past,
members of the CDC were not properly involved in the process, but the CDC was getting
ready to be more involved:
Unofficially, we the CDC members have discussed with the council manager that
we will like to be carried along in the proper way, As a community, we really
don’t know the process as you [the researcher] have described it.
The community associations hold regular meetings to deliberate on issues of
interest to the community. In addition, they hold monthly meetings with local
government officials. The CDC leveraged on these opportunities for deliberations to
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stimulate and coordinate the all-important self-help efforts by the communities of Ijede.
The participants recognized the need to reach out to persons and organizations external to
the community but according to C4 at the one-on-one interview, “The only movements
we have in the community are the CDAs and the CDC. We need help from more
enlightened people to help us.” There is the particular expediency to interact with
external NGOs with professional expertise in socio-political matters. Through external
networking with these professional NGOs, the community associations could tap into the
expertise that empowers them towards improved participatory strategies.
Education/training. The local NGOs are not perceptive at delivering resources to
the community. This node identified education and training as a resource the participants
recognized as desirable for effective advocacy. Empowerment of the citizens is delivered
through education and training. Figure 11 shows the codes that form the network of
training and education.
Perhaps the most important resource network with which the CDC needs to
engage is in education and training. The citizens should understand how democracy
works, how to engage the government from a position of strength as equal partners.
Therefore, to participate effectively in a democratic process, poor citizens require
education in the form of social and civic training, the responsibility for which falls on the
CDC in particular. This kind of advocacy creates engaging citizenry that demands
transparency, accountability, and efficiency (Postigo, 2011). At the one-on-one interview,
C3 narrated a situation that signified the need for training in advocacy:
In the course of our intervention, some people wrote letters and petitions that the
government has not been forthcoming in terms of assisting them in their business.
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They even wrote the petition to us at the CDC that we should assist them to drop
the petitions at the local government. We said no, we are not to provide these
facilities for you. We told them to write directly to the local government but copy
us. By copying us, when we got to the stakeholders meeting, we table the issues
there. We have some of the illiterates come to us with their grievances, and we
advise them to go to the local government when we have stakeholders meetings
with the government to present their views at the meeting.
A professional NGO would handle these situations differently by directly advocating on
behalf of the illiterates and the underserved in the community. In NI’s view during the
focus group discussions, whatever external NGOs do in Ijede, the approach should be
organic:

Figure 11. Codes Linked with Education and Training.
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The NGOs need to come, not with a foreign mentality. It has to be home grown
that we can relate to, not the way they do it in London or the US, it has to be
something we develop here that we can relate to here. Otherwise, they will simply
turn up for meetings, eat drink and go back home, but we should still encourage
NGOs to come and teach these things.
On the side of the government, especially those responsible for overseeing the PB process
and organizing it, there is the consensus about inadequate understanding of the process as
a whole, and every group in the community, including the local officials, should benefit
from some training.
Inhibitors. Adesopo (2011) identified some inhibitors, which hinder community
access to resources and networking with institutions. This node identified some of the
inhibitors preventing effective advocacy in Ijede. Some of these factors were identified
and form the codes in the network in Figure 12.
Adesopo (2011) described as inhibitors, some challenges that might stand in the
way of effective or successful PB process in Nigeria. These include lack of understanding
of how democracy works, misunderstanding about the obligations of stakeholders. poor
oversight and evaluation of projects, transparency and accountability issues, poor
communication, and inadequate resources. Every participant identified one factor or the
other that posed a challenge for PB. On their own, the citizens of Ijede have learned to
network with the government. During the focus group discussions, C9 suggested:
If we have to get in touch with the federal government, we do not have access to
the president in Aso Rock. We have the state assembly; we channel our
grievances through our representative in Lagos state House of Assembly to the
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Governor, and may be from the governor to the presidency. I don’t know how
long that will take but in the meantime, some people are dying because what is
supposed to be health care is not adequate.

Figure 12. Codes Linked with Inhibitors.

The poor residents of Ijede make up the bulk of the memberships of the CDAs and the
CDC. They had provided some training designed to the best of the abilities of those
residents who developed the training materials. At the one-on-one interview, C5
informed:
We have had three trainings this year. The CDC organized training for artisans,
hairdressers, barbers, and tailors. The second training was for auto mechanics
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telling them about their rights. The CDAs and CDC are doing some of those
things NGOs are supposed to be doing.
In the absence of NGOs the CDC could coordinate the activities of the CDAs so
that the trainings could be more focused on community needs and how to get the best
from the government. While these trainings provided some benefits to those who
attended, the community has not developed political sophistication in its citizens.
Government is still perceived, according to C7 at the one-on-one interview, “…as lord
and master. We can’t confront them because we rely on them for many things.” This is a
manifestation of the fact that the citizens lack the understanding of their obligations
toward the government and the obligations of the government to the people. In
recognition of the effect of not fully understanding the ways obligations flow back and
forth between the community and the government, G6 during the one-on-one interview
proposed some lessons in political awareness:
Lessons in awareness will go a long way. We need to let them know the
importance of participatory budgeting and what benefits they stand to gain if they
devote more time to learning about how government is organized. They should be
asking us questions and demanding answers.
According to G4 at the one-on-one interview, the community needs to be enlightened:
The people should be aware that there’s something called participatory budgeting.
Even though they are practicing it, they really do not know that is what they are
doing. They should be aware of the expected outcomes, the advantage it can
bring. They need to know about the history of the process in Brazil where it
originated and I think they should be involved and be part of the process itself.
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They should be able to form different groups and know that they can belong to
different groups that address different interests that they align with.
G1 suggested that the people needed to play more roles in the PB process:
The second step is in the implementation of projects. They should be given
supervisory and contractual roles. Let them suggest contractors for projects and
the people that are closest to the project should supervise and report to the
appropriate groups as often as possible. That may improve the level of
participatory budgeting.
As there are no professional NGOs in Ijede to assist with empowering training
towards better participations C3, echoed the suggestion of a few other participants that
“through seminars and presentations of that sort in open forum, the NGOs can help, but
the NGOs are not here.”
Cultural Problem. During the one-on-one interview, N1 introduced the cultural
dimension to the factors inhibiting proper PB process. N1 expressed concern about policy
formulation or engaging the government,
Our traditions are contrary to most Western culture. First, we have the tradition of
when the elder talks, you keep quiet. You have the situation where the person who
used to be your king or your chief is now a civil servant, or the government has
now taken over the position of traditional heads, once you become the local
government chairman, whatever you say goes, you become the king. So you have
people who now project traditional images and traditional ways of doing things to
basic civil governance, which is not.
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Before citizens develop the capacity to engage the government effectively, they
should understand their rights and responsibilities as citizens. The citizens of Ijede, in
C5’s opinion expressed during the one-on-one interview, are inhibited by their cultural
values:
The difference is; do they [the citizens] care? Do they care about their wellbeing,
about their health, about pollution? People in America do not say because they are
janitors they don’t care because they do care. They know they have rights, and
they will not be put down by a wealthy man. The problem in Ijede is they are very
religious and they believe that God put them wherever they are, and they don’t
complain. They work tirelessly and make every effort they believe can get them
there.
Limited resources. This node stands apart from other inhibitors as a significant
resource the community lacked at all levels including government, civil society, and
individuals, thus contributing to stunted community development. Resources, especially
financial resources, are necessary for PB to be of any consequence. Figure 13 is the
taxonomy of codes that form the limited resources network.
A prominent theme among the participants was inadequate resources. The more
optimistic of the participants would say resources were limited. Lack of resources or
limited resources is a major inhibitor to the success of PB. All governments experience
limited resources in one way or the other. In the case of Ijede, it is particularly dire.
According to G7 at the one-on-one interview, Ijede LCDA and four other LCDAs were

151

Figure 13. Codes Linked with Limited Resources.
created out of Ikorodu Local Government in 1999 therefore, “the funds coming from the
federal government has to be divided into six.” G2 posited a reason the revenue of the
LCDA is less than it should be; “…they did not do proper census before they gave the
figure to the census board. That is the major problem they have with federal allocation.”
There are no other avenues for the LCDA to raise its revenue base, according to C9
during the one-on-one interview,
…except through Federal allocation and internally generated revenues, but in this
environment, because of the nature of things, we don’t have much economic
activities. It is only small small shops, no market. Revenue is so low we depend
largely on the allocation from the federal government and from the state
government.
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At the one-on-one interview, C2 was empathetic towards the local government
administration because “This place [Ijede] is very rural and they could not generate much
internally generated revenue (IGR) here. They have to rely on the money coming from
the federation account." In recognition of the efforts of the community at self-help
projects, C7 suggested:
The key thing is to meet with the leader of the community, to organize something
like a seminar with the good people of this community. We have so much to do.
We have no funds to tackle them except NGOs will come to our rescue, then we
will tell them our problems. There is no availability of funds to address the
problems we have.
The government is evidently resource strapped as G1 revealed earlier: "budget
performance is usually on the low side with only 2% of total revenue expended on capital
budget while 98% was expended on overheads or recurrent expenditures." Paradoxically,
the NGOs that have shown any interest in Ijede, according to G2, “want money from the
local government, but we don’t have anything”. G2 further conjectured in the one-on-one
interview:
It is the lack of financial resources that is driving them [NGOs] away. They don’t
have international backing; they source for themselves so they expect that we [the
local government] would source for them too. So, finance has been our problem.
C3 expressed similar empathetic agreement towards the local government administration:
“The Executive Secretary of the local government has actually initiated the digging of
drainage, but the major challenge he has is finance.”
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Transparency and Accountability. The role of the government in its interface
with CSOs is important for effective advocacy. This node identified what the participants
recognized as essential to advocacy and in interacting with the government. Since PB
involves fiscal issues, the government must be transparent in providing the citizens with
its finance and policy guidelines (Wampler, 2012b). Two of the goals of PB are
transparency and accountability. Where these are missing, networking between the
government and NGOs is difficult. The codes are shown in Figure 14.
Donaghy (2010) posited that when the priorities of the citizens are integrated into
state budget priorities, there is the strong perception of transparency by the citizens. In
practicing PB, the government in Ijede demonstrated its willingness to be transparent as
presented by G5 at the one-on-one interview:
We invite people from every sector money is budgeted for. So, in their presence,
the chairman will present the budget and they can see what we are doing with
their money. By the time we passed the budget, it will not be new to them because
they are already aware of what we are doing. As far as I am concerned, we were
transparent in our job.
In demonstrating the importance of transparency and accountability, G2 acknowledged
during the one-on-one interview, “The only incentive you can give them [the citizens] is to
do what you have promised, you must earn their trust, be transparent.”
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Figure 14. Codes Linked with Transparency and Accountability.
In NI’s view, the people need to learn to demand accountability:
Once you teach them on how to engage the government and how to have
constructive criticism, how to demand accountability from the government, then
we are well on our way. The first step to getting people involved in governance is
to first of all expose them to the fact that they are not just the governed but they
are the government. Once they realize that as the electorate, their votes put the
politicians there, it is their right to have accountability from that government.
Willing government. Willingness on the part of the government to respect the
budget priorities of its citizens is essential for successful PB. The community-organizing
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activities of civil society in educating and informing the electorates on procedural and
legal matters need the support and encouragement of the government. The organizers of
the PB process should be willing to consider the convenience of citizens when organizing
for the process (Wampler, 2012b). A willing government willing to negotiate with NGOs
is a prerequisite of a successful PB process. The codes that form the willing government
network are shown in Figure 15.
Participatory budgeting only succeeds where the government is willing to
accommodate the participation of the citizens, and the advocacy of civil society (Fung,
2006; Goldfrank, 2007). G1 submitted, “As civil servants, if the population we have to
deal with is more enlightened about what we are doing, it makes our work easier and
more rewarding.” G3 further suggested,
If we keep doing what is expected of us, providing the people with the services
they need, eventually, some people will notice. They will let the people know that
they can get more if they know how to engage the government and collaborate
with us.” C6 corroborated this willingness by observing, “Whenever the local
government sees us organizing to undertake projects, they become jittery and they
respond by contributing to our efforts. So, we take the initiative, and they follow.
Next time, they start before we start.
Actions for the future. The participants recognize the inadequacy in resources
and networking that might have contributed to the ineffectiveness of NGO advocacy.
This node represents the suggested actions the community could embark upon to
strengthen PB advocacy. The NGOs need to form new partnerships and alliances to
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Figure 15. Codes Linked with Willing Government.

improve the level of resources required to improve advocacy. The codes that form the
network for future actions are in Figure 16.
The participants at the focus group discussions recognized the need to inject fresh
ideas into Ijede Community to assist with empowering the CDAs, the CDC, and the IDF
to help with progressive development of the community. G2 opined,
Development has to be through NGO involvement and on the side of the local
government, we do our best, and we continue to strive to do better because Ijede
should not have three primary schools and the children have to trek for miles to
go to school and to return home.” C9 believed “the CDC should identify areas
where they can open up the community to outsiders because Ijede is a closed
community.
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Figure 16. Codes Linked with Future Actions.

Before the arrival of external NGOs, C6 proposed “…to make sure that this community is
developing, we must continue to with self help, and raising funds through donations from
individual and corporate bodies present within the community.” C7 recommended the
involvement of the youths through extracurricular activities, if possible, “…we can hold
some events in the school and let the children host us.”
During the focus group discussions, several of the participants spoke about the
beauty of Ijede and gentrification of the community to attract external interests. A few
participants echoed G2’s suggestion:
For example, this is the lagoon. Let us develop a very beautiful place for people to
come from all over the country to relax and have fun. Then the whole country will
be interested to know where Ijede is. Someone told me he boarded a ferry from
Lagos Island to Ijede. That was when I was posted here. I was surprised. So this is
a very good tourist attraction, and the community could be developed through
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such a project. That is one. Again, I think they have a local magazine or
newspaper. They need to distribute it beyond the community to let people know
there is a beautiful place called Ijede.
At one of the focus group discussions, C6 typified the general optimism by the
participant:
I think ultimately NGOs will come from outside. As others have said, the
improved caliber of the people in the community as more people move into the
community will eventually attract outside NGOs. And these new people are likely
to have the necessary connections at their disposal to help the community. With
the discussion we are having today, I think in the next few years to come, Ijede
will be in the center of action.
Research Question 3
What local dynamics at Ijede LCDA encourage the involvement of the business
community in the PB process? The purpose of the question was to explore the local
dynamics at Ijede LCDA to encourage the involvement of the business community in the
PB process. Three thematic nodes emerged from the data to address this research
question. According to Lindgreen and Swaen (2010), corporations enhance their public
perception of accountability and social responsibility by undertaking social programs for
the benefit of people living within communities in which they operate. Through corporate
social responsibility (CSR) programs, corporations fill the gaps in services provided by
governments and the needs of communities (Idemudia, 2011).
Community development. The dire necessity for development at Ijede is a
significant driver for the need to encourage the business community to contribute to the
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PB process in Ijede. The involvement of corporations in PB fills the resources gaps
experienced by governments and their communities. The intervention leads to faster
community development. The codes making up this node are in Figure 17.

Figure 17. Codes Linked with Community Development.

At no time did Ijede LCDA invite businesses and corporations operating in the
community to participate in the PB process. At the one-on-one interview, G3 revealed
and described the benefits of involving corporations in PB:
We don’t invite them [businesses and corporations] but I can see that if we invite
them, they can see how we conduct ourselves and how we care about the
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community they have located their business. We have drawn up a program to
have meetings with them monthly or quarterly to rub minds on the way forward.
The participants were aware of the benefits of CSR. Indeed, the community
appears to pursue the tactic albeit with native and uncoordinated approach. At the one-onone interview, C3 informed that:
During the meeting for 2015 budget, it was mentioned that the council should be
in a position to assist to approach corporate organizations to provide electricity,
which the council actually did by relating with Egbin Electricity Company to
ensure power is distributed to this area just as a sort of encouragement.
Electricity supply to the community is unreliable, but it is host to the power plant
supplying electricity to several communities in Southern Nigeria. Ijede is yet to reap the
benefit of the proximity to the supply source. The strategic location of Ijede is beginning
to attract newcomers. C5 is a relative newcomer to Ijede and disclosed during the one-onone interview, “The reason I have remained in Ijede is because of the potential. That has
encouraged me to engage. Like I said, we have the fishing and agricultural communities
and industrial base community, with road and water access.” There is the proposal by the
state government to connect Ijede with metropolitan Lagos. If the government executes
the project, Ijede should experience the inflow of new settlers and economic development
from which the business community could benefit. N1 continued:
The World Bank would not give the money to construct a six-lane highway to
Ikorodu if there is no economic strength or potential in this area and they will not
be thinking of a fourth mainland bridge that will bring traffic from Lagos to Ijede
and Ikorodu axis roads. There is the Lagos state farmland for cattle ranching and
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animal husbandry, rice farm in Imota, a neighboring town so; all these make Ijede
a potential growth town. The fishing industry has not been touched so Lagos State
seems to be encircling Ijede.
For the time being, while the community awaits the government to put super
infrastructure in place, in C1's reflection during the one-on-one interview:
“…communities [are] doing things by themselves and the government is merely
observing and then the government comes to collect taxes on the usage of some of those
projects.” The self-help projects embarked upon by the community are sufficient to
encourage corporations to assist their host community with resources to complete more
projects.
Corporate social responsibility. The vehicle for business community
involvement is through corporate social responsibility. The involvement of corporate
organization in PB process is through CSR. The codes in this network are shown in
Figure 18.
There is the evidence that the business community in Ijede had been responsive to
the community’s requests for assistance. At the one-on-one interview, C4 narrated the
community success at getting companies to act:
The Chairman of CDC went to the contractors that worked on the main road to
Ikorodu, told them about the efforts of the local people to develop the community.
That company became socially responsible and gave us the equipment for 48
hours. The company encouraged the CDC to identify areas where they can open
up the community to other areas. The CDC was encouraged. The progress we
have made so far is through the people’s efforts, not the government.
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Figure 18. Codes Linked with Corporate Social Responsibility.
G6 corroborated C4’s contribution, “The companies provided road construction
equipment like graders, and the oil companies assisted with road construction equipment.
They have given financial assistance to the CDAs. That has been very effective.” Other
participants corroborated the community’s attempt at engaging with corporations to be
more socially responsible. Some participants echoed C1’s account of the community’s
efforts at reaching out to businesses in the community:
About June this year, there was a meeting between my community association
and some corporate organizations to discuss their corporate social responsibility.
We provided a list of what need to be done. We wrote to their headquarters in
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Lagos, and they promised to look into our requests from January 2016. We took
them round the areas, and they promised to start working from January 2016.
The major corporate activities in Ijede may be creating potentially serious
environmental problems. According to N1 during the focus group discussions, the
corporations are giving what might amount to tokenism, considering the environmental
effects of their activities:
Nobody has attempted to assess the environmental impacts of the hydroelectricity
plant and the sand dredging on the lagoon. The community does not have the
required advocates to confront the corporations involved in these activities. The
dredging activity alone should have attracted NGOs interested in the environment,
to be concerned whether the dredging activities could cause erosion, whether it
causes a drop in fishing activities. As I said, the road infrastructure takes a lot of
pressure from the sand-moving trucks, which use the roads that are not designed
for such heavy goods vehicles.
At the focus group discussions, C9 proposed the community organize events to
invite external businesses to extend their marketing programs to Ijede:
In terms of encouraging businesses, maybe we have a mini trade fair for the
companies in and out of Ijede to showcase their goods and services. If trade fair
can bring additional business exposure to the companies in Ijede, that may
encourage them to be socially responsible towards the community.
Limited resources. The unusually high level of scarcity of resources, especially
financial resources, is an important element that should promote and encourage the
involvement of the business community of Ijede in its PB process. A compelling reason
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for corporations to embrace CSR is the scarcity of resources and how best corporations
intervene. The code network that addressed limited resources is shown in Figure 13.
Research Question 4
What sustainability strategies should Ijede LCDA consider for citizen-selected
projects? The purpose of this question was to explore the sustainability strategies for
citizen-selected projects. Two nodes emerged to address this question.
Participatory budgeting in Nigeria, as in other jurisdictions where it is practiced
suffers from scarcity of financial resources to fully support citizen-elected projects.
Where funds run out to complete projects within the same fiscal year in which they were
initiated, the risk of abandoned projects increases. In order to ensure project completion
and sustainability, PB could benefit from medium-term planning rather than single fiscal
year planning. Bryson (2011) posited that medium-term strategy for government
spending in a strategic planning model provides some assurance of project completion
and sustainability. Issues relating to this research questions were not discussed during the
focus group discussions because it was directed only at participants representing the
government.
Strategic planning. Medium to long-term planning, as is the practice in strategic
planning, is a sustainability strategy identified by the participants to prevent partisan
intervention by politicians especially after regime change. Projects selected by citizens in
a PB process are prone to abandonment especially when regime change occurs. Strategic
planning is one strategic to reduce the risk. The codes that address this question are in
Figure 19.
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Figure 19. Codes Linked with Strategic Planning.

Participants representing civil servants and politicians responded to questions
relating to project sustainability. G3 appreciated the significance of strategic planning,
contextually associating it with the citizens’ perception of confidence in the government:
The community has more confidence in the government when they know that
such longer-term projects have the commitment of any government that comes in.
For instance, we are in October, if the government wants to embark on a road
project, the people will have the confidence that the project will be completed, if
not this year, next year because it is already in the plans for the estimated time it
will take to construct the road. It is already in the budgets. Without the long-term
planning, the people will be skeptical and say, don’t mind them, before February
they will abandon it, but if there is the strategic plan, the community will have
confidence that it will be completed.
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G7 attributed sustainability issues to the nature of democracy itself:
Politicians have their own agenda and their predecessors’ programs do not excite
them. They want to abandon what they meet on ground and start funding their
own programs. Often times, when they say continuity and there is a change in
government, the new government may not be interested in some projects, so they
tend to abandon them.
The tenure and timing of strategic plan are just as important as its implementation. G2
suggested,
If I were to be part of the policy formulators, I would say since the local
government chairmen have three-year tenure, the strategic plan should be six
years so that, at least, after three years there will be continuity. There will be no
abandoned projects. If the new government knows there is six-year plan that has
run for three years, I think they will follow it.
G1 examined the topic from the problem local governments have in planning their
finances, which fluctuates due to factors beyond the control of the local governments, but
disagrees with a six-year term:
Strategic planning would go a long way in assisting the local government to plan
its financing. Elected local officials have three-year tenure, and it will make sense
if we were to have stakeholders’ priorities that will span a three-year plan for the
life of each legislature. We will be able to plan for quality projects that can be
completed within the three years into the budget. That will make sense.
Sustainability. This node represents project sustainability involving regular
maintenance of citizen elected projects. Project sustainability is important where
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resources are limited, and new projects are not commonplace. The codes in this network
are shown in Figure 20.
Project sustainability involves completing a project and maintaining it for as long
as it is needed and available for the citizens. G2 believed local government employees
still have a lot to learn to serve the people efficiently:
We need more training, constant training, and this continuity; the government
coming in should read the blueprint of the past government and really follow it. That will
not disturb them from doing their own program, just to continue, not to dump what others
have done.

Figure 20. Codes Linked with Sustainability.
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C1 and C8 addressed the issue of project sustainability from the perspectives of the
citizens. They believed the government had done very little in terms of project
implementation. The citizens through self help, a common theme throughout the data
collection process, had achieved the little development the community currently enjoys.
C8 complained that the government failed to reimburse the community for all the selfhelp projects it had undertaken, contrary to the arrangement make by the state with CDCs
all over the state:
Some of those self-help projects need attention. The government can, at the very
least, provide some funds year in year out to make sure that they help the
community to maintain these projects.
C1 was concerned the community would like to do more self-help projects:
…but the ones we have already done now need maintenance. Look at the drainage
we constructed: yes, they have lasted well, but they need maintenance. The
government does not include in their annual budgets the cost of maintaining these
projects that we used our own efforts to build. They owe us money they promised
they will pay for the self-help projects they approve, but till today, nothing.
The major drawback with self-help projects, according to C4, is:
Who will maintain them? We have used our meager resources and the toil of our
people to build these projects. The least the government can do is to ensure that
there is provision for maintaining these projects, but as you know, in Nigeria, we
lack maintenance culture.
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Summary of Key Lessons Learned
An overarching revelation by the data analysis was that Ijede LCDA did not
follow a structured or well-designed participatory budgeting process. Although the
process was not identified as participatory budgeting, the process, as revealed by the
individual interviews, was over simplified to mean stakeholders’ meeting. The
unstructured nature of the process was responsible for the absence of documents relating
to prior PB process. Minutes of the minutes were not maintained, and attendance was not
recorded. Decisions taken at the stakeholders’ meetings were said to be included in the
budget. Therefore, the finding of research question 1 is, NGOs did not play any roles in
the design of participatory budgeting in Ijede.
The budget documents available did not indicate any specific projects or items of
capital expenditure that were citizen-selected projects. The absence of structure to the
process goes to the heart of Avritzer’s (2009) theory of participatory institutions and civil
society. For participatory democracy to be effective, there should be some strong
interplay between institutional design, the political society, and an active civil society.
The absence anyone of the three weakens participatory democracy. In the particular case
of Ijede, the absence of strong institutional design was exacerbated by the non-inclusion
of NGOs in the call notices inviting stakeholders to the process. Serendipitously, active
NGOs existed in Ijede, but the CDAs, the CDC, and the IDF all constituted by the local
citizens, were not recognized as such. The fact of their true statuses emerged during the
first of the focus group discussions and confirmed during the second group discussion.
Regarding research question 2, the interview questions revealed the need for help
from professional NGOs from outside the community to organize the community for
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better participation in democracy. At the same time, all the participants recognized the
challenge of getting external assistance. The members of the CDC, five of whom were
participants in this study, had the time to deliberate before the group discussions. Indeed,
a meeting of the CDC was scheduled a day before the focus group discussions took place.
The participants appeared determined to get the process to work for the benefit of the
community.
At the focus group discussions, the dominant topic was how to attract professional
NGOs to the community to train, educate, and empower the citizens. The participants
recognized they lacked the skills the process required. There were several suggestions on
the strategies to adopt for professional NGOs in Lagos to pay attention to Ijede. Having
overcome the confusion around the name and nature of PB, the participants focused their
attention on how to develop Ijede to attract interests from the world at large. The CDC
did much to motivate the people to action. It mobilized the community to undertake
several projects through the efforts of the people contributing personal resources and
communal labor. This strategy was what the CDC considered along with organizing
business and cultural expositions to attract attention to the community, which although
still underdeveloped, holds first-time visitors in awe of its aquatic splendor.
At the focus group discussions, there appeared to be the awakening of some
consciousness and the need to project the community to attract investors, NGOs and
governments. For the community’s strategy to work, the citizens need education and
training, not only for participation in PB but also to acquire networking skills. Such skills
are required at the state level where there might be some opportunities for CDCs from
more affluent communities across the state to provide information and share experiences.
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In addressing research question 3, the participants appeared unsatisfied with the
corporate social responsibility efforts of the major businesses in the community. Without
some coordinated strategy to maximize the willingness of some of the corporations to
assist the community, the participants at the one-on-one interviews appeared somewhat
satisfied with the token largesse the community received. At the group discussions, the
need to get more out of the businesses was discussed. The community lacked the skill to
advocate for more contributions. The participants believed the involvement of
professional NGOs with expertise in working with rural communities could encourage
businesses to do more.
Research question 4 was for the participants representing civil servants and
elected government officials during the one-on-one interview sessions. The participants
were unanimous in supporting measures to protect citizen-selected projects from
abandonment or non-implementation from a new government in the event of regime
change. The consensus was for the government to adopt medium-term strategic planning
to ensure the execution, completion, and sustainability of citizen-selected projects by
earmarking funds for the completion of projects without interference from a new
government. Considering the concerns of citizen participants over the maintenance and
sustainability of projects the community undertook through self-help efforts, this strategy
could help the government protect and preserve the projects undertaken by the citizens.
Research Data Trustworthiness
To attain what Patton (2002) described as particularity, “doing justice to the
integrity of unique cases,” the platform for trustworthiness of the data collected for this
study was set with the acknowledgment that the nature of the data and the iterative
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process of analyzing the data are grounded in my subjective researcher judgment (p.
546). To understand the constructions of meanings of the participants, I brought my deep
understanding of the context, content, and culture of the participants, all of which were
critical to interpreting the meanings and the experiences the participants projected.
Adequacy of the Data Corpus
I relied on multiple evidential sources for the data corpus to be adequate and for
the result of this study to be valid. I collected adequate amount of evidence from the
information provided by the 15 participants. There was adequate variety in the typology
of evidence, which consisted of the one-on-one interviews, focus group discussions, and
documents provided by the local government. Another adequacy of evidence included
intuitive interpretation of the data, and the presentation of the interpretation of the
findings to meet trustworthiness criteria.
Therefore, I located the validity of the result of this study within qualitative
paradigmatic reinforcements of multiple data sources including one-on-one interviewing
of the 15 participants, two focus group discussions, and the review of budget documents
provided by the local government. By establishing some nexus between these data
sources during data analysis, I established another positivist paradigmatic praxis of data
triangulation (Patton 2002). The contextual meanings of the participants were dominant
throughout the data analysis, the participants having been provided the interview
transcripts for member checking to support the validation of their understanding and the
result of this study.
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Discrepant Data
Research question 1 and research question 2 were designed to address the
sustainability of participatory budgeting as a democratic institution. “Legal framework”
was a code from the literature review, the revelation of which was expected in the data.
An essential element of for the sustainability of participatory budgeting is the legal
instrumentality that entrenches the process and protects it from disruption or termination
by an unsympathetic government. Participatory budgeting had survived assaults from
Right-wing governments in parts of Brazil because the process had the necessary legal
framework that institutionalized it (Rodgers, 2010; Wampler & Hartz-Karp, 2012). The
data did not reveal such enabling legal framework. Participatory budgeting is fragile and
tenuous without the proper legislation to protect it. Perhaps the absence of the legal
framework simplified the decision for the local government to suspend the process for
two years between 2012 and 2013 because it was expedient to sidetrack the process.
Summary
In this chapter, articulated the results of the study. I also presented the data
collection process, at the locus in quo, the transcription of the interviews from audio
recordings, and the analysis of the interview transcripts. I commenced data analysis by
identifying precodes from the theoretical and conceptual frameworks, and from the
literature review. I proceeded to interpret the data according to the research questions to
which they corresponded.
I used research question 1 to interrogate the roles of NGOs in the design structure
of the participatory process at Ijede LCDA. The data revealed the lack of deliberate
attempt to involve NGOs in the process. The general belief was there were no NGOs in
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Ijede. However, there were the CDAs, the CDC and the IDF, all of which were formed by
the citizens to perform as NGOs. Serendipitously, the government invited the CDAs and
the CDC as representatives of the citizens to participate in the process, but without their
involvement in the process design.
Research question 2 uncovered the resource framework and network that are
necessary for effective PB advocacy at Ijede LCDA. The data revealed the intimate
nature of the relationship between the CDC, which has stood as advocates for the
community in the absence of professional NGOs. The participants acknowledged the
need for training and education in civic responsibilities. There was the recognition of the
need to learn how to engage the government for effective participation. The participants
also identified some inhibitors to participation such as poverty, lack of or inadequate
resources for the local government and the community, and illiteracy. The presence of
these inhibitors hindered the ability of the people to demand accountability and
transparency from the government, which by all accounts, was willing to conduct PB as
effectively as it could.
I applied research question 3 to explore the possible local dynamics at Ijede
LCDA that could encourage the involvement of the business community in the PB
process. The data indicated lackluster efforts by the major corporate organizations
operating in the community. The participants appreciated that the commercial activities
of the corporations, which include hydroelectricity and sand dredging from the lagoon,
pose potential environmental problems for the community. Most of the participants
believed the corporations have contributed a much to the community while others
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believed the corporations should be more responsible to their host community because of
the potential hazards to which the community is exposed.
Research question 4 was exploratory in nature and it was intended for the
government participants only. The question investigated the sustainability strategies Ijede
LCDA could consider for citizen-selected projects. The consensus was the need for
medium-term budget planning of three years. The participants believed the introduction
of strategic planning at the local government level could eliminate the potential for the
abandonment of projects by new governments unsympathetic to ongoing or uncompleted
projects initiated by preceding administrations.
In Chapter 5, I probe deeper into the findings of this study and conclude with
implication for social change, and recommendations for further research.
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
Introduction
The purpose of this qualitative case study was to explore the role of civil society
in educating and empowering the citizens of Ijede LCDA to participate effectively in the
budgetary decision-making processes
To achieve this purpose, I conducted 15 one-on-one interviews and two focus
group discussions. The purpose of the study was achieved by using the following
interrogating research questions:
RQ1: What roles do nongovernmental organizations play in the design structure of the
PB process at Ijede LCDA?
RQ2: What resource framework and network are necessary for effective PB advocacy at
Ijede LCDA?
RQ3: What local dynamics at Ijede LCDA encourage the involvement of the business
community in the PB process?
RQ4: What sustainability strategies should Ijede LCDA consider for citizen-selected
projects?
In this chapter, I recapitulate the data collection strategy and data analysis,
provide insight into themes emerging from the data, and finally, I provide the study
results.
Study Overview
The foundations of this study were the theoretical framework of participatory
institutions and civil society and the conceptual framework of participatory budgeting.
The theory of participatory institutions and civil society connects the tripartite
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relationships between civil society, political society, and institutional design (Avritzer,
2009). These three approaches to democratic governance do not always create active
public engagement and equitable distribution of public services unless local peculiarities
form the basis of their application. Participatory budgeting is a democratic process that
provides the opportunity for citizens to interact with the government by actively engaging
in decision making on fiscal planning priorities (Fischer, 2012; Pateman, 2012).
Ijede is a semi-rural town and its proximity to Lagos conurbation has attracted
low-income and middle-class dwellers who wish to escape the high property and rental
costs of the metropolis. Residents of Ijede commute by ferry to the commercial hub of
Lagos, a journey of less than 15 minutes (Ilesanmi, 2010). The presence of Egbin
Hydroelectricity Plant, dredging activities on the Lagos Lagoon, a federal governmentowned gas company, an oil palm plantation, and some housing estates owned by some of
the corporations have sustained the economic activities of Ijede. The majority of the
inhabitants of Ijede are poor. The citizens rely on the LCDA to implement policies that
would alleviate poverty and improve the local economy.
It is not entirely clear when PB was introduced in Ijede LCDA. With this study, I
set out to investigate whether and how civil society could empower citizens of Ijede to
participate in the participatory budgeting process.
The findings of this study come from the views of the residents of Ijede. The
participants characterized their perceptions of participatory budgeting as a process they
need to learn. They acknowledge the expediency to reach out to professional NGOs to
provide training and education to empower them to engage effectively with the
government. Ijede has the potential to attract interests from outside the community. The
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participants were committed to developing the community through their self-help efforts
and through informed involvement in participatory budgeting. By transforming these
ideas into action, participatory democracy could be strengthened through effective
participatory budgeting. In the remainder of this chapter, I discuss the results and findings
of this research and the implications for social change. Finally, I discuss
recommendations for further research.
Discussion: Research Question 1
Research question 1 was: what roles do NGOs play in the design structure of the
PB process at Ijede LCDA? An effective institutional design should consider and include
civic mobilization, stable financial pathways, and consistent organizational arrangements
(Hilmer, 2010; Wampler, 2012b). The first finding is the poor PB design at Ijede LCDA.
The understanding of the participants representing the government was that there were no
NGOs in Ijede. For this reason, the government did not involve the Community
Development Associations (CDAs) the Community Development Committee (CDC), and
the Ijede Development Foundation (IDF) in designing the PB process in Ijede. The lack
of recognition of these entities as NGOs by the local government and the entities
themselves was responsible in part for their non-inclusion in the design of PB at the local
government level.
Acharya (2004) posited that community-based organizations (CBOs) are probably
the most effective for participatory budgeting because they have a better understanding of
local issues than advocacy NGOs, which often fail to empower the people with necessary
skills for participation. Nongovernmental organizations participate when they have a
relationship with the government or sponsors. Therefore, CBOs are the lowest level of
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NGOs to engage the government. However, without the requisite skills, CBOs are
ineffective in self-representation and they might inadvertently legitimize state actions
against their wellbeing (Grajzl & Murrell, 2009). The failure to recognize the CBOs as
NGOs was a fundamental flaw in the PB design at Ijede. The state, according to Bherer
(2010), could correct this flaw by strengthening the community organizations through
state-organized education and training arrangements.
The second finding is that the government did not have a communication strategy
to explain the history, the purpose, and the process of PB to the citizens. Civic
mobilization established through effective communication is one of the pillars of
institutional design (Hilmer, 2010; Wampler, 2012b). The absence of strategic
communication led to a misunderstanding among the citizens about the meaning and
purpose of the PB process.
To the citizens’ understandings, their PB experiences were annual stakeholders
meetings with the local government for the presentation of annual budgets, which took
account of their chosen projects. Given the belief that there was no NGO presence in the
community, the local government, should have promoted the process by organizing
informational sessions to educate the citizens about citizen roles and responsibilities in
the process. This oversight weakened the PB design in the community and diminished the
veracity of the intended outcome of active citizen engagement and the participation in
public policy decisions that affected their daily lives.
The third finding is the weakness in the design of PB was due to inadequate or
nonexistant training provided to government officials organizing the PB process. The
civil servants, especially those with PB experiences from other local governments, were
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better informed about the process than the politicians were. Regular training and updates
on ideas that work in other local governments in Lagos State would empower the
organizers to organize better PB processes. Although the government is not expected to
play the role of NGOs, ensuring that the citizens play their roles in the process would
enable the local government to perform its role as mandated by the state government.
The fourth finding addresses the need for educational empowerment and the
enlightenment of the citizens. Most of the citizens in Ijede are active members of the
CDAs. The CDC regularly holds meetings with other CDCs around the state. Through its
state level interactions, the CDC could reach out to other CDCs for training, which could
be sponsored by the Lagos State Ministry of Local Governments, the organizers of the
state CDC meetings.
The enlightenment of the citizens prepares the local NGOs to perform impactful
advocacy roles. Ijede Development Foundation would benefit from this arrangement, as
many of the members of the CDC are also members of the IDF. The community leaders,
through the CDC, regularly organize the citizens to execute developmental projects that
are funded and performed by the citizens. Although the state government should have
compensated the community for its efforts, the state failed to commit to this expectation.
The citizens require empowerment programs that could teach them how to negotiate the
bureaucratic terrain that fails to meet the expectations of the community and slows its
ability to develop.
The IDF should play a leadership role in reaching out to professional NGOs to
provide advocacy services to Ijede, albeit on ad hoc basis. The citizens of Ijede suggested
various ideas to energize the community through socio-cultural events, tourism, funfair,
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and gentrification projects. The IDF is in the best position to lead the efforts to transform
Ijede from obscurity to some prominence. In spite of their PB experiences, it was unclear
how much of participatory democracy civil servants have learned and put into practice
for the benefit of the community.
The fifth finding concerns project funding, oversight, and evaluation. According
to Adesopo (2011), poor funding for PB and the absence of project oversight and
evaluation carried out by the citizens are two of the reasons for the ineffectiveness of PB.
This finding is a direct effect of the lack of awareness of the roles of citizens in a welldesigned PB process. Having taken the time to evaluate projects desired by the
community, the citizens, under the leadership of the CDC and the IDF, should engage the
government to ensure the implementation of their selected project choices. The
government expended less than 2% of its total revenue on capital projects. It was not
clear from government records how much of the 2% was directed at PB projects, but the
citizens did not demand explanations and analysis of capital expenditures. In other words,
the CDAs, the CDC, the IDF, and individual citizens did not demand accountability of
the government.
The role of the citizens is to hold the government to the contract between the
citizens and the government that is the agreed upon budget that the government presented
to them at a town hall stakeholders’ meeting. The role of the citizens does not end at
identifying projects. They should take an active interest in supervising and ensuring the
completion of projects to the agreed upon specifications.
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Discussion: Research Question 2
Research question 2 asked: what resource framework and network are necessary
for effective PB advocacy at Ijede LCDA? In the particular case of Ijede, and considering
the findings revealed by research question 1, the NGOs in Ijede require greater than the
usual amount of resources and networking to perform advocacy roles in the community.
The first finding is the willingness on the part of the government to permit the PB process
and to encourage its continuity. The local government engaged with the people
periodically and appeared sympathetic to the citizens’ plight including poor road
network, unreliable electricity supply, and low economic activities. Without the
willingness of the government to cede roles to citizens and create the space for civic
engagement, participatory democracy would lose its essence of putting power in the
hands of the people (Dewachter & Molenaers, 2011). However, the CDCs in Lagos State
are creations of the state government. They are embedded in the Lagos State Ministry of
Local Governments, and they might have lost the voice to protest and to protect their
communities.
The IDF is independent of the state, and it should be involved in the community’s
interfacing with the government to reduce the vulnerability that exists in the CDC’s
interaction with the state. In the meantime, more should be done to ensure that the
citizens develop political sophistication and to learn the nuances of democracy.
The second finding is the willingness of the government to cooperate with the
community. This obscures the reality of inadequate resources, thus preventing the
citizens from confronting the government. Adesopo (2011) was particularly concerned
about the diminutive funding local governments in Nigeria make available for PB. Given
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the bloated recurrent expenditures of the local government, the community had little to
gain from the capital expenditure allocation earmarked for physical development in the
community. Since professional NGOs run on resources partly provided by the
government, the local government in Ijede could allocate some funds for the NGOs to
expend towards citizen empowerment specifically designed for participation in the PB
process and for advocacy roles similar to professional NGOs. The local NGOs could
direct such funds towards inviting professional trainers on topics directly relevant to the
PB process and towards advocacy in general.
The IDF is already involved in providing scholarships to children of indigenes in
Ijede. Some of the funds could be directed toward educating the community as a whole
on how to develop the community space to attract more state and federal presence, and to
project the willingness of the community to develop. Ijede is one of the few communities
in Lagos state with available land for residential, industrial, and agricultural
developments. Without a ready work force and the road network for easy access,
investors could be unenthusiastic about locating their operations in the community.
Thirdly, NGOs provide better services to the people when the government is
transparent and accountable. The activism of the NGOs should engender independent and
politically aware citizenry, whose awareness inspires transparency, accountability, and
efficiency (Postigo, 2011). Since the awareness of the NGOs was not strong, a willing
government in Ijede should complement its willingness with its openness in matters of
direct interest to the citizens. In the circumstance where the local government ran out of
funds to implement its budget proposals, it should be as open to disclose its inability to
implement elements of the budget that affect the people directly as it was enthusiastic in
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announcing the budget. When citizens lose trust in the government, getting them to sit at
the table to discuss matters relating to PB would require unnecessary persuasion, and it
might lead to the collapse of the process.
A missing node from the data was the legal framework to strengthen the
networking ability of NGOs with the government. In the absence of a legal framework to
institutionalize the process, efforts of NGOs could be frustrated and undermined by
unfriendly governments. The Lagos State government has not established a legal
framework institutionalizing PB. The fragility of the process manifested when in 2012
and 2013 the local government suspended the process for lack of funds in spite of
budgetary provisions for capital expenditures for those years.
Discussion: Research Question 3
Research question 3 was: what local dynamics at Ijede LCDA encourage the
involvement of the business community in the PB process? Corporate organizations are
capable of committing considerable resources towards the socio-economic development
of their host communities (Fowler, 2012; Lindgreen & Swaen, 2010). When sufficiently
persuaded, corporate organizations do reinvest in communities. Firstly, the businesses
community in Ijede has had minimal impact on the locality. There was no evidence major
businesses voluntarily assisted the community. The businesses appeared willing to accede
to token requests by a community in dire need of a lot of assistance.
In conducting the PB process in Ijede, the organizers had left out local businesses
when inviting participants to the process. By their presence at PB meetings, corporations
are exposed to the needs, the challenges, and efforts of the citizens at making the
community conducive for commerce. While the businesses might not be contending for
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projects, they gain some understanding of the challenges of the environment, and they
appreciate the necessity for whatever demands the community directs at their CSR
programs. The businesses should be as concerned about the wellbeing of their host
community as they are about their workforce and corporate performance. The business
community should be willing to expend some resources to fill apparent gaps between the
needs of the community and the resources of the local government.
Secondly, the requests for corporations to provide assistance under their CSR
programs have been uncoordinated with different communities receiving what might
amount to tokenism from corporations. The corporations are capable of providing better
resources when the requests are coordinated community wide (Idemudia, 2011). There
was the assumption by the citizens that the local government could approach the
corporations on their behalf. In Lagos State, corporations are known to have collaborated
with the government to develop modern infrastructure and city gentrification.
The local NGOs in Ijede should coordinate their requests to the corporations for
investment in community projects rather than providing funds to the state, which
according to Idemudia (2009), are often misdirected and misappropriated. In addition,
CBOs can advance CSR initiatives of corporate organizations by helping to identify what
message to communicate and what other factors are unique to the effectiveness of
communication in the community (Lindgreen & Swaen, 2010). Therefore, the community
could channel its demands on corporations through the government, which is best placed
to negotiate tax write-offs and other incentives for the businesses that participate in
government initiated public-private partnerships (PPP). The PPP strategy is appropriate
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for high-value projects that could be negotiated under Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT)
agreements with businesses inside and outside the community.
The third finding concerns the potential environmental impacts of the Egbin
Hydroelectricity Plant and the dredging companies located in and around Ijede. There has
not been any attempt to assess the environmental footprints of these activities and the
effects they have on the community’s health and wellbeing. While the environmental
consequence of the hydroelectricity plant and the dredging activities might be unknown
without some research, the participants were concerned about the potential adverse effect
on fishing, the mainstay of several of the residents. They were also concerned that the
local fishermen might not have the ability to perceive the immediate causes of
unexpected activities on the lagoon should they occur. The IDF and the CDC should
express their concerns to the Lagos State Environmental Protection Agency to investigate
their concern and issue a protocol to monitor the lagoon regularly for pollutants and to
ensure the protection of the ecology of the lagoon.
Discussion: Research Question 4
Research question 4 asked: what sustainability strategies should Ijede LCDA
consider for citizen-selected projects? Participatory budgeting was an idea born out of the
fundamental concept of participatory democracy (Abers, 2001; Menegat, 2002). Adesopo
(2011) agreed that the prospect for project sustainability is better when fiscal planning or
budgeting co-occur with strategic planning. There is the danger of project abandonment
under participatory budgeting when the project is of high value and spans more than a PB
cycle of one year. The likelihood of change in political party controlling the government
is a threat to project completion and indeed to the PB process. An incoming government
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with no prior understanding or commitment to the process could abandon or discontinue
ongoing projects. According to Schick (2003), fiscal policies are meaningless when
budgets span a single year because budget monitoring is weak and sustainability is
subjugated. The new strategy should encourage sustained and consistent information flow
to all stakeholders, especially when budgeting is a product of strategic planning that
would have involved these stakeholders in the first place (Gollwitzer, 2011).
A major sustainability problem creating fragility for the process was the absence
of a legal framework. A legal framework would protect PB from funds starvation, bypass,
and abandonment by unsympathetic regimes, and suspension and application of the
process by government officials (Alves & Allegretti, 2012). A PB legal framework
institutionalizes the process and opens up the opportunity for process improvements
spearheaded by the government (Avritzer, 2010; Wampler, 2012).
The participants representing the group of politicians and civil servants believed a
medium-term plan of three years would ensure that projects not completed in one fiscal
year would be carried over for completion in the succeeding fiscal years. When a change
in government occurs, sufficient provision will remain in the budget for project
completion before the new government formulates its budget. The medium-term strategy
gives some level of confidence in the government that it would complete the projects it
began.
The second finding referenced the issue of sustainability and maintenance of
projects especially those performed by the community through self-help efforts. The state
government, by its policy, should reimburse the community for the costs of completing
such projects. The state government did not fulfilled its end of the arrangement. The
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citizens had to redirect resources that should have been utilized to develop other projects
to maintain projects already in use. The local NGOs should negotiate with the local
government to earmark some funds in its budget for the maintenance of all projects,
including self-help projects that the government should have owned, had it reimbursed
the community for the costs of the projects.
In the Brazilian experience of PB, governments hostile to the process had three
issues against PB. The issues included the unsustainability of the single-year-span of PB
that did not support sustainable development, the curtailment of citywide strategy by the
parochial interests of the corporations, and the failure of PB to connect the demand for
state funds with PPP investments (Leubolt et al., 2008; Sintomer et al., 2008). To support
the state to supplement the scarce resources of government, there was the call for the
mobilization of private sector investors. While Leubolt et al. saw the focus on large
projects by PPP initiatives as a drawback, PPP initiatives could assist Ijede to develop
more rapidly rather than the stagnant outcomes from small projects that have failed to
improve the immediate locale of the poor. The private sector has always favored longterm fiscal planning, and if they are to contribute to the government’s development
strategy, there should be a concurrence of budget tenures between the two partners
(Schneider & Baquero, 2006).
Implications for Social Change
This study challenged the participants, all of whom were actively engaged in the
affairs of the community, to introspect on their individual and communal contributions.
They spoke with enthusiasm and passion about the community. They were optimistic
about the possibility of their community developing for the good of their families and
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their future. The findings under the four research questions addressed how the
community and the local government could collaborate to make participatory budgeting
achieve its goals of efficiency in the administration of scarce resources and transparency
in governance as suggested by Goldfrank (2007), Heller (2012) and Peruzzotti (2012).
This study exposed the fragility and volatility of PB in the absence of a legal
framework institutionalizing the process. The government of Lagos State could consider
a set of formal rules to protect the sustainability of PB in the state. The framework could
mandate a minimum percentage of the revenue of local governments be reserved for
citizen elected projects. The legal mandate has the potential to elevate PB to the
consciousness of the residents of Lagos State in general.
The findings of this study also indicate the need for the Ijede LCDA to redesign
its participatory budgeting process. The redesigning should take account of the active
presence of the community bases organizations as the advocates of the community.
The local government currently does not engage in strategic planning (SP). By
introducing SP, a redesigned PB process would be conducted during the stakeholders’
conference of SP. The local government should have the capacity to undertake higher
impact projects which implementation might span two or more fiscal years without the
risk of abandonment due to lack of funds or regime change.
There is the dearth of training for the civil servants, the citizens, and the NGOs in
Ijede in areas relevant to PB, negotiations, and community development strategies. Funds
could be targeted at education and training to be provided by professionals. This
educational strategy has the potential to develop better-informed and active electorates
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and civil servants, and it could contribute to the acceleration of development in Ijede
LCDA.
The IDF might become a dominant entity in the forefront of change if it takes the
steps to initiate investor engagement programs. The IDF could negotiate with the Lagos
State government for businesses and corporations in Ijede and beyond, to contract for
PPP of high-value projects under build-operate-transfer (BOT) agreements.
Recommendations
Although the results of this study might be transferable to other communities in
Nigeria and elsewhere, the findings indicate the need to research other rural communities
for local peculiarities of what might be required to strengthen participatory budgeting for
social and economic development in those communities.
Participatory budgeting being an extraction of strategic planning ab initio, further
research could be conducted to understand the effects of funds availability, higher impact
projects, and project sustainability if PB were attached to the medium-term strategic
planning of localities. Additionally, this study revealed the fragility of PB in the absence
of a legal framework to institutionalize the process. Research could be undertaken to
understand the effect of legal frameworks on the effectiveness and sustainability of PB
process in selected municipalities in Nigeria and elsewhere.
Conclusions
Participatory budgeting is a quintessential example of participatory democracy. It
is a political institution that has not attracted sufficient interests among the socially
disadvantaged citizens who stand to benefit the most from being involved in political
discourses. Participatory budgeting gives citizens the opportunity to engage actively with
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the government in decision making on fiscal planning priorities. With this study, I set out
to gain further understanding of the role of civil society in educating and empowering the
citizens of Ijede LCDA to participate effectively in the budgetary decision-making
process. The foundations of this study anchored on Avritzer’s (2009) theory of
participatory institutions, and the concept of participatory budgeting.
In Chapter 2, I used the literature to examine the crucial roles of CSOs. Through
advocacy, CSOs consolidate efforts of communities, groups, and individuals to highlight
concerns for the attention of the state and the larger public. Civil society organizations
have opened up the public sphere to the poor and the voiceless to be part of governance
and public decision making through participatory democracy (Orji, 2009). As shown in
the review of literature in Chapter 2, and as with other participatory democratic
institutions, citizens who participate in PB learn civic activities and responsibilities
through practice, and by so doing, improve the quality of the electorates (Hamlett &
Cobb, 2006). Citizens learn to think in terms of collective goals and benefits rather than
personal gains and selfish agitations.
This study helped to uncover the understanding of the civil servants, and the
elected politicians at the Ijede LCDA that there were no NGOs operating in Ijede to
assume advocacy roles and to prepare the citizens for participation in the PB process.
However, the study revealed the existence of a number of active NGOs, which were not
identified as NGOs primarily because their memberships consisted of local residents.
These NGOs have been responsible for organizing the communities as best they could.
The results further revealed inadequate institutional design in the legal
framework, planning, training, and in the financial resources at the local government, all

192

of which have contributed to weakening the PB process in Ijede LCDA. Particularly,
without a set of formal rules to institutionalize the process, PB is fragile and vulnerable.
Therefore, this study would have achieved positive social change if Lagos State
government could establish a broad system of formal rules to protect the process from
political actors unsympathetic to the process.
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Appendix A: Study Population Criteria
__________________________________________________________________
Criteria

Considerations

Examples

__________________________________________________________________

Inclusive

Elected politicians

Council Chairperson/Counselors

criteria

Employees of the LCDA

Council Manager/Treasurer

Community residents

Community organizers

NGOs in the community

Active NGOs

__________________________________________________________________
Target

Prior PB experience

population

Neighborhood assembly
Ward budget forum

__________________________________________________________________
Accessible

Civil servants

Employees of the LCDA

Population

Elected politicians

Ward counselors

Citizens suggested by

Known prior participants

gatekeeper
Adults only

Male or female aged over 21

__________________________________________________________________
Criteria for

No prior PB experience

Inability to speak/read/write

exclusion

Illiterates

English

Likelihood of prop-out

Unavailability for at least two days

Ethical concern

Expectation of reward
Quid pro quo
Persons with mental disability

__________________________________________________________________

216

Appendix B: Individual Interview Protocol for Resident Citizens
Date of Interview:
Name:
Official Title/
Interest Group:
Responsibilities:
Purpose of interview: As you are aware, the Lagos State government introduced
participatory budgeting to local governments in the state in 2005.
After about 10 years of experience with the process, I am
conducting this research to gain further understanding of the role
of civil society in educating and empowering the citizens of Ijede
LCDA to participate effectively in decision-making processes such
as in participatory budgeting.
The information you provide has the potential to influence how
government arrives at public policy decisions when active
electorates are involved. As more citizens get involved, your
information could improve how citizens negotiate opposing
positions peaceably.
This interview should last no more than an hour and it will center
on your personal experience of participatory budgeting and other
issues associated with the process.
__________________________________________________________________
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Appendix B: continued
IQ/RQ/FQ

Interview Questions for Resident Citizens

__________________________________________________________________

IQ

Participatory budgeting is said to be a democratic process that
provides the opportunity for the electorates to interact with the
state and through participation, citizens actively engaged in
decision-making on fiscal planning priorities and in budgetary
policy formulation. How did you hear about PB?

IQ

In how many PB sessions have you participated or organized?

IQ

What roles did you perform during PB process?

IQ

Describe other community groups or activities in which you have
participated.

IQ

What do you understand to be the objectives of PB?

RQ1

Briefly describe your experiences with PB: the organizing, budget
allocation, project selection and implementation.

FQ

How would you access your contributions to the process? Do you
believe you made a difference to your community?

RQ3

How prepared were you to participate in the process? What was
the nature of the preparation, if any?

FQ

What, if any, were the rules of participation in PB?

FQ

What benefits have accrued to the community as a result of PB?

__________________________________________________________________
Note. IQ = Introductory Question

RQ = Research Question FQ = Follow-up Question
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Appendix C: Individual Interview Protocol for Civil Servants

Date of Interview:
Name:
Official Title/
Interest Group:
Responsibilities:
Purpose of interview: As you are aware, the Lagos State government introduced
participatory budgeting to local governments in the state in 2005.
After about 10 years of experience with the process, I am
conducting this research to gain further understanding of the role
of civil society in educating and empowering the citizens of Ijede
LCDA to participate effectively in decision-making processes such
as in participatory budgeting.
The information you provide has the potential to influence how
government arrives at public policy decisions when active
electorates are involved. As more citizens get involved, your
information could improve how citizens negotiate opposing
positions peaceably.
This interview should last no more than an hour and it will center
on your personal experience of participatory budgeting and other
issues associated with the process.
__________________________________________________________________
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Appendix C: continued
IQ/RQ/FQ

Interview Questions for Civil Servants/Elected Politicians

________________________________________________________________________

IQ

Participatory budgeting is said to be a democratic process that
provides the opportunity for the electorates to interact with the
state and through participation, citizens actively engaged in
decision-making on fiscal planning priorities and in budgetary
policy formulation. How did you hear about PB?

FQ

In how many PB sessions have you participated or organized?

RQ3

What roles did you perform during PB process?

RQ1

Describe in as much detail as you can recall, the process of
organizing a PB session? Tell me what you perceive the citizens
expect from PB?

FQ

How successful would you say PB has been in project
implementation? Why have you been successful or not so
successful in implementing citizen nominated projects?

RQ1

What challenges, if any, have you identified that may be facing
PB? Describe a most difficult moment you recall during the
process?

RQ1

What changes have been introduced to the process since you have
been organizing?

RQ1

How successful have you been at completing PB-selected projects?
What factors, if any, might have prevented project completion, if
projects were not complete?

FQ

In what ways did you influence the process and the decisions on
project selection?
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Appendix C: continued

IQ/RQ/FQ

Interview Questions for Civil Servants

________________________________________________________________________
RQ4

Strategic planning has been described as a deliberate, disciplined
approach to essential decision-making and taking particular actions
that direct the purpose and the survival strategy of an organization.
Strategic planning provides the roadmap to organization leaders to
determine courses of action and to provide the basis for those
actions for long term planning. Given that strategic planning
covers three to five years, how do you imagine longer-term
planning under strategic planning could aid project completion?

FQ

How have you personally benefitted, in terms of information, skills
and attitudes?

RQ1

In what ways do you believe the PB process could be improved?

FQ

Are there any other points of observations, information or
suggestions you would like to share?

__________________________________________________________________
Note. IQ = Introductory Question

RQ = Research Question FQ = Follow-up Question
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Appendix D: Individual Interview Protocol for NGOs
Date of Interview:
Name:
Official Title/
Interest Group:
Responsibilities:
Purpose of

As you are aware, the Lagos State government introduced

Interview

participatory budgeting to local governments in the state in 2005.
After about 10 years of experience with the process, I am
conducting this research to gain further understanding of the role
of civil society in educating and empowering the citizens of Ijede
LCDA to participate effectively in decision-making processes such
as in participatory budgeting.
The information you provide has the potential to influence how
government arrives at public policy decisions when active
electorates are involved. As more citizens get involved, your
information could improve how citizens negotiate opposing
positions peaceably.
This interview should last no more than an hour and it will center
on your personal experience of participatory budgeting and other
issues associated with the process.

__________________________________________________________________

222

Appendix D: continued
IQ/RQ/FQ

Interview Questions for Representatives of NGOs

__________________________________________________________________
IQ

Participatory budgeting is said to be a democratic process that
provides the opportunity for the electorates to interact with the
state and through participation, citizens actively engaged in
decision-making on fiscal planning priorities and in budgetary
policy formulation. How did you hear about PB?

IQ

In how many PB sessions have you participated or organized?

IQ

What roles did you perform during PB process?

RQ3

Describe your NGOs involvement in past PB sessions?

FQ

What expectations, outcomes, or effects do you anticipate for your
involvement?

RQ3

What training programs have you had with PB participants?

RQ3

To what extent would you say the trainings were adequate?

RQ2

What specific resources, (human, financial and material) do you
consider necessary to be involved effectively in PB?

RQ2

What additional resources do you believe are required either from
the government or from other sources?

RQ3

How could your advocacy encourage the business community in
and around the LCDA to provide additional resources (financial,
materials and expertise) to improve the quality and spread of
projects approved at PB sessions?

FQ

How have you personally benefitted, in terms of information, skills
and attitudes?

RQ1

In what ways do you believe the PB process could be improved?
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Appendix D: continued
IQ/RQ/FQ

Interview Questions for Representatives of NGOs

__________________________________________________________________
RQ3

Describe how you have interacted with government officials and the
business community before, during, and after PB sessions?

FQ

Are there any other points of observations, information or suggestions you
would like to share?

__________________________________________________________________
Note. IQ = Introductory Question

RQ = Research Question FQ = Follow-up Question
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Appendix E: Focus Group Interview Protocol

Date of Interview:
Participant 1:
Official Title/Interest group
Participant 2:
Official Title/Interest group
Participant 3:
Official Title/Interest group
Participant 4:
Official Title/Interest group
Participant 5:
Official Title/Interest group
________________________________________________________________________
Purpose of interview:

This is a follow up session to the individual interviews you
each had with me. This interview is to provide the
opportunity to confer with others who have had
participatory budgeting experiences and to reflect on what
your particular experiences mean since your participation.

________________________________________________________________________
RQ1

Considering how PB is currently designed in Ijede, what aspects of
PB do you consider most beneficial and which areas need
improvement?
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Appendix E: continued
RQ1

How would you extend the benefits of your PB experiences to
other areas in the community?

RQ/FQ

Interview Questions for Focus Groups

RQ2

NGOs are to assist the citizens to navigate the process and
negotiate resources with the government. What specific skills are
required but not yet acquired by different stakeholder groups
involved in PB? In what ways can NGOs empower citizens to
improve participation?

RQ1

During the one-on-one interviews, some of you identified certain
challenges that might prevent the community from benefiting the
most out of PB. These include... In what ways could the
community overcome these barriers?

RQ3

What administrative and legal supports do civil society
organizations need in order to support PB in Ijede LCDA?

RQ3

Describe the type of support the business community in and around
Ijede LCDA could provide in support of PB

RQ4

The idea of incorporating PB within the frame of strategic planning
was suggested and discussed during the one-on-one interviews
with politicians, civil servants and NGOs. Let us discuss the
viability of the idea and how it could ensure longer-term planning
to ensure sustainability of citizen-selected projects.

FQ

Are there any other observations you have that might help
improved the PB process?

Note. RQ = Research Question

FQ = Follow-up Question
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Appendix F: Document Review Protocol
Step 1:
Make a list of documents and likely information required from the documents. Consider
sourcing documents from other sources, for example, state government, for inclusion.
Step 2:
Develop a list of relevant attributes in existing record such as date, time, source, authors,
and authorizations.
Step 3:
For each item of required information that could potentially be found in an existing
document, determine alternative sources for same information and the location of those
other sources. Consider accessing the alternative sources.
Step 4:
Develop a document review checklist that can be systematically used by any other
reviewer to ensure consistency of information to be collected, analyzed, and coded.
Include document title, file reference, storage location, and custodian.
Step 5:
Complete the protocol checklist to verify that all useful information has been extracted
and documented.
Step 6:
Document the findings of the reviews noting contradictory information, inconsistent
information from that collected from the interviews.
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Appendix G: continued
Note where documents indicate the existence of other documents that might be relevant
or corroborative.
Step 7:
Collate the review documents and notes for data analysis
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Appendix G: Coding Protocol
Step 1
Transcribe recorded interview, field notes, and public documents;
Step 2:
Format data for coding in Microsoft Word;
Step 3:
Copy formatted data to Atlas.ti;
Step 4:
Level 1 coding: Initial coding and open coding begin with key words or phrases from
literature, theoretic framework and conceptual framework
Level 2 coding: Review codes in Level 1 and develop categories
Level 3 coding: Study codes categorization from Level 2 and refine codes categorization
to develop themes.
Level 4 coding: Develop theoretical concepts emerging from categories and themes and
organize possible answers to research questions.

